VEDANTA-SUTRAS WITH RAMANUJA'S SRÎBHASHYA 50 страница

46. There is injunction of other auxiliary means for him who is such, as in the case of injunction and so on; (the term _mauna_ denoting) according to an alternative meaning a third something.

'Therefore let a Brahmana after he has done with learning wish to stand by a childlike state; and after having done with the childlike state and learning (he is) a Muni' (Bri. Up. III, 5). A doubt arises whether this text enjoins Muni-hood in the same way as it enjoins learning and the childlike state, or merely refers to it as something already established. -- The Purvapakshin holds the latter view on the ground that as 'Muni-hood' and 'learning' both connote knowledge, the word 'Muni' merely refers back to the knowledge already enjoined in the phrase 'after he has done with learning.' For the text presents no word of injunctive force with regard to Muni-hood. -- This view the Sutra controverts. 'For him who is such,' i.e. for those who possess knowledge, 'there is an injunction of a different co-operative factor' 'in the same way as injunctions and the rest.' By the _injunctions_ in the last clause we have to understand the special duties of the different asramas, i.e. sacrifices and the like, and also such qualifications as quietness of mind and the like; and by the 'and the rest' is meant the learning of and pondering on the sacred texts. Stated at length, the meaning of the Sutra then is as follows -- in the same way as texts such as 'him Brahmanas seek to know through the reciting of the Veda, through sacrifices and charity, and so on,' and 'Quiet, subdued,' &c. (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23) enjoin sacrifices and so on, and quietness of mind and the like, as helpful towards knowledge; and as texts such as 'the Self is to be heard, to be pondered upon' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5) mention hearing and pondering as helpful towards knowledge; thus the text under discussion enjoins learning, a childlike state of mind, and Muni-hood as three further different auxiliaries of knowledge. -- 'Muni-hood' does _not_ denote the same thing as 'learning' -- this the Sutra intimates by the clause 'alternatively a third,' i.e. as the word muni is observed alternatively to denote persons such as Vyasa distinguished by their power of profound reflection (manana), the abstract term munihood denotes a third thing different from _learning_ and the 'childlike state.' Hence, although the phrase 'then a Muni' does not contain a word of directly injunctive power, we must all the same understand it in an injunctive sense, viz. 'then let him be or become a Muni'; for Muni-hood is not something previously established. Such munihood is also something different from mere _reflection_ (manana); it is the reiterated representation before the mind of the object of meditation, the idea of that object thus becoming more and more vivid. The meaning of the entire text therefore is as follows. A Brahmana is at first fully to master knowledge, i.e. he is to attain, by means of hearing and pondering, to the knowledge of Brahman in all its fulness and perfection. This is to be effected through the growth of purity of mind and heart, due to the grace of the Lord; for this Smriti declares, 'Neither by the Vedas nor by austerities, and so on, can I be so seen -- ; but by devotion exclusive I may be known' (Bha. Gî. XI, 53-54); and Scripture also says, 'Who has the highest devotion for God' (Svet. Up. VI, 23), and 'That Self cannot be gained by the study of the Veda,' &c. 'He whom the Self chooses by him the Self is to be attained' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 23). After that 'he is to stand by a childlike state'; what this means will be explained further on. And after that he is to be a Muni, i.e. he is to fix his thoughts so exclusively and persistently on Brahman as to attain to the mode of knowledge called meditation. Having by the employment of these three means reached true knowledge he -- the text goes on to say -- having done with amauna and mauna is a Brahmana. Amauna, i.e. non-mauna, denotes all the auxiliaries of knowledge different from mauna: employing these and mauna as well he reaches the highest goal of knowledge. And, the text further says, there is no other means but those stated whereby to become such, i.e. a true Brahmana. The entire text thus evidently means to enjoin on any one standing within any asrama learning, a childlike state, and mauna as auxiliary means of knowledge, in addition to sacrifices and the other special duties of the asramas. -- But, an objection is raised, if knowledge, aided by panditya, and so on, and thus being auxiliary to the action of the special duties of the asramas, is thus declared to be the means of attaining to Brahman; how then are we to understand the Chandogya's declaring that a man, in order to attain to Brahman, is throughout his life to carry on the duties of a householder [FOOTNOTE 711: 1]? -- To this the next Sutra replies.

[FOOTNOTE 711:1. Ch. Up. VIII, 13.]

47. But on account of the existence (of knowledge) in all, there is winding up with the householder.

As knowledge belongs to the members of all asramas it belongs to the householder also, and for this reason the Upanishad winds up with the latter. This winding up therefore is meant to illustrate the duties (not of the householder only, but) of the members of all asramas. Analogously in the text under discussion (Bri. Up. III, 5) the clause 'A Brahmana having risen above the desire for sons, the desire for wealth, and the desire for worlds, wanders about as a mendicant,' intimates duties belonging exclusively to the condition of the wandering beggar, and then the subsequent clause 'therefore let a Brahmana having done with learning,' &c., enjoins panditya, balya, and mauna (not as incumbent on the parivrajaka only, but) as illustrating the duties of all asramas. -- This the next Sutra explicitly declares.

48. On account of the others also being taught, in the same way as the condition of the Muni.

The injunction, on him who has passed beyond all desire, of mauna preceded by parivrajya (wandering about as a mendicant), is meant to illustrate the duties of all asramas. For the duties of the other asramas are taught by Scripture no less than those of the Muni (and the householder). Similarly it was shown above that in the text 'There are three branches of sacred duty -- he who is founded on Brahman goes to immortality,' the term 'founded on Brahman' applies equally to members of all asramas. -- It therefore remains a settled conclusion that the text under discussion enjoins panditya, balya, and mauna as being auxiliaries to knowledge in the same way as the other duties of the asramas, such as sacrifices and the rest. -- Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the injunction of other auxiliaries.'

49. Not manifesting itself; on account of the connexion.

In the text discussed above we meet with the word 'balya,' which may mean either 'being a child' or 'being and doing like a child.' The former meaning is excluded, as that particular age which is called childhood cannot be assumed at will. With regard to the latter meaning, however, a doubt arises, viz. whether the text means to say that he who aims at perfect knowledge is to assume all the ways of a child, as e.g. its wilful behaviour, or only its freedom from pride and the like. -- The former, the Purvapakshin maintains. For the text gives no specification, and texts enjoining restraints of different kinds (on the man desirous of knowledge) are sublated by this specific text which enjoins him to be in all points like a child. -- This view the Sutra disposes of. 'Not manifesting itself.' That aspect of a child's nature which consists in the child not manifesting its nature (viz. in pride, arrogance, and so on), the man aiming at true knowledge is to make his own. 'On account of connexion,' i.e. because thus only the 'balya' of the text gives a possible sense. The other characteristic features of 'childhood' the texts declare to be opposed to knowledge, 'He who has not turned away from wicked conduct, who is not tranquil and attentive, or whose mind is not at peace, he can never attain the Self by knowledge' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 24); 'When food is pure, the whole nature becomes pure' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2), and so on. -- Here terminates the adhikarana of 'non-manifestation.'

50. What belongs to this world, there being no obstruction at hand; as this is seen.

Knowledge, as enjoined by Scripture, is twofold, having for its fruit either exaltation within the sphere of the Samsara, or final Release. With regard to the former the question arises whether it springs up only immediately subsequent to the good works which are the means to bring it about; or, indefinitely, either subsequent to such works or at some later time. -- The Purvapakshin holds the former view. A man reaches knowledge through his good deeds only, as the Lord himself declares, 'Four kinds of men doing good works worship me,' &c.(Bha. Gî. VII, 16); and when those works have been accomplished there is no reason why the result, i.e. knowledge, should be delayed. -- This view the Sutra disposes of. 'What is comprised in this world,' i.e. meditation, the result of

which is worldly exaltation, springs up immediately after the works to which it is due, in case of there being no other works of greater strength obstructing the rise of knowledge; but if there is an obstruction of the latter kind, knowledge springs up later on only. 'For this is seen,' i.e. Scripture acknowledges the effects of such obstruction; for a statement such as 'what he does with knowledge, with faith, with the Upanishad that is more vigorous,' means that works joined with the knowledge of the Udgîtha, and so on, produce their results without obstruction (which implies that the action of other works is liable to be obstructed). -- Here terminates the adhikarana of 'what belongs to this world.'

51. In the same way there is non-determination with regard to what has Release for its result; that condition being ascertained, that condition being ascertained.

So likewise in the case of the origination, through works of very great merit, of such knowledge as has for its result final Release, the time is not definitely fixed; for here also there is ascertained the same condition, viz. the termination of the obstruction presented by other works. A further doubt might in this case be raised on the ground that such works as give rise to knowledge leading to final Release are stronger than all other works, and therefore not liable to obstruction. But this doubt is disposed of by the reflection that even in the case of a man knowing Brahman there may exist previous evil deeds of overpowering strength. -- The repetition of the last words of the Sutra indicates the completion of the adhyaya. -- Here terminates the adhikarana of 'what has Release for its result.'

FOURTH ADHYAYA

FIRST PADA.

1. Repetition, on account of the text teaching (what has to be done more than once).

The third adhyaya was concerned with the consideration of meditation, together with its means. The Sutras now enter on a consideration of the results of meditation, after a further preliminary clearing up of the nature of meditation. The question here arises whether the act of knowledge of Brahman inculcated in Vedanta-texts, such as 'He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest,' 'Having known him thus he passes beyond death,' 'He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman,' is, in the view of Scripture, to be performed once only, or to be repeated more than once. -- Once suffices, the Purvapakshin maintains; for as the text enjoins nothing more than knowing there is no authority for a repetition of the act. Nor can it be said that the act of knowing, analogous to the act of beating the rice-grains until they are freed from the husks, is a visible means towards effecting the intuition of Brahman, and hence must, like the beating, be repeated until the effect is accomplished; for knowing is not a visible means towards anything. Such acts as the Jyotishtoma sacrifice and the knowledge inculcated in the Vedanta-texts are alike of the nature of conciliation of the Supreme Person; through whom thus conciliated man obtains all that is beneficial to him, viz. religious duty, wealth, pleasure, and final Release. This has been shown under III, 2, 38. The meaning of Scripture therefore is accomplished by performing the act of knowledge once only, as the Jyotishtoma is performed once. -- This view the Sutra sets aside. The meaning of Scripture is fulfilled only by repeated acts of knowledge 'on account of teaching,' i.e. because the teaching of Scripture is conveyed by means of the term 'knowing' (vedana), which is synonymous with meditating (dhyana, upasana). That these terms are so synonymous appears from the fact that the verbs vid, upas, dhyai are in one and the same text used with reference to one and the same object of knowledge. A text begins, e. g. 'Let him meditate (upasîta) on mind as Brahman,' and concludes 'he who knows (veda) this shines, warms,' &c. (Ch. Up. III, 18). In the same way the knowledge of Raikva is at first referred to by means of vid, 'He who knows (veda) what he knows is thus spoken of by me,' and further on by means of upas,'teach me the deity on which you meditate' (Ch. Up. IV, 1, 2). Similarly texts which have the same meaning as the text 'He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest' -- viz. 'the Self should be seen, be heard, be reflected on, be meditated upon (nididhyasitavya)' -- 'Then he sees him meditating (dhyayamana) on him as without parts' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 8), and others -- use the verb dhyai to express the meaning of vid. Now dhyai means to think of something not in the way of mere representation (smriti), but in the way of _continued_ representation. And upas has the same meaning; for we see it used in the sense of thinking with uninterrupted concentration of the mind on one object. We therefore conclude that as the verb 'vid' is used interchangeably with dhyai and upas, the mental activity referred to in texts such as 'he knows Brahman' and the like is an often-repeated continuous representation.

2. And on account of an inferential mark.

Inferential mark here means Smriti. Smriti also declares that that knowledge which effects Release is of the nature of continued representation. Meditation therefore has to be repeated. -- Here terminates the adhikarana of 'repetition.'

3. But as the Self; this (the ancient Devotees) acknowledge (since the texts) make (them) apprehend (in that way).

The following point is now taken into consideration. Is Brahman to be meditated upon as something different from the meditating Devotee, or as the Self of the latter? -- The Purvapakshin holds the former view. For, he says, the individual soul is something different from Brahman; as has been proved under II, 1, 22; III, 4, 8; I, 1, 15. And Brahman must be meditated upon as it truly is; for if it is meditated upon under an unreal aspect, the attaining to Brahman also will not be real, according to the principle expressed in the text, 'According as a man's thought is in this world, so will he be when he has departed this life' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 1). This view the Sutra sets aside. Brahman is rather to be meditated upon as being the Self of the meditating Devotee. As the meditating individual soul is the Self of its own body, so the highest Brahman is the Self of the individual soul -- this is the proper form of meditation. -- Why? Because the great Devotees of olden times acknowledged this to be the true nature of meditation; compare the text 'Then I am indeed thou, holy divinity, and thou art me.' -- But how can the Devotees claim that Brahman which is a different being is their 'Ego'? -- Because the texts enable them to apprehend this relation as one free from contradiction. 'He who dwelling within the Self is different from the Self, whom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body, who rules the Self from within; he is thy Self, the inner ruler, the immortal one'(Bri. Up. III, 7, 3); 'In the True all these beings have their root, they dwell in the True, they rest in the True; -- in that all that exists has its Self' (Kh. Up. VI, 8); 'All this indeed is Brahman' (Kh. Up. III, 14, 1) -- all these texts teach that all sentient and non- sentient beings spring from Brahman, are merged in him, breathe through him, are ruled by him, constitute his body; so that he is the Self of all of them. In the same way therefore as, on the basis of the fact that the individual soul occupies with regard to the body the position of a Self, we form such judgments of co-ordination as 'I am a god -- I am a man'; the fact of the individual Self being of the nature of Self justifies us in viewing our own Ego as belonging to the highest Self. On the presupposition of all ideas being finally based on Brahman and hence all words also finally denoting Brahman, the texts therefore make such statements of mutual implication as 'I am thou, O holy divinity, and thou art me.' On this view of the relation of individual soul and highest Self there is no real contradiction between two, apparently contradictory, sets of texts, viz. those on the one hand which negative the view of the soul being different from the highest Self, 'Now if a man meditates upon another divinity, thinking "the divinity is one and I another," he does not know'; 'He is incomplete, let him meditate upon Him as the Self'; 'Everything abandons him who views anything apart from the Self (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10; 7-II, 4, 6); and on the other hand those texts which set forth the view of the soul and the highest Self being different entities, 'Thinking of the (individual) Self and the Mover as different'(Svet. Up. I, 6). For our view implies a denial of difference in so far as the individual 'I' is of the nature of the Self; and it implies an acknowledgment of difference in so far as it allows the highest Self to differ from the individual soul in the same way as the latter differs from its body. The clause 'he is incomplete' (in one of the texts quoted above) refers to the fact that Brahman which is different from the soul constitutes the Self of the soul, while the soul constitutes the body of Brahman. -- It thus remains a settled conclusion that Brahman is to be meditated upon as constituting the Self of the meditating Devotee. -- Here terminates the adhikarana of 'meditation under the aspect of Self.'

4. Not in the symbol; for (the symbol) is not that one (i.e. the Self of the Devotee).

'Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 1); 'He who meditates on name as Brahman' (Ch. Up. VII, 15) -- with regard to these and similar meditations on outward symbols (pratîka) of Brahman there arises a doubt, viz. whether in them the symbols are to be thought of as of the nature of Self or not. The Purvapakshin holds the former view. For, he says, in form those injunctions do not differ from other injunctions of meditation on Brahman, and Brahman, as we have seen, constitutes the Self of the meditating Devotee. -- This view the Sutra sets aside. A pratîka cannot be meditated on as being of the nature of Self; for the pratîka is not the Self of the meditating Devotee. What, in those meditations, is to be meditated upon is the pratîka only, not Brahman: the latter enters into the meditation only as qualifying its aspect. For by a meditation on a pratîka we understand a meditation in which something that is not Brahman is viewed under the aspect of Brahman, and as the pratîka -- the object of meditation -- is not the Self of the Devotee it cannot be viewed under that form. -- But an objection is raised here also, it is Brahman which is the real object of meditation; for where Brahman _may_ be viewed as the object of meditation, it is inappropriate to assume as objects non-sentient things of small power such as the mind, and so on. The object of meditation therefore is Brahman viewed under the aspect of mind, and so on. -- This objection the

next Sutra disposes of.

5. The view of Brahman, on account of superiority.

The view of Brahman may appropriately be superimposed on mind and the like; but not the view of mind, and so on, on Brahman. For Brahman is something superior to mind, and so on; while the latter are inferior to Brahman. To view a superior person, a prince e.g., as a servant would be lowering; while, on the other hand, to view a servant as a prince is exalting. -- Here terminates the adhikarana of 'symbols.'

6. And the ideas of Aditya and the rest on the member; on account of this being rational.

'He who shines up there let a man meditate on him as the Udgîtha' (Ch. Up. I, 3, 1). -- With regard to this and similar meditations connected with subordinate parts of sacrificial performances there arises the doubt whether the idea of Aditya and so on has to be superimposed on the subordinate part of the sacrifice, such as the Udgîtha, or vice versa (i. e. whether Aditya should be meditated upon under the aspect of the Udgîtha, or vice versa). -- The Purvapakshin holds the former view. For the general principle is that the lower being should be viewed under the aspect of the higher, and the Udgîtha and so on, which are parts of the sacrifices through which certain results are effected, are superior to the divinities who do not accomplish any result. -- Of this view the Sutra disposes. The ideas of Aditya and so on are to be superimposed on the 'members,' i.e. the Udgîtha and so on, which are constituent members of the sacrifices; because of the gods only superiority can be established. For it is only through the propitiation of the gods that sacrifices are capable of bringing about their results. The Udgîtha and the rest therefore are to be viewed under the aspect of Aditya and so on. -- Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the ideas of Aditya and so on.'

7. Sitting; on account of possibility.

It has been shown that that special form of cognitional activity which the Vedanta-texts set forth as the means of accomplishing final Release and which is called meditation (dhyana; upasana) has to be frequently repeated, and is of the nature of continued representation. A question now arises as to the way in which it has to be carried on. -- There being no special restrictive rule, the Purvapakshin holds that the Devotee may carry it on either sitting or lying down or standing or walking. -- This view the Sutra sets aside. Meditation is to be carried on by the Devotee in a sitting posture, since in that posture only the needful concentration of mind can be reached. Standing and walking demand effort, and lying down is conducive to sleep. The proper posture is sitting on some support, so that no effort may be required for holding the body up.

8. And on account of meditation.

Since, as intimated by the text,'the Self is to be meditated upon,' the mental activity in question is of the nature of meditation, it requires as its necessary condition concentration of mind. For by meditation is understood thought directed upon one object and not disturbed by the ideas of other things.

9. And with reference to immobility.

And it is with reference to their immobility that the earth and other inanimate things -- the air, the sky, the waters, the mountains -- may be spoken of as thinking, 'the earth thinks (dhyayati) as it were,' and so on. Movelessness hence is characteristic of the intensely meditating person also, and such movelessness is to be realised in the sitting posture only.

10. And Smriti texts say the same.

Smriti texts also declare that he only who sits can meditate, 'Having placed his steady seat upon a pure spot, there seated upon that seat, concentrating his mind he should practise Yoga' (Bha. Gî. VI, 11-12).

11. Where concentration of mind (is possible), there; on account of there being no difference.

As the texts do not say anything as to special places and times, the only requisite of such places and times is that they should favour concentration of mind. This agrees with the declaration 'Let a man apply himself to meditation in a level and clean place, &c., favourable to the mind' (Svet. Up. II, 10). -- Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the sitting one.'

12. Up to death; for there also it is seen.

The question now arises whether the meditation described which is the means of final Release is to be accomplished within one day, or to be continued day after day, until death. -- The view that it is accomplished within one day, as this will satisfy the scriptural injunction, is disposed of by the Sutra. Meditation is to be continued until death. For Scripture declares that meditation has to take place 'there,' i.e. in the whole period from the first effort after meditation up to death,

'Acting thus as long as life lasts he reaches the world of Brahman.' -- Here terminates the adhikarana of 'up to death.'

13. On the attainment of this, there result the non-clinging and the destruction of later and earlier sins; this being declared.

Having, so far, elucidated the nature of meditation, the Sutras now begin to consider the result of meditation. Scripture declares that on the knowledge of Brahman being attained a man's later and earlier sins do not cling to him but pass away. 'As water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil deed clings to him who knows this' (Ch. Up. IV, 14, 3); 'Having known that he is not sullied by any evil deed' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23); 'As the fibres of the Ishîka reed when thrown into the fire are burnt, thus all his sins are burnt' (Ch. Up. V, 24, 3); 'All his works perish when He has been beheld who is high and low' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). -- The doubt here arises whether this non-clinging and destruction of all sins is possible as the result of mere meditation, or not. -- It is not possible, the Purvapakshin maintains; for Scripture declares, 'no work the fruits of which have not been completely enjoyed perishes even in millions of aeons.' What the texts, quoted above, say as to the non- clinging and destruction of works occurs in sections complementary to passages inculcating knowledge as the means of final Release, and may therefore be understood as somehow meant to eulogize knowledge. Nor can it be said that knowledge is enjoined as an expiation of sins, so that the destruction of sins could be conceived as resulting from such expiation; for knowledge -- as we see from texts such as 'He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest,' 'He knows Brahman and he becomes Brahman' -- is enjoined as a means to reach Brahman. The texts as to the non- clinging and destruction of sins therefore can only be viewed as arthavada passages supplementary to the texts enjoining knowledge of Brahman. -- This view the Sutra sets aside. When a man reaches knowledge, the non-clinging and destruction of all sins may be effected through the power of knowledge. For Scripture declares the power of knowledge to be such that 'to him who knows this, no evil deed clings,' and so on. Nor is this in conflict with the text stating that no work not fully enjoyed perishes; for this latter text aims at confirming the power of works to produce their results; while the texts under discussion have for their aim to declare that knowledge when once sprung up possesses the power of destroying the capability of previously committed sins to produce their own evil results and the power of obstructing that capability on the part of future evil actions. The two sets of texts thus refer to different matters, and hence are not mutually contradictory. There is in fact no more contradiction between them than there is between the power of fire to produce heat and the power of water to subdue such heat. By knowledge effecting the non-clinging of sin we have to understand its obstructing the origination of the power, on the part of sin, to cause that disastrous disposition on the part of man which consists in unfitness for religious works; for sins committed tend to render man unfit for religious works and inclined to commit further sinful actions of the same kind. By knowledge effecting the destruction of sin, on the other hand, we understand its destroying that power of sin after it has once originated. That power consists, fundamentally, in displeasure on the part of the Lord. Knowledge of the Lord, which, owing to the supreme dearness of its object is itself supremely dear, possesses the characteristic power of propitiating the Lord -- the object of knowledge -- and thus destroys the displeasure of the Lord due to the previous commission of sins on the part of the knowing Devotee; and at the same time obstructs the origination of further displeasure on the Lord's part, which otherwise would be caused by sins committed subsequently to the origination of such knowledge. What Scripture says about sin not clinging to him who knows can however be understood only with regard to such sins as spring from thoughtlessness; for texts such as 'he who has not turned away from evil conduct' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 24) teach that meditation, becoming more perfect day after day, cannot be accomplished without the Devotee having previously broken himself off from all evil conduct. -- Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the reaching of that.'

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