VEDANTA-SUTRAS WITH RAMANUJA'S SRÎBHASHYA 46 страница

31. Of those who have a certain office there is subsistence (of their works) as long as the office lasts.

We do not maintain that all those who have reached true knowledge divest themselves at the time of death of all their good and evil works; we limit our view to those who immediately after death attain to moving on the path, the first stage of which is light. Persons like Vasishtha, on the other hand, who are entrusted with certain offices, do not immediately after death attain to moving on the path beginning with light, since the duties undertaken by them are not completely accomplished. In the case of beings of this kind, who owing to particular deeds have been appointed to particular offices, the effect

of the works which gave rise to the office does not pass away before those offices are completely accomplished; for the effect of a work is exhausted only through the complete enjoyment of its result. In the case of those persons, therefore, the effects of the works which gave rise to their office continue to exist as long as the office itself, and hence they do not after death enter on the path beginning with light. -- Here terminates the adhikarana of 'passing away.'

32. There is no restriction (since) all (have to go on that path). (Thus) there is non-contradiction of sacred text and Smriti.

The question here is whether Brahman is to be reached on the path of the gods by those only who take their stand on those meditations which, like the Upakosala-vidya, describe that path, or by all who practise any of the meditations on Brahman. The Purvapakshin holds the former view, since there is no proof to show that in other vidyas the going on that path is not mentioned, and since those other vidyas-such as the texts 'and those who in the forest meditate on faith and austerities,'and' those who in the forest worship faith, the True' (Ch. Up. V, 10, 1; Bri. Up. VI, 2, 15) -- suggest to the mind the idea of the knowledge of Brahman. This the Sutra negatives. There is no restriction to that limited class of devotees, since all who carry on meditations have to go on that path. For on this latter assumption only text and inference, i.e. scripture and authoritative tradition, are not contradicted. As to scripture, the Chandogya and the Vajasaneyaka alike, in the Pañkagni-vidya, declare that all those who practise meditation go on that path. In the Vajasaneyaka the words 'who know this' refer to those who practise the meditation on the five fires, while the following words 'those who in the forest meditate on faith and the True' refer to those who meditate on Brahman; and the text then goes on to say that all those devotees go to Brahman, on the path of the gods. Texts such as 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,' and 'the True must be enquired into,' prove that the term 'the True' denotes Brahman; and as in the Chandogya the term 'tapas' occurs in the corresponding place, we conclude that both these terms, viz. _the True_ and tapas, denote nothing else but Brahman. Meditation on Brahman, preceded by faith, is mentioned elsewhere also; in the text which begins 'The True must be enquired into' we read further on 'Faith must be enquired into' (Ch. Up. VII, 18, 16; 19). Smriti also declares that all those who know Brahman proceed on the path of the gods, 'Fire, the light, the day, the bright fortnight, the six months of the sun's northern progress -- proceeding by that road those who know Brahman go to Brahman' (Bha. Gî. VIII, 24). And there are many other Sruti and Smriti passages of this kind. The conclusion therefore is that the Upakosalavidya and similar texts merely refer to that going of the soul which is common to all vidyas. -- Here terminates the adhikarana of 'non-restriction.'

33. But the conceptions of the Imperishable are to be comprised (in all meditations). There being equality (of the Brahman to be meditated on) and (those conceptions) existing (in Brahman); as in the case of what belongs to the upasad. This has been explained.

We read in the Brihad-aranyaka (III, 8, 9),'O Gargî, the Brahmanas call that the Akshara. It is neither coarse nor fine,' and so on. And in the Atharvana (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5) we have 'The higher knowledge is that by which the Akshara is apprehended. That which cannot be seen nor seized,' &c. The doubt here arises whether all the qualities there predicated of Brahman -- called akshara, i.e. the Imperishable -- and constituting something contrary in nature to the apparent world, are to be included in all meditations on Brahman, or only those where the text specially mentions them. The Purvapakshin advocates the latter view; for, he says, there is no authority for holding that the qualities which characterise one meditation are characteristic of other meditations also; and such negative attributes as are mentioned in those two texts do not -- as positive qualities such as bliss do -- contribute to the apprehension of the true nature of Brahman. What those two texts do is merely to deny of Brahman, previously apprehended as having bliss, and so on, for its essential qualities, certain qualities belonging to the empirical world, such as grossness, and so on; for all negation must refer to an established basis. -- This view the Sutra refutes. The ideas of absence of grossness, and so on, which are connected with Brahman viewed as the Akshara, are to be included in all meditations on Brahman. For the imperishable (akshara) Brahman is the same in all meditations, and qualities such as non-grossness enter into the conception of its essential nature. The apprehension of a thing means the apprehension of its specific character. But mere bliss, and so on, does not suggest the specific character of Brahman, since those qualities belong also to the individual soul. What is specifically characteristic of Brahman is bliss, and so on, in so far as fundamentally opposed to all evil and imperfection. The individual soul, on the other hand, although fundamentally free from evil, yet is capable of connexion with evil. Now being fundamentally opposed to evil implies having a character the opposite of grossness and all similar qualities which belong to the empirical world, material and mental. He therefore who thinks of Brahman must think of it as having for its essential nature bliss, knowledge, and so on, in so far as distinguished by absence of grossness and the like, and those qualities, being no less essential than bliss, and so on, must therefore be included in all meditations on Brahman. -- The Sutra gives an instance illustrating the principle that qualities (secondary matters) follow the principal matter to which they belong. As the mantra 'Agnir vai hotram vetu,' although given in the Sama-veda, yet has to be recited in the Yajur-veda style, with a subdued voice, because it stands in a subordinate relation to the upasad-offerings prescribed for the four-days 'sacrifice called Jamadagnya; those offerings are the principal matter to which the subordinate matter -- the mantra -- has to conform. This point is explained in the first section, i.e. in the Purva Mîmamsa-sutras III, 3, 9. -- But this being admitted, it would follow that as Brahman is the principal matter in all meditations on Brahman, and secondary matters have to follow the principal matter, also such qualities as 'doing all works, enjoying all odours and the like,' which are mentioned in connexion with special meditations only, would indiscriminately have to be included in all meditations. -- With reference to this the next Sutra says.

34. So much; on account of reflection.

Only so much, i.e. only those qualities which have to be included in all meditations on Brahman, without which the essential special nature of Brahman cannot be conceived, i.e. bliss, knowledge, and so on, characterised by absence of grossness and the like. Other qualities, such as doing all works and the like, although indeed following their substrate, are explicitly to be meditated on in special meditations only. -- Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the idea of the Imperishable.'

35. Should it be said that (the former reply refers) to that Self to which the aggregate of material things belongs (since) otherwise the difference (of the two replies) could not be accounted for; we say -- no; as in the case of instruction

In the Brihad-aranyaka (III, 4; 5) the same question is asked twice in succession ('Tell me the Brahman which is visible, not invisible, the Self who is within all'), while Yajñavalkya gives a different answer to each ('He who breathes in the upbreathing,' &c.; 'He who overcomes hunger and thirst,' &c.). The question here is whether the two meditations, suggested by these sections, are different or not. They are different, since the difference of reply effects a distinction between the two vidyas. The former reply declares him who is the maker of breathing forth, and so on to be the inner Self of all; the latter describes him as free from hunger, thirst, and so on. It thence appears that the former passage refers to the inner (individual) Self which is different from body, sense-organs, internal organ and vital breath; while the latter refers to that which again differs from the inner Self, viz. the highest Self, free from hunger, thirst, and so on. As the individual soul is inside the aggregate of material things, it may be spoken of as being that inner Self of all. Although this kind of inwardness is indeed only a relative one, we nevertheless must accept it in this place; for if, desirous of taking this 'being the inner Self of all' in its literal sense, we assumed the highest Self to be meant, the difference of the two replies could not be accounted for. The former reply evidently refers to the individual soul, since the highest Self cannot be conceived as breathing forth, and so on; and the latter reply, which declares the Self to be raised above hunger, &c., evidently refers to the highest Self. This is expressed in the earlier part of the Sutra: 'The former reply refers to the Self to which there belongs the aggregate of material things, i.e. the individual soul as being the inner Self of all; otherwise we could not account for the difference of the two replies.' -- The last words of the Sutra negative this -- 'not so,' i.e. there is no difference of vidyas, since both assertions and replies refer to the highest Self. The question says in both places, 'the Brahman which is visible, not invisible, the Self who is within all,' and this clearly refers to the highest Self only. We indeed observe that in some places the term _Brahman_ is, in a derived sense, applied to the individual soul also; but the text under discussion, for distinction's sake, adds the qualification 'the Brahman which is manifest' (sakshat). The quality of 'aparokshatva' (i.e. being that which does not transcend the senses but lies openly revealed) also, which implies being connected with all space and all time, suits Brahman only, which from texts such as 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' is known to be infinite. In the same way the attribute of being the inner Self of all can belong to the highest Self only, which texts such as 'He who dwelling within the earth,' &c., declare to be the inner ruler of the universe. The replies to the two questions likewise can refer to Brahman only. The unconditional causal agency with regard to breath, declared in the clause 'he who breathes in the upbreathing,' &c., can belong to the highest Self only, not to the individual soul, since the latter possesses no such causal power when in the state of deep sleep. Ushasta thereupon, being not fully enlightened, since causality with regard to breathing may in a sense be attributed to the individual soul also, again asks a question, in reply to which Yajñavalkya clearly indicates Brahman, 'Thou mayest not see the seer of sight,' &c., i.e. thou must not think that my previous speech has named as the causal agent of breathing the individual soul, which is the causal agent with regard to those activities which depend on the sense-organs, viz. seeing, hearing, thinking, and knowing; for in the state of deep sleep, swoon, and so on, the soul possesses no such power. And moreover another text also -- 'Who could breathe if that bliss existed not in the ether?' (Taitt. Up. II, 7) -- declares that the highest Self only is the cause of the breathing of all living beings. In the same way the answer to the second question can refer to the highest Self only, which alone can be said to be raised above hunger, thirst, and so on. For this reason also both replies wind up with the same phrase, 'Everything else is of evil.' The iteration of question and reply serves the purpose of showing that the same highest Brahman which is the cause of all breathing is beyond all hunger, thirst, and so on. -- The Sutra subjoins a parallel instance. 'As in the case of instruction.' As in the vidya of that which truly is (Ch. Up. VI, 1 ff.), question and reply are iterated several times, in order to set forth the various greatness and glory of Brahman. -- Thus the two sections under discussion are of the same nature, in so far as setting forth that the one Brahman which is the inner Self of all is the cause of all life and raised beyond all imperfections; and hence they constitute one meditation only. -- To this a new objection is raised. The two sections may indeed both refer to the highest Brahman; nevertheless there is a difference of meditation, as according to the one Brahman is to be meditated upon as the cause of all life, and according to the other as raised above all defects; this difference of character distinguishes the two meditations. And further there is a difference of interrogators; the first question being asked by Ushasta, the second by Kahola.

36. There is interchange (of ideas), for the texts distinguish; as in other cases.

There is no difference of vidya because both questions and answers have one subject-matter, and because the one word that possesses enjoining power proves the connexion of the two sections. Both questions have for their topic Brahman viewed as the inner Self of all; and in the second question the word 'eva' ('just,' 'very') in 'Tell me just that Brahman,' &c., proves that the question of Kahola has for its subject the Brahman, to the qualities of which the question of Ushasta had referred. Both answers again refer to the one Brahman, viewed as the Self of all. The idea of the injunction of the entire meditation again is suggested in the second section only, 'Therefore a Brahmana, after he has done with learning, is to wish to stand by real strength.' The object of meditation being thus ascertained to be one, there must be effected a mutual interchange of the ideas of Ushasta and Kahola, i.e. Ushasta's conception of Brahman being the cause of all life must be entertained by the interrogating Kahola also; and vice versa the conception of Kahola as to Brahman being beyond hunger, thirst, and so on, must be entertained by Ushasta also. This interchange being made, the difference of Brahman, the inner Self of all, from the individual soul is determined by both sections. For this is the very object of Yajñavalkya's replies: in order to intimate that the inner Self of all is different from the individual soul, they distinguish that Self as the cause of all life and as raised above hunger, thirst, and so on. Hence Brahman's being the inner Self of all is the only quality that is the subject of meditation; that it is the cause of life and so on are only means to prove its being such, and are not therefore to be meditated on independently. -- But if this is so, to what end must there be made an interchange, on the part of the two interrogators, of their respective ideas? -- Brahman having, on the ground of being the cause of all life, been ascertained by Ushasta as the inner Self of all, and different from the individual soul, Kahola renews the question, thinking that the inner Self of all must be viewed as different from the soul, on the ground of some special attribute which cannot possibly belong to the soul; and Yajñavalkya divining his thought thereon declares that the inner Self possesses an attribute which cannot possibly belong to the soul, viz. being in essential opposition to all imperfection. The interchange of ideas therefore has to be made for the purpose of establishing the idea of the individual nature of the object of meditation. -- 'As elsewhere,' i. e. as in the case of the knowledge of that which truly is, the repeated questions and replies only serve to define one and the same Brahman, not to convey the idea of the object of meditation having to be meditated on under new aspects. -- But a new objection is raised -- As there is, in the Sad-vidya also, a difference between the several questions and answers,

how is that vidya known to be one? -- To this question the next Sutra replies.

37. For one and the same (highest divinity), called the 'truly being,' and so on (is the subject of that meditation).

For the highest divinity, called there _that which is_ -- which was introduced in the clause 'that divinity thought,' &c. -- is intimated by all the following sections of that chapter. This is proved by the fact that the attributes -- 'that_ which truly _is' and so on -- which were mentioned in the first section and confirmed in the subsequent ones, are finally summed up in the statement, 'in that all this has its Self, that is the True, that is the Self.'

Some interpreters construe the last two Sutras as constituting two adhikaranas. The former Sutra, they say, teaches that the text, 'I am thou, thou art I,' enjoins a meditation on the soul and the highest Self as interchangeable. But as on the basis of texts such as 'All this is indeed Brahman,' 'all this has its Self in Brahman,' 'Thou art that,' the text quoted is as a matter of course understood to mean that there is one universal Self, the teaching which it is by those interpreters assumed to convey would be nothing new; and their interpretation therefore must be rejected. The point as to the oneness of the individual and the highest Self will moreover be discussed under IV, I, 3. Moreover, there is no foundation for a special meditation on Brahman as the individual soul and the individual soul as Brahman, apart from the meditation on the Self of all being one. -- The second Sutra, they say, declares the oneness of the meditation on the True enjoined in the text, 'whosoever knows this great wonderful first-born as the True Brahman' (_Bri_. Up. V, 4), and of the meditation enjoined in the subsequent passage (V, 5. 2), 'Now what is true, that is the Aditya, the person that dwells in yonder orb, and the person in the right eye.' But this also is untenable. For the difference of abode mentioned in the latter passage (viz. the abode in the sun and in the eye) establishes difference of vidya, as already shown under Su. III, 3, 21. Nor is it possible to assume that the two meditations comprised in the latter text which have a character of their own in so far as they view the True as embodied in syllables, and so on, and which are declared to be connected with a special result ('he who knows this destroys evil and leaves it'), should be identical with the one earlier meditation which has an independent character of its own and a result of its own ('he conquers these worlds'). Nor can it be said that the declaration of a fruit in 'he destroys evil and leaves it' refers merely to the fruit (not of the entire meditation but) of a subordinate part of the meditation; for there is nothing to prove this. The proof certainly cannot be said to lie in the fact of the vidyas being one; for this would imply reasoning in a circle, viz. as follows -- it being settled that the vidyas are one, it follows that the fruit of the former meditation only is the main one, while the fruits of the two later meditations are subordinate ones; and -- it being settled that those two later fruits are subordinate ones, it follows that, as thus there is no difference depending on connexion with fruits, the two later meditations are one with the preceding one. -- All this proves that the two Sutras can be interpreted only in the way maintained by us. -- Here terminates the adhikarana of 'being within.'

38. Wishes and the rest, here and there; (as is known from the abode, and so on).

We read in the Chandogya (VIII, I, 1), 'There is that city of Brahman, and in it the palace, the small lotus, and in it that small ether,' &c.; and in the Vajasaneyaka, 'He is that great unborn Self who consists of knowledge,' and so on. A doubt here arises whether the two texts constitute one meditation or not. -- The two meditations are separate, the Purvapakshin maintains; for they have different characters. The Chandogya represents as the object of meditation the ether as distinguished by eight different attributes, viz. freedom from all evil and the rest; while, according to the Vajasaneyaka, the being to be meditated on is he who dwells within that ether, and is distinguished by attributes such as lordship, and so on. -- To this we reply that the meditations are not distinct, since there is no difference of character. For desires and so on constitute that character 'here and there,' i.e. in both texts nothing else but Brahman distinguished by attributes, such as having true wishes, and so on, forms the subject of meditation. This is known 'from the abode and so on,' i.e. the meditation is recognised as the same because in both texts Brahman is referred to as abiding in the heart, being a bridge, and so on. Lordship and the rest, which are stated in the Vajasaneyaka, are special aspects of the quality of being capable to realise all one's purposes, which is one of the eight qualities declared in the Chandogya, and as such prove that all the attributes going together with that quality in the Chandogya are valid for the Vajasaneyaka also. The character of the two vidyas therefore does not differ. The connexion with a reward also does not differ, for it consists in both cases in attaining to Brahman; cp. Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3 'Having approached the highest light he is manifested in his own form,' and Bri. Up. V, 4, 24 'He becomes indeed the fearless Brahman.' That, in the Chandogya-text, the term _ether_ denotes the highest Brahman, has already been determined under I, 3, 14. As in the Vajasaneyaka, on the other hand, he who abides in the ether is recognised as the highest Self, we infer that by the ether in which he abides must be understood the ether within the heart, which in the text 'within there is a little hollow space (sushira)' (Mahanar. Up. XI, 9) is called sushira. The two meditations are therefore one. Here an objection is raised. It cannot be maintained that the attributes mentioned in the Chandogya have to be combined with those stated in the Vajasaneyaka (lordship, rulership, &c. ), since even the latter are not truly valid for the meditation. For the immediately preceding passage, 'By the mind it is to be perceived that there is here no plurality: from death to death goes he who sees here any plurality; as one only is to be seen that eternal being, not to be proved by any means of proof,' as well as the subsequent text, 'that Self is to be described by No, no,' shows that the Brahman to be meditated upon is to be viewed as devoid of attributes; and from this we infer that the attributes of lordship and so on, no less than the qualities of grossness and the like, have to be denied of Brahman. From this again we infer that in the Chandogya also the attributes of satyakamatva and so on are not meant to be declared as Brahman's true qualities. All such qualities -- as not being real qualities of Brahman -- have therefore to be omitted in meditations aiming at final release. -- This objection the next Sutra disposes of.

39. On account of emphasis there is non-omission.

Attributes, such as having the power of immediately realising one's purposes, and so on, which are not by other means known to constitute attributes of Brahman, and are in the two texts under discussion, as well as in other texts, emphatically declared to be attributes of Brahman, as constituting the object of meditations undertaken with a view to final release, cannot be omitted from those meditations, but must be comprised within them. In the Chandogya. the passage, 'Those who depart from hence, after having cognised the Self and those self- realising desires, move about at will in all those worlds,' enjoins the knowledge of Brahman as distinguished by the power of realising its desires and similar qualities, while the text, 'Those who depart from here not having cognised the Self, &c., do _not_ move about at will,' &c., finds fault with the absence of such knowledge, and in this way emphasises the importance of the possession of it. In the same way the repeated declarations as to Brahman's ruling power ('the lord of all, the king of all beings,' &c.) show that stress is to be laid upon the quality indicated. It truly cannot be held that Scripture, which in tender regard to man's welfare is superior to a thousand of parents, should, deceitfully, give emphatic instruction as to certain qualities -- not known through any other means of knowledge -- which fundamentally would be unreal and hence utterly to be disregarded, and thus throw men desirous of release, who as it is are utterly confused by the revolutions of the wheel of Samsara, into even deeper confusion and distress. That the text, 'there is not any diversity here; as one only is to be seen that eternal being,' teaches a unitary view of the world in so far as everything is an effect of Brahman and thus has Brahman for its Self, and negatives the view of plurality -- established antecedently to Vedic teaching -- as excluding Brahman's being the universal Self, we have explained before. In the clause 'not so, not so' the so refers back to the world as established by other means of proof, and the clause thus declares that Brahman who is the Self of all is different in nature from the world. This is confirmed by the subsequent passage, 'He is incomprehensible, for he is not comprehended, he is undecaying,' &c.; which means -- as he is different in nature from what is comprehended by the other means of proof he is not grasped by those means; as he is different from what suffers decay he does not decay, and so on. And analogously, in the Chandogya, the text 'by the old age of the body he does not age' &c. first establishes Brahman's being different in nature from everything else, and then declares it to be satyakama, and so on. -- But, an objection is raised, the text, 'Those who depart from hence, having cognised the Self and those true desires, move about at will in all worlds. Thus he who desires the world of the fathers,' &c., really declares that the knowledge of Brahman as possessing the power of immediately realising its wishes has for its fruit something lying within the sphere of transmigratory existence, and from this we infer that for him who is desirous of release and of reaching Brahman the object of meditation is not to be found in Brahman in so far as possessing qualities. The fruit of the highest knowledge is rather indicated in the passage, 'Having approached the highest light it manifests itself in its own form'; and hence the power of realising its wishes and the rest are not to be included in the meditation of him who wishes to attain to Brahman. -- To this objection the next Sutra replies.

40. In the case of him who has approached (Brahman); just on that account, this being declared by the text.

When the soul, released from all bonds and manifesting itself in its true nature, has approached, i.e. attained to Brahman; then just on that account, i.e. on account of such approach, the text declares it to possess the power of moving about at will in all worlds. 'Having approached the highest light he manifests himself in his true form. He is the highest Person. He moves about there laughing, playing,' &c. This point will be proved in greater detail in the fourth adhyaya. Meanwhile the conclusion is that such qualities as satyakamatva have to be included in the meditation of him also who is desirous of release; for the possession of those qualities forms part of the experience of the released soul itself. -- Here terminates the adhikarana of 'wishes and the rest'

41. There is non-restriction of determination, because this is seen; for there is a separate fruit, viz. non-obstruction.

There are certain meditations connected with elements of sacrificial actions; as e.g. 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om as udgîtha.' These meditations are subordinate elements of the sacrificial acts with which they connect themselves through the udgîtha and so on, in the same way as the quality of being made of parna wood connects itself with the sacrifice through the ladle (made of parna wood), and are to be undertaken on that very account. Moreover the statement referring to these meditations, viz. 'whatever he does with knowledge, with faith, with the Upanishad, that becomes more vigorous,' does not allow the assumption of a special fruit for these meditations (apart from the fruit of the sacrificial performance); while in the case of the ladle being made of parna wood the text mentions a special fruit ('he whose ladle is made of parna wood does not hear an evil sound'). The meditations in question are therefore necessarily to be connected with the particular sacrificial performances to which they belong. -- This view the Sutra refutes, 'There is non-restriction with regard to the determinations.' By 'determination' we have here to understand the definite settling of the mind in a certain direction, in other words, meditation. The meditations on the udgîtha and so on are not definitely connected with the sacrificial performances; 'since that is seen,' i.e. since the texts themselves declare that there is no such necessary connexion; cp. the text, 'therefore both perform the sacrificial work, he who thus knows it (i. e. who possesses the knowledge implied in the meditations on the sacrifice), as well as he who does not know' -- which declares that he also who does not know the meditations may perform the work. Were these meditations auxiliary elements of the works, there could be no such absence of necessary connexion (as declared in this

⇐ Предыдущая 47 48 49 50 515253 54 55 56 Следующая ⇒