Shri Bhagavad-Gita 4 страница

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knowledge) acquaintance with Sastra*, and that there,

foreit mightfairly besupposed that the dualistic knowledge

which Isvara had in his ignorant stage, might yet

continue even after the dawningof monistic knowledge,

comingto him from SSstra.* For,to maintain such a position

would be to contradict all Sruti® and Smfiti* declarations,

such for example:—"Who is All-knowing and All-under

standing"® ;"Transcendentis His power,and verily varied;

so itis heard. Knowledge,strength,and capacity for action

are natural (to Him)"®; "

/know, Arjuna! allthe beings

ofthe past,of the present and ofthe future; butMe,no one

knows"'. Again,it mustbeasked(«>.,we ask you),that—ad

mittingthatParamapurushaand allthe line ofthe Apostolic

succession of Preceptors{guru-paramparS) were convinced

of the monistic nature of spirit, and admitting that dual

notions (somehow) persisted as well,—to whom do they

mpart their conviction,the true monisti knowledge? If

you rejoin that the imparting(of monistic instruction) isto

such men as Arjuna &c. appearing as their reflections,{\w&

say that)this position is also unmaintainable.For,who,un

lesshe be mad,would,—knowing that the reflectionsofhim

selfin a(polished)gem, sword or mirror, are but hitnself

reflected therein and none other—yet be foolish enough to

impart them(the reflections^ any instruction?

1, I put the argument in other

words for better comprehension.

‘* Ignorance or false notion is dualism

which was instrumental in producing a

knowledgeof differences, which should

disappear with the advent of the coun-

ter-knowledge of on-dualism of

Atma (ves., that there is but ome Uni-

versal Soul, and a second doth not

exist). But such disappearance is not

referrible to any fixed point of time

in the eternal past,’?

To begin with, no continuance of dualistic notion can

even be alleged by them (viz.,the holders of the monistic

theory), for (according to thecn) that which causes the

dualistic notion of things as existing separate from atmd,is,

by reason ofitsantagonistic doctrine ot the monistic nature

ofatmd,should haveexploded in time beginningless{anddi).

(/.e. ifat any one point of time, it can be asserted that

monistic knowledge came and dualistic knowledge depart

ed,only then it can be reasonably comprehended thatfrom

that time forward,the previous notion persisted and soon ;

but monistic knowledge is according to them (z.e., you)

eternal,i. e.,never began in time ; hence the argument itself

is a fallacy)'. Next, we might suppose our opponent assail

ing us with the (analogical)argument of the'duplicated

moon.* Thus may he say:—The moon is one,and yet the

diseased eyesees two moons. With the knowledgethatthere

is but one moon, may not yet the knowledge ofthe'dupli

cated moon' exist? (This is as much as to say that the

unreal dualistic notion of dtnid, may, though unreal, yet

continueto co-exist with thereal monistic notion of atmd).

To this we reply:—'this analogy does not apply to your

case'. For the disease of the eye is a factj whereas your

disease, viz:ignorance which produces the dualistic notion,

is a figment Again the cause,viz. the disease ofthe eye,

giving birth to the sight ofthe'duplicated moon,'remains;

whereas yourignorancehasvanished! There is thus reason

for the persistence ofthe'double moon'though it must be

conceded thatstrongerevidence existing in favorofonly one

moon,renders the diseased eye a proof of little or no im

portance. Butin your case,the dualistic notion(according

to you)is a fiction! Not alone the notion or knowledge,

but as well the objects ofsuch knowledge,thecausesofsuch

knowledge, have no existence (according to you)! For

your real knowledge ofthings,viz.the monistic knowledge,

has dissipated it for ever I Hence in no way whatever isit

possible for you to maintain the argument of'the conti

nuance or persistence of the dualistic notion' in the face

of your monistic hypothesis.

Hence,ifit is*t^ethatthe hypothetic(monism)alone

is the veritable knoledge that Sarvesvara and all the

ApostoliclineofTeachers up to this time maintained, then

the dualistic ground on which alone all tutorial function

can be based, is inadmissible.

If on the other hand,(you say)they have(still)had

dualistic knowledge, then (because of such knowledge)

ignorance and itscause must have existence. When,there

fore,ignorance hasexistence, because of that very existence,

•—ignorance,—there can in nocase besuchathingasimpart

ing instruction ofreal (/. e., according to you,the monistic)

knowledge. (For, how can an ignorant man teach

truth?)

1. I use Brahtn for the neuter form Brahma to distinguished It from

Brahkmd, the masculine form, the for-

mer referring to the Infinite God, the

latter to the four-faced Demiurge, the

Lord of a Brahmanda, or one bubble-

world in the Infinite Aedsa.

1. The drift cof Ramanuja’s argu-

ment may be gathered from the fol-

lowing extract :—‘‘ If these rules of

initiation be truthful, then the doctrine

of One Being (a-dvaifa) is necessarily

| falsified, for they presuppose the exist-

ence of the gtru and of all things

which are necessary for the perform-

ance of the Vedic ritual; and if the

rules are themselves illusory, the

Vedantic initiation must itself be an

illusion ; and if the initiation be false,

the indoctrination must be false too ;

for he only gets knowledge who has

gotan dchkdrya. The Vedanta will

not allow that its grand consum-

mation can be brought about without

a qualified tutor. If there be no

Gcharya, there can be no teaching;

and if the indoctrination is a delusion,

the conclusion of this spiritual exercise,

t.?., mukte must be the grandest of de-

Jusions; and the whole system of

Ved4antism (a-dvattism), all its texts

and sayings, its precepts and promises,

its dcharya and adhikdri (qualified

pupil) are therefore built like a house

(as Raimanuja suggests) upon an im-

aginary mathematical line.” Dia-

logues on Hindu Philosopuy p: 421.

Sri Yamunacharya argues thus :—

To whom is Moksha? To jiv-dima

(individual soul) ? But individual soul

is to you a non-entity, so that Moksha

is to an wsrealjiva, which isa reduc-

tio ad absurdam. And _ therefore

follow this advice when any one comes

to preach you this kind of Afoksha :

—‘ dham-artha-vindsas-chet moksha-

tly adhyavasyati, apasarped asau

moksha-kathd-prastava-gandha tah.

Read also verse: 4, Decem: 8,

Cent: 2, Vol: II. Bhagavad-vishaya.

1. Dhira is translated as wase

man from the root ‘ dhiyd ramante.’

2. Karma is either past deeds or

present work, Done with motive, it

binds ; motiveless, leaves one free.

3- «This is reaping what ts sown,

A teacher again is (according to you)one who pos

sesses the supreme knowledge that atmd is non-dual;

and hence Brahm'-ignorance and all its products'do not

exist for him. And therefore all instruction to a pupil is

(under such circumstances)entirely futile.

But if you should assert that the (spiritual)teacher as

well as his (monistic) knowledge may be itnagined, then

the pupil and his (monistic) knowledge should also be

imagined. Hence,not an hnagined(monistic) knowlege of

the pupil can be the means of dispelling his illusion (i.^.,

dualism).

If, however, you should retort again that (monistic)

knowledge—(even though itbe oftheimagineddescription)-

ha.s, in th^ case of the pupil, the force of destroying the

antecedent(dualistic)illusion,—by reason of their(mutual)

antagonism,—then this argument equally applies to the

teacher; and let it then be suppossed, that the teacher's

own (dualistic) illusion perish by means of his own

(monistic) knowledge,thus rendering all necessity for in-

doctrination-(as the having to imagine the duality of a

non-existent pupil,&c)superfluous andnnconsistent.

Hence,whichever way you argue, the giving and the

taking ofinstruction(onthe basis ofthe monistic hypothesis)

is meaningless.

Enough then with all such exploded sophistic contro

versies!'.

(This verse therefore,as wehaveinterpreted,is a clear,

exposition ofthe dualistic doctrine that dtma(or soul is

different from God,and that dtmd is plural).

&c.

13. As arechildhood,youth and senility in this body,

so is translation to other bodies. No wise man'

errs(or gets deluded)in that.

As,dwelling in a single body itself,the.dweller(dtmd)

does not grieve at the transition taking place from in

fancyto youth &c.,believing that in thattransition the dtmd

is in any way lost(/. e., affected),so no man who is wise

will,similarly,regret at having to pass from ope body to

another, knowing that(as is the case in the single body)

dtmd ever endures.

What practically one has to do(in these circumstan

ces)is this:—Atmds are eternal. Bound down by deeds

(karma)' done in the eternal past,they incarnate in bodies

such as are determined®by karma\ with these very bodies,

theyhave to work out liberation from bondage by engaging

in Sastra-sanctioned works(karma)such as undertaking a

war &c.,appropriate to the(several)castes (in which they

may find themselves born), but performing them with no

desire for the ultimate fruit thereof.

To men who are so environed, the experiences of

pleasure and pain are unavoidable,inasmuch as they are

the productof'coldsand heats'* which thesensessensate by

coming in contact with external objects. Hence one needs

tolerate such experiences happening to one during the pro

secution,and until termination,ofany work undertaken.

This is explained in the following verse:—

&c.

14. The sense-contacts, Kaunteyal* produce

^ pleasures and pains through 'cold-heat'*

experiences. They come and go,and are in

constant. Take them coolly, Bharatal*

The qualities viz\ sound,touch,color, taste and smell,

with theirfunctioningseats viz.,the senses,are called mdtras

(or tan-matrds), because they are the evolutes from mdtras

or the rudimentary elements. The contacts ofthe senses

with sound &c., produce cold,—heat,—soft,—hard &c.,—

experiences,and cause pleasures and pains*.

The expression "cold and heat"* is to imply or typify

the sum of all experiences. Bear them up with courage

till thou earnestoutthy l^astra-enjoined war &c.,tocomple

tion. As these experiences accrue and depart, they are

but fir to be tolerated (/.e.,disregarded)by men ofcourage.

Also they are un-enduring {anityd), meaning that him,

—whosekarma{i. e.,thefruitofdeeds done)hasceased,(as

in the case ofthe mukta,or the freed soul),—the'cold-heat'*

adventitious experiences can never disturb(or distract).

1. Son of Kunti= Arjuna.

2. Descendent of Bharata = Arjuna

(see Geneol : Tree at end of Lec: I).

3. The sense-contacts with exter-

nal phenomenais sensations which are

the sense-with-mind-contacts, ‘ cold-

heat? &c., and then follow the reac-

tions, pleasures and pains.

Is this passive or dull disposition to 'cold-heats'any

use? The following verse tells us:—

4 "T &c.

15. That bold' man, O man-chief! who looks on

pain as equal with pleasure, and whom, these

('colds and heats') cannot molest, is verily

made for immortality*!

Be it mild or acute,noarrow-hitscan tormenta person

ofcourage,—one whoisable tolook upon an inevitable pain

as equal to pleasure. That is the person to whom the

discharge ofduties, incumbent on his status (caste, occu

pation &c.)insociety,—suchasengaging in war(for aKsha-

triya)—without anticipating any benefits thereform—paves

the way to immortality. Such a person wins immortality,

Arjuna!,not thou who canst notsuffer pain. That conduct

(or character)i. e. bearing (up,or patient suffering without

complaint) is a necessary sign ofthe eternality ofdtmas

(souls).

Whether it be the eternality ofdtmds,or the decaying

character ofthe bodies that is regarded,it has been shown

by verse: viz:

The wise, grieve not either as respects bodies,or as

respects dtmds,&c.\(Bh:Gl:ii-li),

that no cause,in any case,exists for regret.

This subject will now be expanded:—

^&c.

16. Tothe non-constant(asat=matter)fixity is not;

to the constant spirit) non-fixity is

not.

1. Bold means sagacious, wise.

2, Such a man of trained will is

‘dear to me,’ says Krishna (Vide XII-

18-19. )

To Truth-Seers are known, the essential

natures of both.^

Ofthat which is'^asat, or body,it cannot be predicat

ed that it is

sat\ Ofthat which is 'sat'or spirit,it can

not be predicated that it is'asat To Seers of truth (or

Sages),the ultimate natures {antd)of both these postulates

are matters of their definite apprehension (or direct per

ceptual matters ofobservation)®.

Anta is literally the'end'. Here it means the'end'of

proof, or the conclusive end of a thing indicated. (So

that the'

end' of sat and asat means their ultimate or

essential natures).

1. R&meanuja’ tells us that this

verse has no allusion to the Satkharya-

zadea of the Sankhyds (zsde, Sankhya

Siitra I-78). Yogi! Parthasarathi

writes :—~*‘ What1s here taught is, not

the inconvertibility of nothing into a

thing, but the inconvertibility of ome

kind of thing or category (ves., the

ever mutable matter) into another

kind of thing or category (viz., the

ever immutable soul)?—Nagapitr.

15-11-87.

‘What is not cannot come to be,

(And) what is, cannot cease to be.’

is a possible meaning, which though stating a true doctrine entitled ‘the

Sathdrya-vada’, is here rejected as irrelevant to the context, and the following

interpretation is therefore preferred :—

‘No matter can soul-nature take,

*'No soul can matter’s nature take.’

Another more liberal rendering is :

‘To the Non-real, existence is not,

‘ Non-existence is not to the Real.

Vogt Parthasdrathi Atyanger.

2. This means that the essential or

substantial natures of these super-sen-

suous categories are demonstrably or

by observation, known to Sages,

They are as certain knowledge to

them as sense-knowledge is to us.

The conclusion or certitude arrived at by Sages

in this matter is that the nature of the non-sentient'body',

is'asat' only(=inconstancy),and that the nature of the

sentient 'atma' is 'saf ony (=constancy). Asat is

thus that which is ofthe perishablecharacter, and saf that

which is of the imperishable character. Says Bhagavan

Parasara:—

'O Twice-born idvija)\,there is therefore nothing,—

even alittle,—that,in the number ofthings,can at any time

not be said to be(sat) with the exception ofthe intdiigent

vijfldna-dtmd)'*'

'(Whathasbeen told thee by me)is thatjndna{—dtmd)

is that which is {tT\ith.—satyam),• everything else is that

which is not (asatyam).'*'

That which is indestructible is admitted by the wise

to be the highest Truth {paramdrtha). But that which is

derived by means of destructible things is doubtless des

tructible.'®*

What would ye call that, O king I, thing?, which by

changes &c., effected by time, receives not different signs

(names)?, what is that!}* And so on.

In Gita itself it is affirned:—

'These bodies have endings &c.," (ii-i8).

But as for that,know it is indestructible (ii-17).

Hence it is clear that what are indicated by'

satna'

and'

a-satvci are these {vis., dtmd and body)

The context does not here admit of this verse having

any reference to what is known as the satkdrya-vdda.

For,theoccasion indeed is one when Kfishna has to explain

to Arjuna—who is labouring under the delusion of not

knowing the distinction between the natures of body and

dtmd,—the perishability and the imperishability of these

two(categories),in order to dispel that delusion.

It is to show this that the verse:'

As respects bodies

or as respects dtmas &c.(ii-ii)' was begun. Aijd it is to

1. Vishnu-purSna;II-I2, 43. 3. Ibid;II-14, 24.

2. Ibid;II-12,45. 4- Ibib;II-13, 100.

further elaborate the same(subject)that verses

But know that to be indestructible &c.' (ii-17)

'These bodies have endings &c.'(ii-i8),

undertake.

But how is dtmd's (or the soul's) indestructibility

known? This verse tells us:—

g cTf^ &c.

17. '

Know that that verily is indestructible by which

all this is pervaded. No one can cause des

truction to this 'exhaustless.''

Know thatthe <frw/<f-category is indestructible,i.e.that

sentient category (or principle) by which all this insentient

category(orinert matter)is piermeated. Thelatter is quite

distinct from the former. By reason of the pervasive

natureofdtmd,itis exceedingly subtle^ and is incapable of

perishment. Nothing which is of a different kind or of

dissimilar nature from it {dtmd)is capable ofdestroying it

(dttm)., for it (the other thing) is the pervadedy by (the

pervading dtmd, and is grosser than dtmd (which is

subtle*).Such things as weapons, water,fire, air &c.,can as

agents ofdestruction,enter into such things as are of the

destructible kind,and cause disintegration thereof.

1. Means that which cannot be

expended, and therefore znfinzte.

2. The idea is the subtle always

penetrates, the gross is penetrated.

Light penetrates glass. Glass may

get broken, but it never can destroy

light. As glass is to light, so body

is to atma.

The rationale of a club or a mallet &c., striking a

thing and destroying it is thus given;—(The mere contact

ofthe club with the thing does not destroy,the mere force

caused by wielding the club, without coming in contact

with the thing cannot destroy. Therefore), the club when

used with force and the thing is struck, what happens is

that rapid vibration is produced in the air-particles,

which, entering into the thing, produces molecular disrup

tion.^ Hence the afmd-pr'mclple is indestructible.

The next verse tells (us)that perishability is the very

nature of bodies:—

^^&c.

18. These bodiesare declared terminable with respect

to the eternal,indestructible and undemonstra-

ble {dtmns)indwelling the bodies. Therefore

do thou,Bharata! hght.

The term deha(body)is derived from dih,to increase.

And therefore those bodies which increase, have decrease,

and therefore are ofdestructible nature, as in the example

ofa pot which comes to be a pot by increase,combination,

aggregation (or growth),and is therefore subject todecline,

or segregable. The elements combine and become bodies

for the service ofthe eternal embodying(di/nd), to enable

theffl to experience therein the fruitsofkarma(past de^ds).

Say the ^astras:—

By merit,(one becomes)meritorious &c'';

The bodies last as long as karmahsisio be exhausted,

then they disappear.

1. We know of loud noises, like

the thunder-clap, shattering glass-

panes. A loud noise is a sound, a

sound is but a rapid commotion and

agitation set up among the air-part- *

cles, which strike each other and

produce the sound.

2. ‘Punyah pupyena Karmana

bhavati, papah papena &c., (Br: Up

VI-4-5-)

3- Atma, the I, being the self.

conscious entity is no object of con-

sciousness. I[ is the Cognizer of all

facts of consciousness, and no fact of

consciousness can prove the cognizer.

As for dtmdy it is indestructible. Why?

Because it is not an object (of demonstration)

{aprameyd). For dtmd is to be known not as an object to

lared further on.—"The versed(in soul-science)callhfni who

knows this{kshetra\ as the knowerofkshetra(matter,—the

extended)(Bh:Gl XIII-i).

Atma is inconceivable as an aggregate of many

(substances or elements), for everywhere in bodies it is

apprehended in its uniform character of being differentfrom

bodyas prover or cognizer(firamdirt),bysuch experience as

Iknow this'. Nor is apprehensible as of mutable

nature as is the case with the various parts of a body.

Hence,by reason of its uniform (or changeless) nature

(everywhere), di/nd is not an entity which can increase by

aggregation. By reason, moreover,ofits being the prover

(subject) and being the pervader, dimd is eternal. As

regards'body,'because it is aggregable,because it isforthe

service oftheembodied {dtmd)in itsexperiencing the fruits

ofkarma; because it is multiform ;and because it is pene

trable; it is destructible.

Hence, because'

body'is of perishable nature, and

because dtmd is of eternal nature, neither of them can be

just ground for regret. And therefore, with fortitude, bear

the unavoidable sharp contacts of arrows &c., falling

on thee, and bear it in others; and thus going to war &c,

but- without desire for fruit thereof, prepare thyself for

reaching immortality.

^ frfft &c.

19. 'Both ofthem lack understanding,he who think-

eth this dtmd to be the destroyer and he who

thinketh itasthe destroyed. For(dtmd)neither

killeth nor is killable.

1. Cp. ‘Hanta chen-manyate

hantum, hataschen-manyate hatam,

ubhau tal navijdnito ndyam hanti na

hanyate. Kat: Up: II-19,

Whoever fancies that any one can be an instrument

for killing dtmd, and whoever fancies that dtmd is

killable by any cause, both ofthem are short of wisdom.

For reasons stated (already)that dttnd is ofeternal charac

ter (&c), it can never be the cause of destruction; ergo,

dtmd can never destroy. The root kanti,to kill, connotes

an act which requires dtmd as its object. But the act is

expressive ofthat which causes a separation,viz:separation

ofdtmd from body'.

The ^astra-injunctions such as:

No creature shall be harmed'.*

No brdhmana shall be killed'* &c.

are but expressions indicating that, unlawfully, no separa

tion of dtmds from bodies shall be caused.

•T &c.

20. 'At no time is it {dtmd) born, nor doth it die.

Having been (in the past), it cannot be that

it is not going to be (in the future). It

is birthless {aja), eternal {nitya), constant

(sdsvata), and ancient (purdna), and is never

destroyed though the body be destroyed.®'

1. ‘Na himsyad bhiitani.’

2. ‘ Brahmago na hantavyah.’

3. Cf. ‘Na jayate mriyate va

vipaschin-ndyam kutaschin na

babhiiva kaschit, ajo nityas sdsvato-

yam purainpo nahanyate hanyam&ne

| sarire.’ (Kat. Up. [I-18).

4. Brahma’s age.

For reasons set forth, the characteristics^ which are

natural to insentient (inert) bodies such as birth, death

&c, do not pertain to dtmd, for it has no changes on

account ofits eternality. The bodily experiences known

as birth and death do not affect dtmd,and hence the ex

pressions "it is not born,nor doth it die." It cannot be said

that having been before a kalpa^, dtmd is not going

to be after a kalpa. Such births and deaths,at beginnings

Bfid endsofkalpds,the Agamds(Scriptures)say,as happen-

ing to Prajapati^ and others, are with reference to their

bodies, but do not affect atma,

Atind which pervades all bodies is therefore unborn

{aja); and therefore it is eternal and constant. These two

terms denote that like matter even its incessant

subtle(or insensible)changes(in the stage before manifes

tation as the visible kosmos)do not affect dtma.

Purdna (ancient): is etymologically purdpi navah,

meaning 'old, yet new'; meaning tha;t dtmd issuch that

though ancient or old, it is experiencable (or enjoyable)

ever as new.

Hence, though bodies may perish, never can perish

dtmd.

&c.

21. 'Knowing this dtmd to be indestructible,eternal

and birthless, which person, Partha I can,any,

kill or cause to be killed ?'

Thus, how can any person, knowing dtind to be eter

nal by reason of its birthlessness and deathlessness and its

Inexhaustible nature,destroy any dtmd which dwellsin the

numerous bodies of celestial, human, animal and vege

table kingdoms? Whom can he kill? How can he kill?

How can one cause killing?

Hence ignorance of the true nature of dtmd is the

cause of grief that is born by thinking: 'I cause these

dttnds to be killed or I kill them.'

2. The Lord of creatures, lit;

meaning the four-faced Brahm& who

is charged with the minor creations

falling within the limits of a single

globular system in the infinite kosmos,

called drakmdnda (or Brahm’s egg).

Admitting that what happens to the eternal dtmds is

but disjunction from bodies,yetit may form good ground

for regret that bodies,serving as they do as instruments for

enjoying, or for securing enjoyment of, pleasures,should

so separate away! Reply(to this objection):—

wftf &c.

22. 'As,casting off worn out garments, man puts on

other new ones,so doth the dwellerofthe body

eschew worn out bodiesand migratetonew ones.

We learn from the §astras that those who drop their

bodiesinarighteous war,receiveother bodiesofa surpassing

ly more blessed character. Such an event,in our opinion,is

certainly matter for unmixed rejoicing, as is the case of

one who doffs worn out raiment and dons a new and more

decent one.

Again, now, the subject of the indestructibility (of

atma)enounced in verse: "Know that that verily is indes

tructible,by which all this is pervaded"(II-17),isdeveloped

for better comprehension,and the subject is emphasized as

follows:—

^ WTf% &c.

23. '

This atma the weaponscleave not;this,fire burns

not; this, water wets not ; and wind withers

not this.

&c.

24. 'Invulnerable is this,incombustible is this;never

is this nioistened nor is dried up; this is

eternal, all-pervading, fixed, motionless and

ancient'

Weapons have no power to cut(or inflict wounds on),

nor fire power to consume,nor water to wet,norair to dry,

this {atyna). AUna being capable of pervading all i.e.,

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