Introduction to Shudda-advaita Darshan 2 страница

After having considered the ideals and their real nature, he tells us how to realize these ideals. The realization of the ideals depends upon the suitability of the surroundings but in modern times it is not possible. Environment is not congenial to men in all the cases. What ‘then under’ these circumstances should be done? To that he replies that even under most unfavorable, circumstances there is no need of becoming dependent. If it is not possible to practice the means preached by the scriptures, men should at least be devoted to Lord Krishna. His devotion is quite sufficient. This view he expresses in verse 13. Even the Kali age which is regarded as not favorable, will be favorable. But when? Only if man resorts to Krishna and dedicates himself to his service. So there is no need to be pessimistic. All the scriptures this way, are said to have understood the meaning of scriptures, others fail to understand them. If the interpreters of the scriptures tell anything contrary to this; they should not be listened to.

Pramey Chapter:

But what is this highest entity called God or Brahman? The author answers the question first by giving the Karya Lakshana of God and then by Swaroop Lakshana. By Karya Lakshana we mean, the concept of ‘God’ as expressed in the term of Karya i. e. effect viz world. The author says that if you put a question ‘ What is God?, then, I say that He is the creator of the world and the souls. The author of the Brahman Sutras also pursues this method of describing Brahman, in his second aphorism ‘Janmandhasya Yato’ i. e. God is one from which the world originates in which it exists and into which it finally is absorbed. So in the opinion of out author, the world and the souls are creations of Brahman. He is the material cause as well as the efficient cause. In order to understand the relation subsisting between the cause ‘Brahman’ and its effect ‘the World’ let us understand what is meant by cause.

A cause is that which preceding its effect is invariably concommittant with it and at the same time is not proved to be an essential and accidental circumstance i. e. three essentials constitute our notion of a cause

1. Priority to effect
2. Invariability with it
3. Its Non-accidentality.

The requisite priority excludes effect from being covered up by a cause. The invariability excludes all the accidental circumstances. In the production of a piece of cloth, an ass many by happen to bring the threads out of which cloth is to be made. Here although the ass exists before the cloth, still it is not the cause owing to its want of being invariably associated with the cloth. We cannot say that for the production of a cloth, the ass is necessary. All that is required is threads. They may be carried by an ass or by any other means. The priority of the ass being accidental, he is not a cause.

Again, the cause may be prior, and an unvariable concomitant yet it is not sufficient to be a cause, without being not unessential and accidental circumstance. The colour of the thread does exist before and is invariably connected with a piece of cloth. For this reason it may be the cause. But its not so. Because the colour of threads exhausts its casual power by contributing to the production of the colour of the cloth. In other words, the cause must be Ananyatha-Siddha. Having thus defined the cause, the author of Tarka Sangraha says that they are three kinds of causes

1. Samvaayi
2. Asamvaayi
3. Nimitta

The Vedantins accepts only the first and the last. Samvaayi Karan is the material cause and Nimitta Karan is an efficient cause.

It is explained by the illustration of threads which constitute the material cause of the cloth. Here the cloth is in an intimate relation with the threads. The relation between the material cause and its effect must be intimate (Samvett). Relation of threads with the loom is that of simple conjuction (Samyog). It is intimate relation and not conjunctional relation that is required between a material cause and its effect. This intimate relation subsists between the 2 Ayutsiddha objects i. e. objects out of which one continues united with the other so long as the other exists. This is in accordance with the views of the Naiyayikas. But Purushottamji in his Prasthan Ratnakar defines material cause as for e. g. The yarn is the material cause of the cloth because it is yarn that becomes manifest in the form of cloth. Cloth is nothing but yarn in a transformed condition i. e. the essence of the effect is the same as cause. So when an effect comes out form a cause, it means that the cause possesses that effect in it.

It is latent there, waiting for some external energy to bring it out. When it is brought out, it retains its character of the original substance. An ornament is an effect and gold its material cause. It is material cause, because gold possesses the same substance which is in gold. If the substance were not the same, the ornament would not have been made. So long the ornament remains, the substance of gold also remains. But when ornament is dissolved, the substance of gold is not dissolved. It remains the same in all its phases. So when any material retains its quality of ‘Identity’ between it and its effect, it is called a material cause. In other words that is the material cause which reveals its nature in the effect. This being the case, the material is always inherent in an effect. Without this cause, no effect is possible. The effect ‘Ornament’ is produced from ‘Gold’, because gold is inherent. The Nimitta Karan is the efficient cause. The goldsmith who makes ornaments is the efficient cause. For an effect, therefore, two things are necessary. Once the substance, out of which the thing is to be created and the maker, who creates it in accordance with his plan. The former we call a material cause and the latter, an efficient cause.

Let us try to understand what do these 2 mean? Are they both identical or different? Shri Vallabhacharya holds that in the case of the world and the souls, Brahman is both a material cause and efficient cause. We shall discuss here some important theories relating to this question.

The Casuality of the world is attributed to Nature in the Samkhya system and to atoms in Vaisheshika System. In his Anubhasya, Shri Vallabhacharya has proved the falsity of the samkhyas claim in favour of nature, on the strength of scriptural evidence. Some of the chief points emphasized there in refuting the PrakrutiKaranta as under:

Samkhya System Nirakarana:

1. RachananuPateshascha Nanumanam (2-2-1). Prakriti according to Samkhyas is Jada. The attribute of Kartutva belongs only to Chetan. Therefore Jad Prakruti can not be a cause of the cosmos.

2. Pravruteshcha (2-1-2): If Prakruti is admitted as a cause, the Jeeva’s activity or engagement into various affairs of life would not be possible. The activity needs impulse from something, endowed with conscientiousness. But Prakruti is destitute of such consciousness. So she can not be a cause.

3. Payombuvaschettatrapi (2-2-3). This is advanced against the argument that Pravruti is possible in the case of Prakruti. Just as waters present wonderful spectacle in the foam, by producing diversity of colours; in the same way Prakruti will also manifest activity of its own accord. But this argument does not hold good. Even in the motion of waters, there is the hand of Chetan at work. It is Chetan that imparts motion. So the analogy cited does not support the causality of Prakriti.

4. Vyatirekanavsthiteshchanapekshatvat: (2-2-4): This is directed against Swatah Parinaam Samarthya of Prakriti. If Prakriti be capable of evolving herself, then there will be no end of an effect i. e. cosmos. It will always continue. But we learn that just as the effect (cosmos) has its origin, so it has ultimate end also. A time will come when this continuity will be disturbed. So it is wrong to hold that Prakruti unaided by any other agency evolves cosmos out of herself.

5. Anyatraabhavascha Na Trunadivat (2-2-5): The Samkhya Vadi seems to argue that grassblade and leaves etc. grazed by cattle turn themselves into milk. This turning is not due to any external agency. It happens in the natural course. In the like manner, Prakruti is also capable of self-manifestation.

The Sutrakara Challenges this argument by a meet counter reply. “Turning into milk”, referred to above is not slef-evident. It is caused by the action of Chetan which appeared in “grazing”. If this turning into milk does appear only in a particular part of the body, why dos it not appear in horns etc? This proves that the position taken by Samkhya is false.

6. AbhyupagamepyatharBhavat (2-2-6).

a. To establish causality of Prakriti it should not be said that like a cow going to her calf naturally of her own accord, Prakriti reveals activity for the enjoyment of Purush. Even if such an argument were offered, its validity at once falls down, owing to the absence of Pragyakaaritva in her. So mere Prakruti can not be a cause of cosmos.

Now he proceeds to refute the causality of Prakriti, action under the influence of Purusha.

1. Even this position is not tenable. Prakriti and Purusha both together cannot aid each other in the production of the universe. A blind man may help a lame man and a lame man in his turn a blind man. Or to take another illustration, a piece of iron gets attracted towards a magnet, and a magnet in its turn towards a piece of iron. But such a relation of mutual aiding does not subsist between Prakriti and Purusha. If it is held that Prakriti works under the influence of Purusha. If it is held that Prakriti works acting under the influence of Purusha, then this statement is subject to a flaw of Aprayojakatva of Prakriti. Prakriti will cease to be a Prayojaka. Nor can it be supposed that this acting depends upon Prakriti, and consequently no force or impulse of creating or acting is derived by her from Purusha; because in that case, activity will continue forever and will never cease. This argument naturally presupposes the eternal relationship between Prakriti and Purusha. But the Samkhyas do not belive this. The relation between them is not eternal. The union of Prakriti with Purusha is a cause of bondage. This bondage can be cut off, only when Purusha remains aloof from Prakriti. So it is fallacious to draw conclusion which is antagonistic to the Samkhya theory, in order to establish causality of Prakriti acting under the influence of Purusha.

2. Angitvanupapateshcha (2-2-8). Another flaw is pointed out in the above reasoning. If causality be attributed to Prakriti and Purusha, then one of them must be considered chief and another subordinate. Suppose some on holds that Purusha is chief, then we must know that he indirectly lends support to or rather embrace Brahmvaad. This means frustration of his cherished theories. Nor can he declare that Prakriti is chief and Purusha is subordinate. Such an assumption conduces one to the state of want of emancipation.

The sutra does not permit to draw such an inference so that it will not leave any doubts for any of the flaws, pointed out above. Prakruti is destitute of the capability of knowledge. We are not, therefore, entitled to draw any inference of an opposite kind.

Thus, the Sutrakara rejects Samkhya theory whole-some, as not deserving any amount of consideration in the matter of causality, because on examination, the theory is found defective and incompatible with the spirit of the Shruti. Not only this, but there is a conflict even among the Samkhyas themselves. Some commonly known as “Nirishwar Samkhyas’ accepts 25 substances, enumerated above; while others of the same group known as “Seshvara’ add Ishwara and make the list of 26 substances.

Atomic Theory Nirakaran (Paramanuvaad):

Next, the theory of the causality of atoms supplies the Sutrakara with a theme for consideration. The credit of propounding this theory belongs to Kanad. It is not only peculiar to him but is the distinguishing feature of his philosophy. These atoms take the place of Tanmatras in Samkhya philosophy. It is however not unknown in the Nyaya philosophy, yet it is not fully worked out there as in the Vaisheshika works. In his analysis, he stops at one smallest point, beyond which he cannot carry on his analytical method. Without this admission, he is of opinion that a fault known as a regressus ad infinitum will result. “A mountain, he says, would not be larger then a mustard seed. These smallest and invisible particules are held by Kanad to be eternal in themselves, but non-eternal as aggregates. As Aggregates again they may be organized, the power of smelling is the earthly organ, stones are inorganic”. “As to atoms, they are supposed to form first an aggregate of two, then an aggregate of three double atoms, then of four triples atoms an so on. White single atoms are indestructible, composite atoms are by their very nature liable to decomposition, and in that sense to destruction. An atom, by itself invisible, is compared to the sixth part of a mote in a sun beam”

This atomic theory, says the Sutrakara, fails to interprete correctly the doctrine of causality. The refutation of this theory is based upon the following arguments:

1. No combination of atoms is possible. Two distinct atoms that unite with each other have no space in them. This want of space prevents their combination. So the theory of Dwaanuk, Taryanuk etc is ludircrous.

2. If atoms are eternal, there will be no dissolution of the universe.

3. We can not suppose that atoms possess form. If we believe that they possess form, then they would acquire ephemeral character.

4. This atomic theory is not accepted by all vaidikas.

Buddhist Theory Nirakaran:

Now we shall consider the Buddhist Theory:

According to Buddhas, the combination of two things namely Paramanu Samuh and Skandh Samuday is the cause of the bondage of Jeeva. Paramanu Samuh means Prithvivyadibhut Samuday and Skandh Samuday is the collection of five Skandhas: -

1. Rupa Skandh
2. Vigyan Skandh
3. Vedana Skandh
4. Sangya Skandh
5. Sanskar Skandh

The combination of all these is the cause of the bondage of Jeeva’s in metapsychosis. The separation of all these by the annihilation of each one of them means emancipation. This is the conception of emancipation according to the Buddhistic school. Badarayana refuses to accept this theory of the dual combination of Paramanu Samuh and Skandh Samudaya on the ground that it is accepted them all substances as well as Jivas according to Baudhas being ephemeral, it will not be possible for the Jivas to cut off the bondage of metempsychosis. The reasoning is this. In the first moment, according to this theory, JIvas and Samuday dways will be produced. In the second moment, they will get united with each other. In the third moment, their union results into metempyschosis of the Jivas. But this is opposed to the fundamental doctrine of the Bauddhas who declare the momentariness of all things. The sutra contains refutation of this theory. The disputant offers an explanation for this theory, by stating that, even though all things by nature are momentary, and their existence ceases in the next moment, yet the things existing in a prior condition are a cause to those that usher into existence in a prior condition are a cause to those that usher into existence in a subsequent condition. Thus the continuity is never broken. This being the case, there will be no end of the metempyshosis. But the Sutrakara is too bold to make allowance even such explanation. He therefore in 2-219, boldly declares against this attitude of his disputant. The Nimitatva of these is accepted so far as Uttaropatti of things are concerned. In the case of Samuday it does not permit any such admission; because want of stability of things prevents its after connection in a subsequent stage; and this makes the combination impossible. So the theory is not free from the flaw to which it is subjected above. The theory is not free from the flaw to which it is subjected above. The theory that the things that are produced causes production of subsequent things also does not hold good, because at the moment of its production, it is already destroyed. Moreover, if we accept that things are born, continue and get dissolved. Moreover, if we accept that things are born, continue and get dissolved simultaneously in one and the same moment, the contradiction involved becomes apparent. The attack of this point is an occasion in 2-2-20

The Bahyamat lays down two fundamental Pratigya’s in connection with this. The first one is called Kshanikatva Pratigya which is expressed in Sarva Kshanikam. If in 2-2-21 the Sutrakara says that if the connection of the thing is admitted in the next moment, with another thing, then the first Pratigya will be violated. If it is not admitted then, it leads to the violation of second. Thus the disputant is on the horns of a dilemma. He is placed in a very precarious position. So the assumption of his theory at once totters down.

Having thus rendered Baudha’s postion impotent as regards the production of things ‘in the succeeding moment, the Sutrakara goes on attacking their position with respect to destruction of things’. This gives an occasion for the sutra 2-2-22. This is principally directed against those Baudhists that style themselves as Vainashikas. They hold non-eternity of things. These kinds of destruction, upheld by the Baudhas are not possible; because the continuity of things is not destroyed. The continuity persists even in succeeding moments.

The first Nirodh is opposed to all reasons, because the things being momentaty, cannot have any connection with their Nashak “Destroyer”. The second one also similarly falls to the ground. Thus the theory of Nirodh “Destruction” cannot be supported.

But the Kshanikvadins believe that emancipation results from the extinction of nescience. The Sutrakara says that even this is not true. The Sutra 2-2-23 exposes the hollowness of their arguments. If the destruction of nescience, with all its attendants is admitted as not resulting from any motive then the utility of scriptural authority becomes questionable. If it be admitted to proceed from a deliberate motive, and a fair ground, it is not possible in view of the fact that in the system of the Baudhas, the object other than nescience as well as its effect is not accepted. Commenting upon what has been said about Akash by Baudhas, the Sutrakara in the next sutra states that what applies to Nirodh does mutatis mutandis also apply to Akash.

Vigyanvaad Nirakaran:

Vigyanvadi is also answered as follows in the Nabhavah Upalabhdhe Adhikaran

1. Naabhavah Upalabhdhehe: 2-2-28. The Vigyanvadi consideres Prapancha to be Vigyanmayah. According to him, objects have got no external existence. But this non-existence of the objects cannot be accepted. Objects have their external existence. No body can deny this.

2. 2-2-29. Even if one denies non-existence of Prapanch, its unreality cannot be gain said. If this attitude be taken by Vigyanvadi, the Sutrakara opposes it here. It is a wrong analogy to draw comparison between dreamy phenomena and external objects. Lapse of time does not exhibit any difference in the condition of external objects like a jar etc. Their knowledge will be the same even after a lapse of time. In the dreamy phenomena, our experience is not of the same character.

3. 2-2-30. As external objects have no existence, in the system of Vigyanvad, desires also have no existence. If however it is argued that desires are beginningless, the statement becomes liable to a fault of Andhaparadh. Without object, there can be no desires.

4. Kshanikatvacch 2-1-31. Desires can have no substratum, because AlayVigyan is momentary.

Thus both Sautantrika and Vigyanvadi are firmly overcome by the Sutrakara. Their theory of Asatkaryavad is totally rendered useless.

Syaadvaad Nirakaran:

The Syaadvaad is also refuted in four aphorisms. The followers of Syaadvaad are indifferent to external objects. They explain everything in accordance with what is called Saptabhaanginay. The seven BHangi’s (modes) are

1. Syaadatsi
2. Syaanashti
3. Syaadasti Cha Nasti Cha
4. Syaadvaktavya
5. SyaadastiChaavaktavyaha
6. Syaanaasti Chavaktavyascha
7. Syaadasti Cha Syaanaasti Chavaktavyaascha

1. 2-2-23: This Saptabhanginay does not merit admission, since Bhav and Abhav both expressed in the words of Asti and Nasti cannot be combined into one. The thing cannot be and not be at the same time. Either it is or it is not.

2. 2-2-34: If one says that owing to its indifference to external state of objects, the above fault does not occur, the Sutrakara warns us that even if the above explanation were granted, the statement will not be entirely free from the fault pointed out above. In that case also it will prove non-existence of everything.

According to Syaadvad, the size of soul is in proportion to the body. If the body is big, the soul is big, if it is small, the soul is small. This is hardly believable in view of that fact that, owing to unequality of all bodies, all the souls proportionately will be proportionately unequal.

3. 2-2-35: It should not be said that souls expand and contract like the limbs of the body. If it were so, then atma must be believed a vikaari substance.

4. 2-2-36: To avoid above faults, one should not hold permanency of Anutva or Mahatva. Because even thus does not establish Sharirparimanatva of body. This gives a final stroke to Syaadvad.

Mimansakas and Naiyayikas Nirakaran:

The conception of Ishwara figures prominently in the system of Patanjali, who added Ishwara as an extra entity to the list of 25 entities, accepted by the samkhyas. Kapil, however, does not advance any arguments to disprove the existence of God. What he says is this, that – and in this respect he does not differ much from Kant-there are no logical proofs to establish that existence, but neither does he offer any such proofs for denying it. This position is bettered by Patanjali in the Yoga Philosophy. The question of the existence of a Deity has arrested the attention of Gautam also; but only incidentally-“It comes in when a problem of the Buddhists is under discussion, namely, whether the world came out of nothing, and whether the manifestation of anything presupposes the destruction of its cause. This is illustrated by the fact that the seed has to perish before the flower can appear. But Gautam strongly denies this, and reminds the opponent that if the seed were really destroyed by being pounded or burnt, the flower would never appear. Nor could it be said that the flower, if it had not existed previously, destroyed the seed, while if it had, it would have owed its existence to the simple destruction of the seed. Therefore he continues, as nothing can be produced from nothing, nor from an annihilated something like a seed, the world also cannot have sprung from nothingness, but requires the admission of an Ishvara, the Lord, as its real cause. And this admission of an Ishvara, even though in the capacity of a governor rather then of a maker of the world is confirmed by what was evidently considered by a Gautama as a firmly established truth, namely that every act of man invariably produces its result, though not by itself, but under the superintendence of some one, that is of Ishvara. We then meet with a new argument, different from that of Mimansakas, namely that, if previous work (Karma) continued to produce effect of its own accord, independent of supreme Lord, then, how shall we account for the fact that some good or evil deeds of men at times remain barren without producing their fruits?

This doctrine of Ishvara is disapproved by the Sutrakara, who offers the following arguments.

1. 2-2-37. Ishvara cannot be acknowledged as a Niyamak different from Jeeva’s, because in that case the fault of “Unequality” and “cruelty” will be attributed to Ishvara. As this Ishvara has the expectancy of Karma’s, his independence becomes doubtful.

2. 2-2-33: Jeeva and Brahm being Vibhu, the connection of unborn God with Jiva is not possible.

3. 2-2-39: Ishvara cannot be imagined as a maker of the universe. Otherwise it will be inconsistent with the position assumed by the opponent.

4. If Kartrutva be attributed to Ishvara, then the senses will also belong to him; and this means He is subject to the experience of happiness and misery. This supposition reduces Ishvara to position analogues to that of a Jeeva.

These arguments prove the untenability of the Ishvaravad of Naiyayikas.

Mayavaad Nirakaran:

Shankaracharya explains the creation of the world by his theory of Maya. Absolute Brahman has nothing to do with creation. It is the work of Maya. On account of Maya, the creative activity is attributed to Brahman i. e. Universe is the outcome of Maya. This doctrine is subject to the under-mentioned flaws: -

1. If we support Maya to be the cause, then we shall have to support two principles existing simultaneously

a. Braham and
b. Maya.

This means dualism, which is opposed to the philosophy of Mayavada.

2. It is said by the upholder of the Maya doctrine that just as a man has errorneous cognition of a serpent in a rope lying on the ground, due to some optical defect; in the same way, it is due to Maya that one does see Brahman as the Universe. In fact, just as the serpent does not exist, so also the universe does not exist. Here it must be said that the analogy is false. In the illustration of a rope and a serpent, both the objects have forms, whereas in the example of Brahman and the Universe only the universe has a form. Now how can a Universe that has a form, be seen in Brahman that is formless? This is against common experience. Even the appearance must be of an object that has a form and not of one that has no form. Again in the case of illusion, this law operates, that the illusion is possible only if that object which has been previously seen. In the rope, the illusion of the serpent is possible, because the person who has that illusion has seen the serpent previously, but nobody has seen the universe, prior to its illusion in Brahman. The doctrine of Maya therefore is not tenable.

From all these theories, we learn that neither Prakriti not atoms nor Maya becomes the material cause of Universe. Vallabhacharyaji considers Brahman as the material cause. According to him the universe is not an illusion or something wrongly conceived in Brahman. It is one that was latent in Brahman that been brought out by Brahman for its pleasure. So the universe is not false. It is real as Brahman. Baudhas hold it real but their view is that existence comes into being from non-existence. The Naiyayikas and Vaishehshikas maintain that it is a non-entity arising from entity. The Mayavada holds that the whole series of effects are only as apparent changes in the cause. So the universe according to him is unreal. The Samkhya system has repudiated all these theories and established the theory of an effect being an entity arising from an entity.

But in that system the universe is supposed to emanate from non-entity. The following are the chief grounds on which the existence of an effect is proved in that system.

1. What is a non-entity can never be made an entity i. e. that which has never existed can never be brought into existence. If oil were not contained the oil-seed, we could not have produced oil.

2. Effect is always in one way or another, related to the cause. If the cause is real, its effect must be real.

3. Prior to its revelation, an effect is always latent in the cause. The jar could not be made if it were not latent in the clay. So if the universe were not in its cause, it could not have been manifested. There the universe is real.

Shree Vallabhacharyaji accepts the reality of the universe. As Brahman is real, its creation is also real. It cannot be other then real.

In Tadananyatvaadhikaran, he says that Sutrakara expresses his view on this knotty question on the strength of the passage of the Shruti viz. Shruti ‘Vacharambhanam Vikaaro Naamdheyam Mruttiketyeva Satyam” Cha (6-1-1). Some hold that the words ‘Vacharambhanam” and “Vikaaro” etc. prove that falsity or unreality of the effect. This interpretation, according to Sutrakara, is a far fetched one and unwarranted by the wordings of the Shruti. This point is clearly hinted in the sutra 2-1-14. The purport of the Shruti is to establish the oneness of or non-difference between the cause and the effect and not the unreality of the effect as alleged of Mayavadin. The stress is laid upon Ananyata between Karya and Karan and not upon Mithyatva of Karya. The Bhasyakara commenting upon this sutra, makes the following observations upon the Mayavadins for holding the theory of the unreality of cosmos. It will be realized from these comments that the theory of Mithyatva is here strongly denounced by the Bhasyakara. Not only its hollowness is exposed in all its nakedness but his challenge is thrown point blank back on him. In the example of clay, referred to in the above Shruti, it is said that various names by which different objects created out of clay are known are due to speech. Names and forms are called Vikaras (modifications). In the case of a Jar, the thing that is clay is true at all times; but the fact that it has received the appellation of a jar is due to speech. In the same way, the differences or modifications such as Jagat, Jiva etc that appear to our eyes are due to speech. They do not exist in the thing with which they are associated. In fact Jagat and Jiva are the parts of Brahman. For the sake of wordly transaction they are given distinct names as Jagat and Jiva. This does not make any fundamental difference in their essential form. The difference that appears between them and Brahman is simply nominal. Nobody can say against this, that even when one gives the name of a jar to a certain lump of clay, he is conscious of the conviction of its unreality; because the cognition of a jar is possible only in its existence and not in its non-existence. Even at a time when one has this cognition, the jar is there, nobody can deny its existence. The cognition arises from existence. Hence, it is beyond all shades of doubt that Vacharambhan Shruti propounds oneness with Karan (Brahman). Also, the Shruti (Chandogya 6-2-0) shows the reality of cosmos. Next the two sutras 2-1-15 further support to this.

⇐ Предыдущая 123 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Следующая ⇒