Introduction To Vedanta - P. Nagaraja Rao 6 страница

⇐ ПредыдущаяСтр 10 из 20Следующая ⇒

cursive reason. One of the great mystics of the

Christian tradition, St. John of the Cross, writes, “One

of the greatest favours bestowed on soul transiently

in this life is to enable it to see so distinctly and to

feel so profoundly that it cannot comprehend God

at all. ”

The Kena TJpanisad declares that “to whomsoever

it is not known, to him it is known; to whomsoever it

is known, it is not known. It is not understood by

those who understand it; it is understood by those

who do not understand it. ” What satisfies the intellect

is not complete understanding.

On the ethical side the Vedantic tradition does

not belittle the significance of our universe and life

here. Vedanta requires and teaches us a way of life.

It asks us to transform the institutions of the world

APPROACH TO VEDANTA

in the light of our vision. This effort of ours to save-

the world without authentic spiritual experience is

bound to fail. It asks the God-realized soul not to

conduct a sit-down strike and stay in his own room.

He should go about his business with his vision and

not be tempted by the dirty devices of the world.

He should set an example for others in society. The

Kena Upanisad declares that “in this human life, we

would sustain a great loss if we failed to make an

effort to raise ourselves to spiritual existence. ” The

mystic poet Kablr writes, “O friend, hope for Him

whilst you live, understand while you live, for in

life deliverance abides. ” Vedanta never encouraged

intellectual indolence, nor disregarded free thinking.

It never emphasized piety as against the intellect.

Vedanta asks us to begin with a faith that inquires.

We should start with a working hypothesis. Faith en-

ables us to step out and break away from what is

purely empirical. It releases us from the tyranny of

the world of perception. Faith gives us the necessary

humility which becomes the solid foundation of our

life.

Its test of spirituality is the increase in spiritual

values. An ordered society based on spiritual values

grounded in morality is the ideal of Vedanta. The

Vedantic ideal is perfect rest and peace amidst cease-

less toil and incessant activity. It does not ask us to

indulge in the natural appetites, nor does it ask us to

suppress them, but urges us to utilize them to build

the spiritual life. It neither negates the world nor

affirms its autonomy, but only judges it in the measure

it is useful to us to live our spiritual life.

Chapter V

SANKARA’S ADVAITA

The system of Vedanta popularised by Sankara

is called the Advaita.. True to the traditions of the

Vedanta, Sri Sankara declares- that he has derived

the doctrines of his system from the synthesis of the

triple texts. The glory of this system is that it can

stand the test of the most severe logic. Hence,

it can be viewed as an independent system of philo-

sophy, like those of Kant, Hegel and Plato. It is also

possible to see in it the Indian version of the perennial

philosophy advocated by the great mystics of the

East and the West.

The initial authority for the doctrines of the

Advaita Vedanta is the scripture. Purportful scrip-

ture alone is taken into account. The purport of a

scriptural passage is determined by several marks of

purport. Of the marks of purport, reason (Upapatti)

is the most prominent one. The authority of the scrip-

ture is invoked not in respect of those facts that can be

known from inference and perception. Where they

fail, scripture steps in. Scripture is not taken as

authority in the determination of facts that can be

known from other sources of knowledge. It describes

the two great philosophical ideals mok$a and dharma

and the proper means to their realisation.

Reason is not ruled out completely. Nor is all

reason declared indecisive. It can indicate probab-

ility and not demonstrate completely. The Sastras

are only jnapaka and not kdrakas.

For an intellectual understanding of Advaita we

need sharp understanding. It is not for the intellec-

tually indolent. The Advaitin believes that mere senses

SAtfKARA’S AD V AIT A

and reason^ cannot exhaust Reality. To understand

the spirit and realise it we need expedience. Spiri-

tual experience is the final authority in matters of

religion. It is not occult vision or physical ecstas/*

Spiritual experience transcends the intellect, but is

not contra-intellectual. It is not an instinct. Henri

Poincare observes: “Logic alone is not enough, the"

science of demonstration is not the whole of science,

and that of intuition must still act as a complement,

I must almost say as a counter weight or antidote^

to Logic. ”

Sankara explains his doctrines with the help

of logical reason. He sets forth to explain in terms of

logic what he has spiritually experienced himself.

Spiritual experience, ‘anubhuti’, is the supreme autho-

rity. That type of reasoning which nullifies what is

taught by scripture is declared invalid. We find

the Spirit by experience and explain it with the help

of logic.

The doctrines of Advaita Vedanta can be briefly

stated in a few propositions. (1) Brahman is Reality

(2) The World has apparent (mithya) reality (3) 'The

soul is non-different from Brahman*

Sankara is a Monist. He believes and posits the

reality of only one category. He calls that entity

Brahman. There is nothing besides Brahman. All

that is, is Brahman. It has no second to it. The

Absolute is non-dual. Sankara seeks to establish the

nature of Brahman on the authority of Sruti and

Logic. In the words of William James, Sankara’s sys-

tem is “the paragon of all monistic systems. ”

Reality is Brahman. “It alone was in the begin-

ning, ” say the Upanisads. It is not related to any-

thing for there is nothing else to relate it with. It

INTRODUCTION TO VEDANTA

is a homogeneous non-composite spirit. It is devoid

of all internal and external relations. It is Suddha

caitanya. There is nothing like it. Nor is there any-

thing real other than it. Sankara’s Brahman is not

brute-matter. It is not a substance but is the spirit. It

is not a personality with eyes and hands. It is not

a system with several parts rich in content like the

Absolute of Hegel. Nor is it an organism with several

limbs working in co-operation. to keep the organism

fit.

It is not an object of thought. It is Perfection,

Reality and Existence. It cannot be defined in terms

*' trf’bhy categories, for there is nothing beside it. It

‘ is hot the result or product of any activity. It is self-

caused and the root cause of all. It is an absolute

contrast to, and is fundamentally different from things

that are. It can only be expressed negatively in terms

of what it is not.

Here are a few Upani$adic descriptions of Brah-

man. In a celebrated passage the Mdndukya des-

cribes Brahman, “It is unseen, incapable of being

spoken of, ungraspable, without any distinctive

marks, unthinkable, unnameable, the essence of the

knowledge of oneself, that into which the World is re-

solved, the peaceful, the benign and the non dual. ”

In another passage of the Brhaddranyaka, Yajna-

valkya describes Brahman to his persevering pupil

Gargi, “That which the Brahmanas call the imperish-

able aksara is not gross, not fine, not short, not long,

not glowing, not adhesive, without shadow, without

darkness, without air, without space, without sticki-

ness, odourless, tasteless, without eye, without ear,

without. voice, without wind, without energy, without

mouth, without breath, without personal or family

SANKARA’S ADVATTA

name, unajging and undying, without fedr, immortal,

stainless and not uncovered, not covered, without

measure, without inside and without outside. ” Thus

we see that Sankara’s Brahman is bevond the snh erei

of all predications. It cannot be truly designated in

positive terms. 1

The negative description of Brahman is not the

result of Sankara’s caprice or whim. There are

certain logical difficulties in the attempt to describe

Brahman in positive terms. It is these difficulties that

make Sankara stick to the negative description of

Brahman.

The logical difficulties are many. To describe

a thing is to relate it with some other thing than it-

self. In the case of Brahman there is nothing besides

it to relate it with. Further, description presupposes

some measure in terms of which we describe a thing.

Brahman is the measure of all. It is the Reality and

ground of all things. We cannot measure the mea-

sure itself. We cannot light the candle to see the

sun. We can only describe Brahman as not this, as

not that. Being the basis of all things, it cannot be

described. In a memorable passage the Brhaddran-

yaka describes the difficulties. “For where there is

duality as it were, there one smells another, there one

speaks to another, there one thinks of another, there

one understands another. ” “Where verily, every-

thing has become the self, then by What and whom

should one smell, then by what and whom should

one see, then by what and whom should one hear,

then by what and whom should one speak, then by

what and whom should one understand? ”.... “By

1. Eckhart cried out, “Wouldst Thou be Perfect, do not yelp

about God. ” The Tao says, “Cease holding opinions about It. ”

INTRODUCTION TO VEDANTA

what should one know that by which all this is

known? By what, my dear, should one know the

knower? ”

Brahman is not an object of knowledge. The

logic of definition is beset with difficulties. The attempt

to define Brahman lands us in contradictions. Defini-

tion is a form of relation. It presupposes three fac-

tors, the two relata and the relationing process. The

predicate of a proposition is supposed to say some-

thing about the subject by relating it to it. Several fac-

tors are brought to our notice. There is the ques-

tion whether the predicate is different from the

subject or not. If it is identical and non-different

from the subject, it fails to serve its purpose. If it

is something different, it ascribes to the subject what

it is not. The difficulty does not end there.

The nature of relationing which connects the

subject to the predicate is discrepant. The ques-

tion — is relation a quality separate from the sub-

ject and predicate or not — is not easy to answer with-

out invqlving ourselves in contradictions. If it is

not a separate quality, it is identical; so it cannot

connect the subject and the predicate. It fails in

its purpose of relationing. If. it is regarded as a

separate quality, it needs in its turn another relation

to relate it with, that in its turn requires another.

Thus, the process ends in infinite regress. If it be

contended that there is no need for connection be-

tween the subject and the predicate at all, then the

category of relation becomes superfluous. Relation is

the most important form for the functioning of all

logical categories e. g., Substance and Attribute,

Cause and Effect, Agent and Action,, etc. Without

SAtfKARA’S ADVAITA

the category of relation, they do not become intelli-

gible. On sharp analysis, the category of relation

turns out to be self-discrepant. All descriptions pre-

suppose relation and its work.

Thought cannot work without the scheme of

relation. The relational way of knowing things

cannot give us the knowledge of Brahman. Rela-

tional knowledge can only give us the appearance of

things. Relational knowledge helps us to know about

a thing and not the thing as such. It is mediate

knowledge and not realisation of the nature of a thing.

Bradley clinches the issue about the nature of rela-

tions. He writes, “The conclusion to which I am

brought is that a relational way of thought — any one

that moves by the machinery of terms and relations —

must give appearance and not truth. It is a make-

shift, a device, a mere practical compromise, most

necessary but in the end most indefensible. ”

Brahman is above all the relational ways of know-

ledge. 2 It is an impersonal transcendent Being that is

unthinkable in terms of predicates. It is the seer of

objects. The sights are many, but the seer is one. It

has no genus (jati), not quality (Guna). It is not a

product (kriya). It is above all relational ways of

thinking. It is pure consciousness. It is eternal and

does not suffer any change (vikara). It is not an exist-

ent. It is existence itself. Not being limited by any

objects it is infinite. It is identical with the self of all

beings. It is neither a substance with the quality of

consciousness, nor is it an ever-changing stream of

2. Eckhart writes: ‘‘God is unlike to anything and like to

nothing. He is above being. He is naught. ” “God is Being it-

self, without a second, unchangeable, without quality, without

form, neither this nor that. ”

INTRODUCTION TO VEDANTA

consciousness. It is not even a subject o£ conscious-

ness related to its object. It is pure consciousness,

that is neither a subject nor an object, not even the

unity of the subject and the object. It is an un-

changing indeterminate and subject-objectless consci-

ousness. Sankara in his commentary on the Vedanta

Sutras writes that when Bahva asked hf Bakshita to ex-

pound the nature of Brahman he kept silent. He pray-

ed again, ‘teach me sir. ’ The teacher kept silent, and

when pressed a second and a third time he said, “I am

teaching you, you do not follow. The self is silent. ”

The Upani$ad declares that Words and mind returned

back not attaining Brahman. They declare that Brah-

man is not attainable through discursive thought.

“Outside the spirit there is not and there cannot

be any Reality and the more anything is spiritual, so

much more it is veritably real. ” To say that Brah-

man cannot be described does not mean that it does

not exist. It is not non-existence. It can be known

indirectly and realised directly through spiritual

experience. The negative description of Brahman has

irritated the critics of Sankara at home and abroad.

They equate Sankara’s Brahman with absolute Non-

existence. They declare with. Hegel and the Nyaya

school that pure being is no being at all. Sankara

knew his critics well in advance. He has remarked

in his commentary on the Chdndogya that Brahman

which is bereft of space, time, quality, genus, fruit, etc.

and of all differences is the secondless Reality. It

appears as absolute Nothing to men of feeble intellect

(manda buddhi). Sankara’s Brahman is self-luminous,

unconditioned existence, unexcellable bliss. It is the

Reality of the world. It is the real of all reals.

SANKARA’S ADVAITA

Though Sankara does not believe that Brahman,

can be known by the instruments of knowledge, still

he does not leave us without sufficient methods for

understanding the nature of Brahman. He formulates

two types of definitions called Svarupa lak$ana and

Tatastha-laksana. The first definition states the essen-

tial nature of Brahman. Brahman is described as

Existence, Knowledge, and Bliss (Sat, cit and ananda).

These are not so much qualities of Brahman as his

nature. The description has to be negatively inter-

preted. Brahman is not unreality, ignorance, and

sorrow. They have to be interpreted in the light of

an appositional construction, it would mean Brahman

that is Knowledge, Brahman that is Existence and

Brahman that is Bliss. There is no distinction be-

tween the quality and substance in Brahman. The

three qualities, sat, cit, and ananda are not distinct.

Brahman is described indirectly by scriptures.

In fact, strict students of the Advaita school believe

that all descriptions are forms of indirect knowledge.

‘Tatastha-laksana’ demarcates an object from the

rest by indicating some accidental qualifications. For

example, we may indicate a particular house to a

stranger who is in search of it by pointing out to the

crow that is perching on the roof. The crow is not an

essential characteristic of the house. It only serves to

distinguish the object while not being originally relat-

ed to the defined object. Sankara takes many of the

scriptural statements in this light.

The concept of Existence and its relation to

Reality is conceived by the Western philosophers

differently from that of Sankara. By Reality the

idealist philosophers like Bradley mean that which is

free from contradiction and is a self-consistent whole.

INTRODUCTION TO VEDANTA

By existence they mean that which is and is self-

contradictory. Existence is self-contradictory. Reality

is above it. “Existence is not Reality, and Reality is

the appearance of the Real. For Sankara the Reality

must Exist. . . Existence is in other words a form or

is above all distinction.

Sankara accepts the Reality of Jlrahman as a

working hypothesis on the authority of the Sruti at

the first instance. The Gita clinches the issue in,

a well known verse, “ Of the Real there is no Non-

existence and of the Unreal no existence. ” What is

posited on the authority of the sruti is explained

through logic and affirmed by spiritual experience.

The central problem of philosophy is to explain

the relation between the One and the Many in terms

of human reason to the satisfaction of man’s intelli-

gence. Sankara posits the reality of Brahman and

has to explain the world of matter and the world of

souls in terms of it. In fact, he has to explain the

relation between the pluralistic Universe of Souls and

Matter to Brahman. He holds that the pluralistic

Universe is the appearance of Brahman.

The indeterminable nature of Brahman is a big

stumbling block in the process of explanation. San-

kara cannot adopt the theist’s * creationist hypothesis

to explain the emergence of the world of matter and

of souls as in Christianity or Islam. The concep-

tion of creation requires an agent, a purpose and a

material cause to create with. All these are not pro-

vided for in the scheme of Advaita metaphysics.

The creationist hypothesis is based on the law of

causation. The law of causation involves a relation

between cause and effect. Analysis reveals that the

^ANKARA’S ADVAITA

logical category of cause is self-discrepant. The

nerve of the argument is as follows: Is the effect

different from* the cause, or is it not? If it is not diffe-

rent, then there is no meaning in calling it a cause; if

it is different, it needs a relation to connect it. We

have already seen and shown that the category of

relation though very useful is in the end logically in-

defensible. Hence Sankara could not accept the

creationist-theory.

The Nyaya school holds to this theory. They de-

clare that the Lord creates the world of things from

Atoms (paramainus). The concept of atoms is not

free from contradictions. They declare that, to begin

with, Atoms are of no magnitude. When two atoms

are combined, they hold that magnitude is present.

One fails to see how what is originally without any

magnitude can produce magnitude by merely com-

bining with other atoms.

Further, the Nyaya god is described as devoid of

any activity. Activity presupposes some connection

with matter. It is difficult to envisage any type of

relation between the atoms and god. The relation

cannot be conjunction, for both matter and god are

infinite. Infinite substances cannot be connected. If

inherence (Samavaya) is said to be the relation, there

is the doubt which inheres in what. Nor can we see

any purpose in Lord's creation. The problem of

Evil has been the most difficult pill for the atheist to

swallow. If it is argued that the Lord creates the

things of the world according to the karma of the

individuals, there is the difficulty of the supremacy of

karma. From the supremacy of karma to the super-

fluity of the Lord is an easy step. The problem of

Evil and the mad and monstrous contrasts in life

INTRODUCTION TO VEDANTA

cannot exempt the Lord from responsibility if he is its

sole creator. To admit that Lord has purpose in crea-

tion is to convict him of imperfection. He is said to

be perfect and free from all wants. - He has no desires

or unfulfilled purposes to achieve. Activity is a mark,

of imperfect souls. So it cannot be attributed to the

Lord, without whitling down his perfection and

glory.

When we examine the creationist hypothesis

we are intimately involved in understanding the

real nature of causation as such. Causation is a

central category of science and logic. It is the soul

of all investigation. In fact, all science is the investi-

gation of the cause of the things. The Nyaya school

is true to v its pluralistic metaphysics in looking upon

cause and effect as two different things. They re-

gard the relation between cause and effect as mecha-

nical. No two things are alike for them. They are

radical pluralists. They argue that if cause and effect

are not two different things we need not call them by

. distinct names. Further, one who wants the pot is

not satisfied with the clay or one who wants cloth is

not satisfied with thread. The pragmatic test points

to the difference. The effect is a new product; it is

a de novo creation. It was not in existence before

its production. It has come into being as a new

creation from its prior non-existence. This doctrine

is called Arambha-vada.

The Nyaya view of the cause-effect relation is

mechanical. They regard change as a total process

and the essence of the cause is change. They ignore

the connection element which is the essence of causa-

tion. Cause is not intelligible except in the back-

ground of an identity. Absolute difference is not

SANKARA’S ADVAITA

intelligible except in the background of identity. All

difference is « difference-in-identity. Causation is

identity-in-difference.

The Sankhya theory of causation is organic. It

is a step in advance of the Nyaya view. They re-

gard that causation is the manifestation of what is

latent into an active operation. The effect is al-

ready found in the cause in the potential form. They

hold that the change is understandable only in the light

of an unchanging element. They oppose the Nyaya

school and hold that cause and effect are related

states and not distinct things. They criticise the

Nyaya view severely. If a thing can be produced

de novo from non-existence, it amounts to saying that

anything can be produced from anything. Such a

conclusion is contrary to and falsified by human

experience. It will be impossible to determine any

relation between cause and effect if the effect is

absolutely a new entity. How could a cause be

related to a non-existent effect? Relation can only

exist between two existents and not between

one existent and another non existent. Further, in

our life and experience, we always seek an appropri-

ate cause for an appropriate effect. He who wants

curds seeks milk and not water. He who wants oil

seeks seeds and not sands. The cause itself gets

transformed into the effect. This transformation is

effected by the causal operation. What is potential-

ly present is manifested. The effect, though existent

in the cause, is still in an unmanifest form prior to

the causal operation. The causal operations take

on two forms: It removes the obstruction to reach

an object like the lamp revealing the post in the

dark. It does not give it shape.

INTRODUCTION TO VEDANTA

The Sankhyan theory is closest to the theory

advocated by the Advaitins. It is the preface to

Sankara’s theory of causation. It is the Purva

Bhumi to Vivarta-Vada. A little analysis lays bare

the self-discrepancy involved in the concept of cause

and change. The Advaitin brings oi^t the discre-

pancy in the concept of change and causation.

The concept of change is as old as the concept

of permanence. Let us take an example of the con-

cept of change.

A the cause becomes B the effect. If they are

identical there is no becoming. If they are absolute-

ly different we cannot call them cause and effect or

the changed object. If change is regarded as partly

identical and partly different, the difficulty is not

overcome. This fares no better at the hands of the

resourceful Advaitin. In so far as the identity ele-

ment is concerned there is no becoming; in so far as

they are different there is no relation possible between

them. The concept of identity-in-difference is self-

discrepant. . Though in life the concept of identity-

in-difference is accepted, it cannot be logically

sustained. The mere fact of their being together is

not the guarantee of their validity. Sankara declares

that the identical is that which does not change. And

yet change must be of the identical. That is the

paradox of causation. The cause and effect are

identical, now appearing as cause and now as effect.

Identity is a basic concept. Difference presupposes

it. Identity does not pre-suppose difference.

In the light of the Advaita theory of causation

we can see Sankara’s difficulties in not accepting (1)

the creationist-hypothesis and (2) the transformation

SAtfKARA’S ADVAITA 85

hypothesis put forward by the Nyaya and the Sankhya

systems of philbsophy.

Brahman neither creates the world nor is he

transformed into the world. Brahman is an im-

partite (akhanda) entity. He cannot be transformed

into anything. He is immutable aparindmi and

kutastha. The Prakriti of the Sankhyas cannot ac-

count for the world. There are several difficulties

in accounting for the evolution of the world, the libe-

ration of Purasa, the gradation of the 23 evolutes,

the bondage of the Purusa, the cessation of the evo-

lution etc. The Sankhyan arguments are mostly

analogies highly fanciful and romantic. They do not

stand the test of logic.

If Brahman is to be transformed into the world

of things, we are up against a number of difficulties.

In the process of transformation, Brahman perforce

has to experience all the imperfections of the world.

Such a contingency goes against the perfection and

the glory of God. God and the World will become

identical. God minus the World will be zero. Such an

account will make Advaita a variety of pantheism.

If it be contended that God is immanent and trans-

cendent and that a part of God gets transformed into

⇐ Предыдущая 5 6 7 8 91011 12 13 14 Следующая ⇒