Text 2. Historical Context

Text 2. Historical Context

First it is necessary to look at the background history for this turbulent area of the World. Although we tend to call the 1990/91 conflict the Gulf War this was not the first Gulf war in this region. From 1980 to 1988 Iraqi fought a bloody war against its neighbor Iran. In 1980 Iraqi invaded over a border dispute over the ownership of the Shatt Al Arab waterway which borders the two countries. For years Iraqi steadily lost ground against the numerically superior but technologically inferior Iranians. In the 1988 the Iraqis changed tactics and by using chemical weapons, massive artillery bombardments and the Republican Guard it made rapid advances rolling back the Iranians until when the War ended they had gained 500 miles of territory. The Waterway was so clogged with silt and debris it was now useless. The war left Iraq with over $80 billion worth of debts mainly to Kuwait. It was these tactics of chemical and artillery bombardment, which the Coalition forces were expecting during the later Gulf war, and these debts, which were the seeds of that future conflict.

By 1990 Iraq was in severe financial difficulties the price of oil was low and Iraq relied on this as its main source of income. It accused Kuwait of overproducing and flooding the market with cheap oil. Kuwait agreed to lower production but this failed to pacify Sadamm Hussain. He had a second grievance with Kuwait that of the Rumalia oil field in northern Kuwait. The Iraqis owed half this oil field and wanted the rest of it, so they accused the Kuwaitis of stealing oil from the Iraqi half of the oil field.

With the Western powers focused on Europe and the end of the Cold War few paid much attention to the Iraqis threats to Kuwait a "Rich, small vulnerable state". Even when conflict looked likely it was thought that if they did invade it would be for limited objectives such as the oil field, (this is what Gen Schwarzkopf believed). The only intelligence agency to predict the invasion was the CIA and then it was on the day before the Iraqis invaded, (not much use!).

On 2nd Aug 1990 100,000 Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait spearhead by 3 divisions of the Republican Guard. It was well organized with Heli-bourne and Amphibious assaults, with Special Forces landing at key sites and ground controllers disguised as civilians going on ahead to direct Armour. The resistance was quickly crushed. Saddam Hussein then made his first big mistake, his forces stopped at the Saudi Arabian border. He had 130,000 men 1,200 tanks and 800 guns against only 72,000 Arabians, if he had invaded it would have provoked a stronger international response but with Arabian airfields and ports in his hands it would have made any liberation very difficult indeed. Maybe he was unable to support his forces logistically? Maybe he feared retaliation? No one knows, but this was to be possibly his only chance to win the War. By December 1990 it was clear the Iraqis were digging in, and foolishly throughout the following Coalition build up he left their forces in Saudi Arabia unmolested.

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