CASE OF BOSPHORUS HAVA YOLLARI TURİZM VE TİCARET ANONİM ŞİRKETİ v. IRELAND 1 страница

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GRAND CHAMBER

CASE OF BOSPHORUS HAVA YOLLARI TURİZM VE TİCARET ANONİM ŞİRKETİ v. IRELAND

(Application no. 45036/98)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

30 June 2005

In the case of Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland,

The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:

     Mr C.L. Rozakis, President,
     Mr J.-P. Costa,
     Mr G. Ress,
     Sir Nicolas Bratza,
     Mr I. Cabral Barreto,
     Mrs F. Tulkens,

     Mrs V. Strážnická,
     Mr K. Jungwiert,
     Mr V. Butkevych,
     Mrs N. Vajić,
     Mr J. Hedigan,
     Mr M. Pellonpää,
     Mr K. Traja,
     Mrs S. Botoucharova,
     Mr V. Zagrebelsky,
     Mr L. Garlicki,
     Mrs A. Gyulumyan, judges,
and Mr P.J. Mahoney, Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 29 September 2004 and 11 May 2005,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application (no. 45036/98) against Ireland lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) under former Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a company incorporated in Turkey, Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm (“the applicant company”), on 25 March 1997.

2. The applicant company was represented by Mr J. Doyle, a lawyer practising in Dublin, instructed by Mr M.I. Özbay, the company's managing director and majority shareholder. The Irish Government (“the Government”) were represented by two successive Agents, Ms P. O'Brien and Mr J. Kingston, and by a co-Agent, Ms D. McQuade, all of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

3. The applicant company alleged that the impounding of its leased aircraft by the respondent State had breached its rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

4. The application was transmitted to the Court on 1 November 1998, when Protocol No. 11 to the Convention came into force (Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11).

5. Following the communication of the case to the respondent Government, the Turkish Government confirmed that it did not intend to make submissions in the case (Rule 44 of the Rules of Court).

6. On 13 September 2001, following a hearing on the admissibility and merits, the application was declared admissible by a Chamber composed of Mr G. Ress, President, Mr I. Cabral Barreto, Mr V. Butkevych, Mrs N. Vajić, Mr J. Hedigan, Mr M. Pellonpää, Mrs S. Botoucharova, judges, and Mr V. Berger, Section Registrar.

7. On 30 January 2004 that Chamber relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, none of the parties having objected (Article 30 of the Convention and Rule 72).

8. The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Article 27 §§ 2 and 3 of the Convention and Rule 24.

9. The applicant company and the Government each filed observations on the merits, to which each replied at the oral hearing (Rule 44 § 5). Written comments were also received from the Italian and United Kingdom Governments, and from the European Commission and the Institut de formation en droits de l'homme du barreau de Paris, which were given leave by the President to intervene (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 2). The European Commission also obtained leave to participate in the oral hearing.

10. The hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 29 September 2004 (Rule 59 § 3).

There appeared before the Court:

(a) for the Government
Mr J. Kingston,                                                                       Agent,
Ms D. McQuade,                                                               Co-Agent,
Mr G. Hogan, Senior Counsel,
Mr R. O'Hanlon, Senior Counsel,                                        Counsel,
Mr P. Mooney,                                                                      Adviser;

(b) for the applicant company
Mr J. O'Reilly, Senior Counsel,
Mr T. Eicke, Barrister-at-Law, Counsel,
Mr J. Doyle, Solicitor.

Mr M.I. Özbay, managing director of the applicant company, also attended.

(c) for the European Commission
Mr G. Marenco,
Ms S. Fries,
Mr C. Ladenburger,                                                             Agents.

The Court heard addresses by Mr O'Reilly, Mr Hogan and Mr Marenco.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

A. The lease agreement between JAT and the applicant company

11. The applicant company is an airline charter company incorporated in Turkey in March 1992.

12. By an agreement dated 17 April 1992, the applicant company leased two Boeing 737-300 aircraft from Yugoslav Airlines (JAT), the national airline of the former Yugoslavia. These were, at all material times, the only two aircraft operated by the applicant company. The lease agreement was a “dry lease without crew” for a period of forty-eight months from the dates of delivery of the two aircraft (22 April and 6 May 1992). According to the terms of the lease, the crew were to be the applicant company's employees and the applicant company was to control the destination of the aircraft. While ownership of the aircraft remained with JAT, the applicant company could enter the aircraft on the Turkish Civil Aviation Register provided it noted JAT's ownership.

13. The applicant company paid a lump sum of 1,000,000 United States dollars (USD) per aircraft on delivery. The monthly rental was 150,000 USD per aircraft. On 11 and 29 May 1992 the two aircraft were registered in Turkey as provided for in the lease. On 14 May 1992 the applicant company obtained its airline licence.

B. Prior to the aircraft's arrival in Ireland

14. From 1991 onwards the United Nations adopted, and the European Community implemented, a series of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) – “the FRY” – designed to address the armed conflict and human rights violations taking place there.

15. In January 1993 the applicant company began discussions with TEAM Aer Lingus (“TEAM”) with a view to having maintenance work (“C-Check”) done on one of its leased aircraft. TEAM was a limited liability company whose principal business was aircraft maintenance. It was a subsidiary of two Irish airline companies wholly owned by the Irish State. Memoranda dated 8 and 18 January 1993 showed that TEAM considered, on the basis of information obtained, that the applicant company was not in breach of the sanctions regime, noting that it was doing business with many companies, including Boeing, Sabena and SNECMA (a French aero-engine company). By a letter of 2 March 1993, TEAM requested the opinion of the Department of Transport, Energy and Communications (“the Department of Transport”) and included copies of its memoranda of January 1993. On 3 March 1993 the Department of Transport forwarded the request to the Department of Foreign Affairs.

16. On 17 April 1993 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 820 (1993), which provided that States should impound, inter alia, all aircraft in their territories “in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in or operating from the [FRY]”. That resolution was implemented by Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93, which came into force on 28 April 1993 (see paragraph 65 below).

17. On 5 May 1993 the Department of Foreign Affairs decided to refer the matter to the United Nations Sanctions Committee.

18. By a letter of 6 May 1993, the Turkish Foreign Ministry indicated to the Turkish Ministry of Transport that it considered that the leased aircraft were not in breach of the sanctions regime and requested flight clearance pending the Sanctions Committee's decision. On 12 May 1993 Turkey sought the opinion of the Sanctions Committee.

C. The impounding of the aircraft

19. On 17 May 1993 one of the applicant company's leased aircraft arrived in Dublin. A contract with TEAM was signed for the completion of C-Check.

20. On 18 May 1993 the Irish Permanent Mission to the United Nations indicated by facsimile to the Department of Transport that informal advice from the Secretary to the Sanctions Committee was to the effect that there was no problem with TEAM carrying out the work, but that an “informal opinion” from the “legal people in the Secretariat” had been requested. On 19 May 1993 the Department of Transport explained this to TEAM by telephone.

21. On 21 May 1993 the Irish Permanent Mission confirmed to the Department of Foreign Affairs that the “informal legal advice” obtained from the “United Nations legal office” was to the effect that TEAM should seek the “guidance and approval” of the Sanctions Committee before signing any contract with the applicant company. It was recommended that TEAM submit an application to the Committee with relevant transaction details; if the applicant company was to pay for the maintenance, it was unlikely that the Committee would have a problem with the transaction. On 24May 1993 the Department of Transport received a copy of that facsimile and sent a copy to TEAM, who were also informed by telephone. By a letter dated 26 May 1993, the Irish Permanent Mission provided the Sanctions Committee with the required details and requested the latter's “guidance and approval”.

22. On 21 May 1993 the Sanctions Committee disagreed with the Turkish government's view that the aircraft could continue to operate, referring to Resolution 820 (1993) of the United Nations Security Council. The Turkish Permanent Mission to the United Nations was informed of that opinion by a letter dated 28 May 1993.

23. At noon on 28 May 1993 the applicant company was informed by TEAM that C-Check had been completed and that, on payment of USD 250,000, the aircraft would be released. Later that day payment was received and the aircraft was released. While awaiting air traffic control clearance to take off, the aircraft was stopped. In his report, the duty manager of Dublin Airport noted that TEAM had informed him that it had been advised by the Department of Transport that it would be “in breach of sanctions” for the aircraft to leave. He also stated that the aircraft had been scheduled to depart during that shift and that the airport police had been advised. TEAM informed the applicant company accordingly. The Department of Transport later confirmed by a letter (of 16 June 1993) its instructions of 28 May 1993:

“... [TEAM] were advised by this Department that, in the circumstances, TEAM should not release the [aircraft] ... Furthermore, it was pointed out that if TEAM were to release the aircraft TEAM itself might be in serious breach of the UN resolutions (as implemented by Council Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93) ... and the matter was under investigation. At the same time directions were given to Air Traffic Control, whose clearance is necessary for departure of aircraft, not to clear this aircraft for take-off.”

24. By letters dated 29 May 1993 to the applicant company, TEAM noted that it was waiting for the opinion of the Sanctions Committee and that it had been advised by the authorities that release of the aircraft before receipt of that opinion would be in violation of the United Nations sanctions regime.

D. Prior to judicial review proceedings

25. By a memorandum dated 29 May 1993, the Turkish embassy in Dublin requested the release of the detained aircraft to Turkey, given the latter's commitment to the sanctions regime

26. By a letter dated 2 June 1993, the Irish Permanent Mission informed the Sanctions Committee that the maintenance work had in fact already been carried out, that the government regretted the failure to abide by the procedure it had initiated and that the matter had been taken up with TEAM. The aircraft was being detained pending the Committee's decision.

27. On 3 June 1993 the Irish government learned of the Sanctions Committee's reply to the Turkish government and that the chairman of the Committee had indicated that it would be likely to favour impounding. The Committee would not meet until 8 June 1993.

28. On 4 June 1993 the European Communities (Prohibition of Trade with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)) Regulations 1993 (Statutory Instrument no. 144 of 1993) were adopted. By a letter dated 8 June 1993, the Minister for Transport (Energy and Communications) informed the Dublin Airport managers that he had authorised the impounding, until further notice, of the aircraft pursuant to that statutory instrument.

29. Shortly afterwards the applicant company's second aircraft was grounded in Istanbul, although the parties disagreed as to precisely why.

30. By a letter of 14 June 1993, the Sanctions Committee informed the Irish Permanent Mission of the findings of its meeting of 8 June 1993:

“... the provision of any services to an aircraft owned by an undertaking in the [FRY], except those specifically authorised in advance by the Committee ..., would not be in conformity with the requirements of the relevant Security Council resolutions. The members of the Committee also recalled the provisions of paragraph 24 of [Resolution 820 (1993) of the United Nations Security Council] regarding such aircraft, under which the aircraft in question should have already been impounded by the Irish authorities. The Committee, therefore, would be extremely grateful for being apprised of any action on behalf of Your Excellency's Government to that effect.”

By a letter dated 18 June 1993, the Irish Permanent Mission informed the Sanctions Committee that the aircraft had been detained on 28 May 1993 and formally impounded on 8 June 1993.

31. In a letter of 16 June 1993 to the Department of Transport, the applicant company challenged the impoundment, arguing that the purpose of Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93 was not to deal simply with legal ownership, but rather with operational control. On 24 June 1993 the Department replied:

“The Minister is advised that the intention and effect of the UN resolution as implemented through [Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93] is to impose sanctions by impounding the types of commercial asset mentioned in Article 8, including aircraft, in any case where a person or undertaking in or operating from the [FRY] has any ownership interest of the kind mentioned. As this view of the scope and effect of the original resolution has been confirmed by the [Sanctions Committee], the Minister does not feel entitled to apply [Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93] in a manner which would depart from that approach. ... the aircraft must remain impounded. ... the Minister appreciates the difficulty that [the applicant company] finds itself in and would be anxious to find any solution that was available to him under [Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93] which would permit the release of the aircraft.”

32. By a letter dated 5 July 1993, the Turkish embassy in Dublin repeated its request for the release of the aircraft, stating that the Turkish government would ensure impoundment in accordance with the sanctions. The Irish government indicated to the Sanctions Committee, by a letter of 6 July 1993, that it would be favourably disposed to grant that request. On 4 August 1993 the Sanctions Committee ruled that the aircraft had to remain in Ireland, since the relevant resolutions required the Irish State to withhold all services from the aircraft, including services that would enable it to fly.

E. The first judicial review proceedings: the High Court

33. In November 1993 the applicant company applied for leave to seek judicial review of the Minister's decision to impound the aircraft. Amended grounds were later lodged taking issue with TEAM's role in the impoundment. On 15 April 1994 the High Court struck out TEAM as a respondent in the proceedings, the applicant company's dispute with TEAM being a private-law matter.

34. On 15 June 1994 the applicant company's managing director explained in evidence that rental payments due to JAT had been set off against the deposits initially paid to JAT and that future rental payments were to be paid into a blocked bank account supervised by the Turkish Central Bank.

35. On 21 June 1994 Mr Justice Murphy delivered the judgment of the High Court. The issue before him could,he believed, be simply defined as the question of whether the Minister for Transport was bound by Article 8 of Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93 to impound the applicant company's aircraft. He considered the Department of Transport's letter of 24 June 1993 to the applicant company to be the most helpful explanation of the Minister's reasoning. He found that:

“... it is common case that the transaction between JAT and [the applicant company] was entirely bona fide. There is no question of JAT having any interest direct or indirect in [the applicant company] or in the management, supervision or direction of the business of that company. ...

It is, however, common case that [resolutions of the United Nations Security Council] do not form part of Irish domestic law and, accordingly, would not of themselves justify the Minister in impounding the aircraft. The real significance of the [resolutions of the United Nations Security Council], in so far as they relate to the present proceedings, is that [Resolution 820 (1993) of the United Nations Security Council] ... provided the genesis for Article 8 of [Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93]. ...”

36. In interpreting Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93, Mr Justice Murphy had regard to its purpose. He found the aircraft not to be one to which Article 8 applied, as it was not an aircraft in which a majority or controlling interest was held by a person or undertaking in or operating from the former FRY, and that the decision of the Minister to impound was therefore ultra vires. However, the aircraft was, at that stage, the subject of an injunction obtained (in March 1994) by a creditor of JAT (SNECMA) preventing it from leaving the country. That injunction was later discharged on 11 April 1995.

F. The second judicial review proceedings: the High Court

37. Having indicated to the applicant company that the Minister for Transport was investigating a further impoundment based on Article 1.1(e) of Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93, the Department of Transport informed the applicant company by a letter of 5 August 1994 of the following:

“The Minister has now considered the continuing position of the aircraft in the light of the recent ruling of the High Court and the provisions of the Council regulations referred to.

Arising out of the Minister's consideration, I am now directed to inform you that the Minister has ... directed that the aircraft ... be detained pursuant to Article 9 of [Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93] as an aircraft which is suspected of having violated the provisions of that regulation and particularly Article 1.1(e) and [Regulation (EEC) no.] 1432/92. The aircraft will remain detained pending completion of the Minister's investigation of the suspected violation as required under Article 9 and Article 10 of Regulation [(EEC) no.] 990/93.”

Although not noted in that letter, the Minister's concern related to the applicant company's setting off of JAT's financial obligations (certain insurance, maintenance and other liabilities) under the lease against the rental monies already paid by it into the blocked bank account.

38. On 23 September 1994 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 943 (1994). Although it temporarily suspended the sanctions as peace negotiations had begun, it did not apply to aircraft already impounded. It was implemented by Regulation (EC) no. 2472/94 on 10 October 1994.

39. In March 1995 the applicant company was given leave to apply for judicial review of the Minister's decision to re-impound the aircraft. By a judgment of 22 January 1996, the High Court quashed the Minister's decision to redetain the aircraft. It noted that almost all of the monies which had been paid into the blocked account by the applicant company had by then been used up (with the consent of the holding bank in Turkey) in order to discharge JAT's liabilities under the lease. The crucial question before the High Court was the Minister's delay in raising Article 9 of Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93 given that the applicant company was an “innocent” party suffering heavy daily losses. The High Court found that the Minister had failed in his duty to investigate and decide such matters within a reasonable period of time, to conduct the investigations in accordance with fair procedures and to have proper regard for the rights of the applicant company.

40. On 7 February 1996 the Irish government appealed to the Supreme Court and applied for a stay on the High Court's order. On 9 February 1996 the Supreme Court refused the Minister's application for a stay. The overriding consideration in deciding to grant the stay or not was to find a balance which did not deny justice to either party. Noting the significant delay of the Minister in raising Article 1.1(e) and the potentially minor damage to the State (monies owed for the maintenance and parking in Dublin Airport) compared to the applicant company's huge losses, the justice of the case was overwhelmingly in the latter's favour.

41. The aircraft was therefore free to leave. By letters dated 12 and 14 March 1996, the applicant company, JAT and TEAM were informed that the Minister considered that he no longer had any legal responsibility for the aircraft.

G. The first judicial review proceedings: the European Court of Justice (ECJ)

42. On 8 August 1994 the Minister for Transport lodged an appeal in the Supreme Court against the High Court judgment of 21 June 1994. He took issue with the High Court's interpretation of Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93 and requested a preliminary reference to the ECJ (Article 177, now Article 234, of the Treaty establishing the European Community – “the EC Treaty”).

43. By an order dated 12 February 1995, the Supreme Court referred the following question to the ECJ and adjourned the proceedings before it:

“Is Article 8 of [Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93] to be construed as applying to an aircraft which is owned by an undertaking the majority or controlling interest in which is held by [the FRY] where such aircraft has been leased by the owner for a term of four years from 22 April 1992 to an undertaking the majority or controlling interest in which is not held by a person or undertaking in or operating from the said [FRY]?”

44. The parties made submissions to the ECJ. The applicant company noted that it was ironic that, following Resolution 943 (1994) of the United Nations Security Council, JAT aircraft could fly whereas its own remained grounded.

45. On 30 April 1996 Advocate General Jacobs delivered his opinion. Given the majority interest of JAT in the aircraft, Article 8 of Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93 applied to it. The Advocate General disagreed with the Irish High Court, considering that neither the aims nor the texts of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council provided any reason to depart from what he considered to be the clear wording of Article 8 of Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93.

46. As to the question of the respect shown in that regulation for fundamental rights and proportionality, the Advocate General pointed out:

“It is well established that respect for fundamental rights forms part of the general principles of Community law, and that in ensuring respect for such rights, the [ECJ] takes account of the constitutional traditions of the Member States and of international agreements, notably [the Convention], which has a special significance in that respect.

Article F(2) of the Treaty on European Union ... gives Treaty expression to the [ECJ's] case-law. ... In relation to the EC Treaty, it confirms and consolidates the [ECJ's] case-law underlining the paramount importance of respect for fundamental rights.

Respect for fundamental rights is thus a condition of the lawfulness of Community acts – in this case, the Regulation. Fundamental rights must also, of course, be respected by Member States when they implement Community measures. All Member States are in any event parties to the [Convention], even though it does not have the status of domestic law in all of them. Although the Community itself is not a party to the Convention, and cannot become a party without amendment both of the Convention and of the Treaty, and although the Convention may not be formally binding upon the Community, nevertheless for practical purposes the Convention can be regarded as part of Community law and can be invoked as such both in the [ECJ] and in national courts where Community law is in issue. That is so particularly where, as in this case, it is the implementation of Community law by Member States which is in issue. Community law cannot release Member States from their obligations under the Convention.”

47. The Advocate General noted that the applicant company had relied on the right to peaceful enjoyment of property, protected by the Convention, and the right to pursue a commercial activity, recognised as a fundamental right by the ECJ. Having considered Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden (judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52), he defined the essential question as being whether the interference with the applicant company's possession of the aircraft was a proportionate measure in the light of the aims of general interest Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93 sought to achieve. He had regard to the application of this test in AGOSI v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 24 October 1986, Series A no. 108) and Air Canada v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 5 May 1995, Series A no. 316-A) and to a “similar approach” adopted by the ECJ in cases concerning the right to property or the right to pursue a commercial activity (including Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, Case 44/79 [1979] European Court Reports (ECR) 3727, §§ 17-30).

48. While there had been a severe interference with the applicant company's interest in the lease, it was difficult to identify a stronger type of public interest than that of stopping a devastating civil war. While some property loss was inevitable for any sanctions to be effective, if it were demonstrated that the interference in question was wholly unreasonable in the light of the aims sought to be achieved, then the ECJ would intervene. However, the Advocate General felt that neither the initial decision to impound nor the continued retention of the aircraft could be regarded as unreasonable.

49. Whether or not the financial impact of the sanctions were as outlined by the applicant company, a general measure of the kind in question could not be set aside simply because of the financial consequences the measure might have in a particular case. Given the strength of the public interest involved, the proportionality principle would not be infringed by any such losses.

50. The Advocate General concluded that the contested decision did not

“... strike an unfair balance between the demands of the general interest and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights. That conclusion seems consistent with the case-law of [this Court] in general. Nor has [the applicant company] suggested that there is any case-law under [the Convention] supporting its own conclusion.

The position seems to be no different if one refers to the fundamental rights as they result from 'the constitutional traditions common to the Member States' referred to in the case-law of [the ECJ] and in Article F(2) of the Treaty on European Union. In the [above-cited Hauer case, the ECJ] pointed out ..., referring specifically to the German Grundgesetz, the Irish Constitution and the Italian Constitution, that the constitutional rules and practices of the Member States permit the legislature to control the use of private property in accordance with the general interest. Again it has not been suggested that there is any case-law supporting the view that the contested decision infringed fundamental rights. The decision of the Irish High Court was based, as we have seen, on different grounds.”

51. By a letter of 19 July 1996, TEAM informed JAT that the aircraft was free to leave provided that debts owed to TEAM were discharged.

52. On 30 July 1996 the ECJ ruled that Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93 applied to the type of aircraft referred to in the Supreme Court's question to it. The ECJ noted that the domestic proceedings showed that the aircraft lease had been entered into “in complete good faith” and was not intended to circumvent the sanctions against the FRY.

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