VEDANTA-SUTRAS WITH RAMANUJA'S SRÎBHASHYA 29 страница

The sense of the Taittirîya-text therefore is as follows. The highest Self, which in itself is of the nature of unlimited knowledge and bliss, has for its body all sentient and non-sentient beings -- instruments of sport for him as it were -- in so subtle a form that they may be called non-existing; and as they are his body he may be said to consist of them (tan-maya). Then desirous of providing himself with an infinity of playthings of all kinds he, by a series of steps beginning with Prakriti and the aggregate of souls and leading down to the elements in their gross state, so modifies himself as to have those elements for his body -- when he is said to consist of them -- and thus appears in the form of our world containing what the text denotes as sat and tyat, i.e. all intelligent and non-intelligent things, from gods down to plants and stones. When the text says that the Self having entered into it became sat and tyat, the meaning is that the highest Self, which in its causal state had been the universal Self, abides, in its effected state also, as the Self of the different substances undergoing changes and thus becomes this and that. While the highest Self thus undergoes a change -- in the form of a world comprising the whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings -- all imperfection and suffering are limited to the sentient beings constituting part of its body, and all change is restricted to the non-sentient things which constitute another part. The highest Self is _effected_ in that sense only that it is the ruling principle, and hence the Self, of matter and souls in their gross or evolved state; but just on account of being this, viz. their inner Ruler and Self, it is in no way touched by their imperfections and changes. Consisting of unlimited knowledge and bliss he for ever abides in his uniform nature, engaged in the sport of making this world go round. This is the purport of the clause 'it became the real and the unreal': although undergoing a change into the multiplicity of actual sentient and non-sentient things, Brahman at the same time was the Real, i.e. that which is free from all shadow of imperfection, consisting of nothing but pure knowledge and bliss. That all beings, sentient and non- sentient, and whether in their non-evolved or evolved states, are mere playthings of Brahman, and that the creation and reabsorption of the world are only his sport, this has been expressly declared by Dvaipayana, Parasara and other Rishis,'Know that all transitory beings, from the Unevolved down to individual things, are a mere play of Hari'; 'View his action like that of a playful child,' &c. The Sutrakara will distinctly enounce the same view in II, 1, 33. With a similar view the text 'from that the Lord of Maya sends forth all this; and in that the other is bound by Maya' (Svet. Up. IV, 9), refers to Prakriti and soul, which together constitute the body of Brahman, as things different from Brahman, although then, i.e. at the time of a pralaya, they are one with Brahman in so far as their extreme subtlety does not admit of their being conceived as separate; this it does to the end of suggesting that even when Brahman undergoes the change into the shape of this world, all changes exclusively belong to non-sentient matter which is a mode of Brahman, and all imperfections and sufferings to the individual souls which also are modes of Brahman. The text has to be viewed as agreeing in meaning with 'that Self made itself.' Of a similar purport is the account given in Manu, 'He being desirous to send forth from his body beings of many kinds, first with a thought created the waters and placed his seed in them' (I, 8).

It is in this way that room is found for those texts also which proclaim Brahman to be free from all imperfection and all change. It thus remains a settled conclusion that Brahman by itself constitutes the material as well as the operative cause of the world.

28. And because it is called the womb.

Brahman is the material as well as the operative cause of the world for that reason also that certain texts call it the womb, 'the maker, the Lord, the Person, Brahman, the womb' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3); 'that which the wise regard as the womb of all beings' (I, 1, 6). And that 'womb' means as much as material cause, appears from the complementary passage 'As a spider sends forth and draws in its threads' (I, 1, 7) --

29. Herewith all (texts) are explained, explained.

Hereby, i.e. by the whole array of arguments set forth in the four padas of the first adhyaya; all those particular passages of the Vedanta-texts which give instruction as to the cause of the world, are explained as meaning to set forth a Brahman all-wise, all-powerful, different in nature from all beings intelligent and non-intelligent. The repetition of the word 'explained' is meant to indicate the termination of the adhyaya.

SECOND ADHYAYA

FIRST PADA.

1. If it be said that there would result the fault of there being no room for (certain) Smritis: (we reply) 'no,' because there would result the fault of want of room for other Smritis.

The first adhyaya has established the truth that what the Vedanta-texts teach is a Supreme Brahman, which is something different as well from non-sentient matter known through the ordinary means of proof, viz. Perception and so on, as from the intelligent souls whether connected with or separated from matter; which is free from even a shadow of imperfection of any kind; which is an ocean as it were of auspicious qualities and so on; which is the sole cause of the entire Universe; which constitutes the inner Self of all things. The second adhyaya is now begun for the purpose of proving that the view thus set forth cannot be impugned by whatever arguments may possibly be brought forward. The Sutrakara at first turns against those who maintain that the Vedanta- texts do not establish the view indicated above, on the ground of that view being contradicted by the Smriti of Kapila, i. e. the Sankhya- system.

But how can it be maintained at all that Scripture does not set forth a certain view because thereby it would enter into conflict with Smriti? For that Smriti if contradicted by Scripture is to be held of no account, is already settled in the Purva Mîmamsa ('But where there is contradiction Smriti is not to be regarded,' I, 3, 3). -- Where, we reply, a matter can be definitely settled on the basis of Scripture -- as e.g. in the case of the Vedic injunction, 'he is to sing, after having touched the Udumbara branch' (which clearly contradicts the Smriti injunction that the whole branch is to be covered up) -- Smriti indeed need not be regarded. But the topic with which the Vedanta-texts are concerned is hard to understand, and hence, when a conflict arises between those texts and a Smriti propounded by some great Rishi, the matter does not admit of immediate decisive settlement: it is not therefore unreasonable to undertake to prove by Smriti that Scripture does not set forth a certain doctrine. That is to say -- we possess a Smriti composed with a view to teach men the nature and means of supreme happiness, by the great Rishi Kapila to whom Scripture, Smriti, Itihasa and Purana alike refer as a person worthy of all respect (compare e. g. 'the Rishi Kapila,' Svet. Up. V, 2), and who moreover (unlike Brihaspati and other Smriti -- writers) fully acknowledges the validity of all the means of earthly happiness which are set forth in the karmakanda of the Veda, such as the daily oblations to the sacred fires, the New and Full Moon offerings and the great Soma sacrifices. Now, as men having only an imperfect knowledge of the Veda, and moreover naturally slow-minded, can hardly ascertain the sense of the Vedanta-texts without the assistance of such a Smriti, and as to be satisfied with that sense of the Vedanta which discloses itself on a mere superficial study of the text would imply the admission that the whole Sankhya Smriti, although composed by an able and trustworthy person, really is useless; we see ourselves driven to acknowledge that the doctrine of the Vedanta-texts cannot differ from the one established by the Sankhyas. Nor must you object that to do so would force on us another unacceptable conclusion, viz. that those Smritis, that of Manu e.g., which maintain Brahman to be the universal cause, are destitute of authority; for Manu and similar works inculcate practical religious duty and thus have at any rate the uncontested function of supporting the teaching of the karmakanda of the Veda. The Sankhya Smriti, on the other hand, is entirely devoted to the setting forth of theoretical truth (not of practical duty), and if it is not accepted in that quality, it is of no use whatsoever. -- On this ground the Sutra sets forth the prima facie view, 'If it be said that there results the fault of there being no room for certain Smritis.'

The same Sutra replies 'no; because there would result the fault of want of room for other Smritis.' For other Smritis, that of Manu e.g., teach that Brahman is the universal cause. Thus Manu says, 'This (world) existed in the shape of darkness, and so on. Then the divine Self existent, indiscernible but making discernible all this, the great elements and the rest, appeared with irresistible power, dispelling the darkness. He, desiring to produce beings of many kinds from his own body, first with a thought created the waters, and placed his seed in them' (Manu I, 5-8). And the Bhagavad-gita, 'I am the origin and the dissolution of the whole Universe' (VII, 6). 'I am the origin of all; everything proceeds from me' (X, 8). Similarly, in the Mahabharata, to the question 'Whence was created this whole world with its movable and immovable beings?' the answer is given, 'Narayana assumes the form of the world, he the infinite, eternal one'; and 'from him there originates the Unevolved consisting of the three gunas'; and 'the Unevolved is merged in the non-acting Person.' And Parasara says, 'From Vishnu there sprang the world and in him it abides; he makes this world persist and he rules it -- he is the world.' Thus also Apastamba, 'The living beings are the dwelling of him who lies in all caves, who is not killed, who is spotless'; and 'From him spring all bodies; he is the primary cause, he is eternal, permanent.' (Dharmasu. I, 8, 22, 4; 23, 2). -- If the question as to the meaning of the Vedanta-texts were to be settled by means of Kapila's Smriti, we should have to accept the extremely undesirable conclusion that all the Smritis quoted are of no authority. It is true that the Vedanta-texts are concerned with theoretical truth lying outside the sphere of Perception and the other means of knowledge, and that hence students possessing only a limited knowledge of the Veda require some help in order fully to make out the meaning of the Vedanta. But what must be avoided in this case is to give any opening for the conclusion that the very numerous Smritis which closely follow the doctrine of the Vedanta, are composed by the most competent and trustworthy persons and aim at supporting that doctrine, are irrelevant; and it is for this reason that Kapila's Smriti which contains a doctrine opposed to Scripture must be disregarded. The support required is elucidation of the sense conveyed by Scripture, and this clearly cannot be effected by means of a Smriti contradicting Scripture. Nor is it of any avail to plead, as the Purvapakshin does, that Manu and other Smritis of the same kind fulfil in any case the function of elucidating the acts of religious duty enjoined in the karmakanda. For if they enjoin acts of religious duty as means to win the favour of the Supreme Person but do not impress upon us the idea of that Supreme Person himself who is to be pleased by those acts, they are also not capable of impressing upon us the idea of those acts themselves. That it is the character of all religious acts to win the favour of the Supreme Spirit, Smriti distinctly declares, 'Man attains to perfection by worshipping with his proper action Him from whom all Beings proceed; and by whom all this is stretched out' (Bha. Gî. XVIII, 46); 'Let a man meditate on Narayana, the divine one, at all works, such as bathing and the like; he will then reach the world of Brahman and not return hither' (Daksha- smriti); and 'Those men with whom, intent on their duties, thou art pleased, O Lord, they pass beyond all this Maya and find Release for their souls' (Vi. Pu.). Nor can it be said that Manu and similar Smritis have a function in so far as setting forth works (not aiming at final Release but) bringing about certain results included in transmigratory existence, whether here on earth or in a heavenly world; for the essential character of those works also is to please the highest Person. As is said in the Bhagavad-gîta (IX, 23, 24); 'Even they who devoted to other gods worship them with faith, worship me, against ordinance. For I am the enjoyer and the Lord of all sacrifices; but they know me not in truth and hence they fall,' and 'Thou art ever worshipped by me with sacrifices; thou alone, bearing the form of pitris and of gods, enjoyest all the offerings made to either.' Nor finally can we admit the contention that it is rational to interpret the Vedánta-texts in accordance with Kapila's Smriti because Kapila, in the Svetasvatara text, is referred to as a competent person. For from this it would follow that, as Brihaspati is, in Sruti and Smriti, mentioned as a pattern of consummate wisdom, Scripture should be interpreted in agreement with the openly materialistic and atheistic Smriti composed by that authority. But, it may here be said, the Vedanta-texts should after all be interpreted in agreement with Kapila's Smriti, for the reason that Kapila had through the power of his concentrated meditation (yoga) arrived at an insight into truth. -- To this objection the next Sutra replies.

2. And on account of the non-perception (of truth on the part) of others.

The 'and' in the Sutra has the force of 'but,' being meant to dispel the doubt raised. There are many other authors of Smritis, such as Manu, who through the power of their meditation had attained insight into the highest truth, and of whom it is known from Scripture that the purport of their teaching was a salutary medicine to the whole world ('whatever Manu said that was medicine'). Now, as these Rishis did not see truth in the way of Kapila, we conclude that Kapila's view, which contradicts Scripture, is founded on error, and cannot therefore be used to modify the sense of the Vedanta-texts. -- Here finishes the adhikarana treating of 'Smriti.'

3. Hereby the Yoga is refuted.

By the above refutation of Kapila's Smriti the Yoga-smriti also is refuted. -- But a question arises, What further doubt arises here with regard to the Yoga system, so as to render needful the formal extension to the Yoga of the arguments previously set forth against the Sankhya? -- It might appear, we reply, that the Vedanta should be supported by the Yoga-smriti, firstly, because the latter admits the existence of a Lord; secondly, because the Vedanta-texts mention Yoga as a means to bring about final Release; and thirdly, because Hiranyagarbha, who proclaimed the Yoga-smriti is qualified for the promulgation of all Vedanta-texts. -- But these arguments refute themselves as follows. In the first place the Yoga holds the Pradhana, which is independent of Brahman, to be the general material cause, and hence the Lord acknowledged by it is a mere operative cause. In the second place the nature of meditation, in which Yoga consists, is determined by the nature of the object of meditation, and as of its two objects, viz. the soul and the Lord, the former does not have its Self in Brahman, and the latter is neither the cause of the world nor endowed with the other auspicious qualities (which belong to Brahman), the Yoga is not of Vedic character. And as to the third point, Hiranyagarbha himself is only an individual soul, and hence liable to be overpowered by the inferior gunas, i.e. passion and darkness; and hence the Yoga-smriti is founded on error, no less than the Puranas, promulgated by him, which are founded on rajas and tamas. The Yoga cannot, therefore, be used for the support of the Vedanta. -- Here finishes the adhikarana of 'the refutation of the Yoga.'

4. Not, on account of the difference of character of that; and its being such (appears) from Scripture.

The same opponent who laid stress on the conflict between Scripture and Smriti now again comes forward, relying this time (not on Smriti but) on simple reasoning. Your doctrine, he says, as to the world being an effect of Brahman which you attempted to prove by a refutation of the Sankhya Smriti shows itself to be irrational for the following reason. Perception and the other means of knowledge show this world with all its sentient and non-sentient beings to be of a non-intelligent and impure nature, to possess none of the qualities of the Lord, and to have pain for its very essence; and such a world totally differs in nature from the Brahman, postulated by you, which is said to be all-knowing, of supreme lordly power, antagonistic to all evil, enjoying unbroken uniform blessedness. This difference in character of the world from Brahman is, moreover, not only known through Perception, and so on, but is seen to be directly stated in Scripture itself; compare 'Knowledge and non-knowledge' (Taitt. Up. II, 6, 1); 'Thus are these objects placed on the subjects, and the subjects on the prana' (Kau. Up. III, 9); 'On the same tree man sits grieving, immersed, bewildered by his own impotence' (Svet. Up. IV, 7); 'The soul not being a Lord is bound because he has to enjoy' (Svet. Up. I, 8); and so on; all which texts refer to the effect, i.e. the world as being non-intelligent, of the essence of pain, and so on. The general rule is that an effect is non- different in character from its cause; as e.g. pots and bracelets are non-different in character from their material causes -- clay and gold. The world cannot, therefore, be the effect of Brahman from which it differs in character, and we hence conclude that, in agreement with the Sankhya Smriti, the Pradhana which resembles the actual world in character must be assumed to be the general cause. Scripture, although not dependent on anything else and concerned with super-sensuous objects, must all the same come to terms with ratiocination (tarka); for all the different means of knowledge can in many cases help us to arrive at a decisive conclusion, only if they are supported by ratiocination. For by tarka we understand that kind of knowledge (intellectual activity) which in the case of any given matter, by means of an investigation either into the essential nature of that matter or into collateral (auxiliary) factors, determines what possesses proving power, and what are the special details of the matter under consideration: this kind of cognitional activity is also called uha. All means of knowledge equally stand in need of tarka; Scripture however, the authoritative character of which specially depends on expectancy (akanksha), proximity (sannidhi), and compatibility (yogyata), throughout requires to be assisted by tarka. In accordance with this Manu says,'He who investigates by means of reasoning, he only knows religious duty, and none other.' It is with a view to such confirmation of the sense of Scripture by means of Reasoning that the texts declare that certain topics such as the Self must be 'reflected on' (mantavya). -- Now here it might possibly be said that as Brahman is ascertained from Scripture to be the sole cause of the world, it must be admitted that intelligence exists in the world also, which is an effect of Brahman. In the same way as the consciousness of an intelligent being is not perceived when it is in the states of deep sleep, swoon, &c., so the intelligent nature of jars and the like also is not observed, although it really exists; and it is this very difference of manifestation and non-manifestation of intelligence on which the distinction of intelligent and non-intelligent beings depends. -- But to this we reply that permanent non-perception of intelligence proves its non-existence. This consideration also refutes the hypothesis of things commonly called non-intelligent possessing the power, or potentiality, of consciousness. For if you maintain that a thing possesses the power of producing an effect while yet that effect is never and nowhere _seen_ to be produced by it, you may as well proclaim at a meeting of sons of barren women that their mothers possess eminent procreative power! Moreover, to prove at first from the Vedanta- texts that Brahman is the material cause of the world, and from this that pots and the like possess potential consciousness, and therefrom the existence of non-manifested consciousness; and then, on the other hand, to start from the last principle as proved and to deduce therefrom that the Vedanta-texts prove Brahman to be the material cause of the world, is simply to argue in a circle; for that the relation of cause and effect should exist between things different in character is just what cannot be proved. -- What sameness of character, again, of causal substance and effects, have you in mind when you maintain that from the absence of such sameness it follows that Brahman cannot be proved to be the material cause of the world? It cannot be complete sameness of all attributes, because in that case the relation of cause and effect (which after all requires _some_ difference) could not be established. For we do not observe that in pots and jars which are fashioned out of a lump of clay there persists the quality of 'being a lump' which belongs to the causal substance. And should you say that it suffices that there should be equality in some or any attribute, we point out that such is actually the case with regard to Brahman and the world, both of which have the attribute of 'existence' and others. The true state of the case rather is as follows. There is equality of nature between an effect and a cause, in that sense that those essential characteristics by which the causal substance distinguishes itself from other things persist in its effects also: those characteristic features, e.g., which distinguish gold from clay and other materials, persist also in things made of gold- bracelets and the like. But applying this consideration to Brahman and the world we find that Brahman's essential nature is to be antagonistic to all evil, and to consist of knowledge, bliss and power, while the world's essential nature is to be the opposite of all this. Brahman cannot, therefore, be the material cause of the world.

But, it may be objected, we observe that even things of different essential characteristics stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect. From man, e.g., who is a sentient being, there spring nails, teeth, and hair, which are non-sentient things; the sentient scorpion springs from non-sentient dung; and non-sentient threads proceed from the sentient spider. -- This objection, we reply, is not valid; for in the instances quoted the relation of cause and effect rests on the non- sentient elements only (i.e. it is only the non-sentient matter of the

body which produces nails, &c.).

But, a further objection is raised, Scripture itself declares in many places that things generally held to be non-sentient really possess intelligence; compare 'to him the earth said'; 'the water desired'; 'the pranas quarrelling among themselves as to their relative pre-eminence went to Brahman.' And the writers of the Puranas ako attribute consciousness to rivers, hills, the sea, and so on. Hence there is after all no essential difference in nature between sentient and so-called non- sentient beings. -- To this objection the Purvapakshin replies in the next Sutra.

5. But (there is) denotation of the superintending (deities), on account of distinction and entering.

The word 'but' is meant to set aside the objection started. In texts such as 'to him the earth said,' the terms 'earth' and so on, denote the divinities presiding over earth and the rest. -- How is this known? -- ' Through distinction and connexion.' For earth and so on are denoted by the distinctive term 'divinities'; so e.g. 'Let me enter into those three divinities' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2), where fire, water, and earth are called divinities; and Kau. Up. II, 14, 'All divinities contending with each other as to pre-eminence,' and 'all these divinities having recognised pre-eminence in prana.' The 'entering' of the Sutra refers to Ait. Ar. II, 4, 2, 4, 'Agni having become speech entered into the mouth; Aditya having become sight entered into the eyes,' &c., where the text declares that Agni and other divine beings entered into the sense-organs as their superintendents.

We therefore adhere to our conclusion that the world, being non- intelligent and hence essentially different in nature from Brahman, cannot be the effect of Brahman; and that therefore, in agreement with Smriti confirmed by reasoning, the Vedanta-texts must be held to teach that the Pradhana is the universal material cause. This prima facie view is met by the following Sutra.

6. But it is seen.

The 'but' indicates the change of view (introduced in the present Sutra). The assertion that Brahman cannot be the material cause of the world because the latter differs from it in essential nature, is unfounded; since it is a matter of observation that even things of different nature stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect. For it is observed that from honey and similar substances there originate worms and other little animals. -- But it has been said above that in those cases there is sameness of nature, in so far as the relation of cause and effect holds good only between the non-intelligent elements in both! -- This assertion was indeed made, but it does not suffice to prove that equality of character between cause and effect which you have in view. For, being apprehensive that from the demand of equality of character in some point or other only it would follow that, as all things have certain characteristics in common, anything might originate from anything, you have declared that the equality of character necessary for the relation of cause and effect is constituted by the persistence, in the effect, of those characteristic points which differentiate the cause from other things. But it is evident that this restrictive rule does not hold good in the case of the origination of worms and the like from honey and so on; and hence it is not unreasonable to assume that the world also, although differing in character from Brahman, may originate from the latter. For in the case of worms originating from honey, scorpions from dung, &c., we do _not_ observe -- what indeed we _do_ observe in certain other cases, as of pots made of clay, ornaments made of gold -- that the special characteristics distinguishing the causal substance from other things persist in the effects also.

7. If it be said that (the effect is) non-existing; we say no, there being a mere denial.

But, an objection is raised, if Brahman, the cause, differs in nature from the effect, viz. the world, this means that cause and effect are separate things and that hence the effect does not exist in the cause, i. e. Brahman; and this again implies that the world originates from what has no existence! -- Not so, we reply. For what the preceding Sutra has laid down is merely the denial of an absolute rule demanding that cause and effect should be of the same nature; it was not asserted that the effect is a thing altogether different and separate from the cause. We by no means abandon our tenet that Brahman the cause modifies itself so as to assume the form of a world differing from it in character. For such is the case with the honey and the worms also. There is difference of characteristics, but -- as in the case of gold and golden bracelets -- there is oneness of substance. -- An objection is raised.

8. On account of such consequences in reabsorption (the Vedanta-texts would be) inappropriate.

The term 'reabsorption' here stands as an instance of all the states of Brahman, reabsorption, creation, and so on -- among which it is the first as appears from the texts giving instruction about those several states 'Being only was this in the beginning'; 'The Self only was this in the beginning.' If we accept the doctrine of the oneness of substance of cause and effect, then, absorption, creation, &c. of the world all being in Brahman, the different states of the world would connect themselves with Brahman, and the latter would thus be affected by all the imperfections of its effect; in the same way as all the attributes of the bracelet are present in the gold also. And the undesirable consequence of this would be that contradictory attributes as predicated in different Vedanta-texts would have to be attributed to one and the same substance; cp. 'He who is all-knowing' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'Free from sin, free from old age and death' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 5); 'Of him there is known neither cause nor effect' (Svet. Up. VI, 8); 'Of these two one eats the sweet fruit' (Svet. Up. IV, 6); 'The Self that is not a Lord is bound because he has to enjoy' (Svet. Up. I, 8); 'On account of his impotence he laments, bewildered' (Svet. Up. IV, 7). -- Nor can we accept the explanation that, as Brahman in its causal as well as its effected state has all sentient and non-sentient beings for its body; and as all imperfections inhere in that body only, they do not touch Brahman in either its causal or effected state. For it is not possible that the world and Brahman should stand to each other in the relation of effect and cause, and if it were possible, the imperfections due to connexion with a body would necessarily cling to Brahman. It is not, we say, possible that the intelligent and non-intelligent beings together should constitute the body of Brahman. For a body is a particular aggregate of earth and the other elements, depending for its subsistence on vital breath with its five modifications, and serving as an abode to the sense-organs which mediate the experiences of pleasure and pain retributive of former works: such is in Vedic and worldly speech the sense connected with the term 'body.' But numerous Vedic texts -- 'Free from sin, from old age and death' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1); 'Without eating the other one looks on' (Svet. Up. IV, 6); 'Grasping without hands, hasting without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears' (Svet. Up. III, 19); 'Without breath, without mind' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2) -- declare that the highest Self is free from karman and the enjoyment of its fruits, is not capable of enjoyment dependent on sense-organs, and has no life dependent on breath: whence it follows that he cannot have a body constituted by all the non-sentient and sentient beings. Nor can either non-sentient beings in their individual forms such as grass, trees, &c., or the aggregate of all the elements in their subtle state be viewed as the abode of sense-activity (without which they cannot constitute a body); nor are the elements in their subtle state combined into earth and the other gross elements (which again would be required for a body). And sentient beings which consist of mere intelligence are of course incapable of all this, and hence even less fit to constitute a body. Nor may it be said that to have a body merely means to be the abode of fruition, and that Brahman may possess a body in this latter sense; for there are abodes of fruition, such as palaces and the like, which are not considered to be bodies. Nor will it avail, narrowing the last definition, to say that that only is an abode of enjoyment directly

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