VEDANTA-SUTRAS WITH RAMANUJA'S SRÎBHASHYA 24 страница

28. And for this very reason eternity (of the Veda).

As words such as Indra and Vasishtha, which denote gods and Rishis, denote (not individuals only, but) classes, and as the creation of those beings is preceded by their being suggested to the creative mind through those words; for this reason the eternity of the Veda admits of being reconciled with what scripture says about the mantras and kandas (sections) of the sacred text having 'makers' and about Rishis seeing the hymns; cp. such passages as 'He chooses the makers of mantras'; 'Reverence to the Rishis who are the makers of mantras'; 'That is Agni; this is a hymn of Visvamitra.' For by means of these very texts Prajapati presents to his own mind the characteristics and powers of the different Rishis who make the different sections, hymns, and mantras, thereupon creates them endowed with those characteristics and powers, and appoints them to remember the very same sections, hymns, &c. The Rishis being thus gifted by Prajapati with the requisite powers, undergo suitable preparatory austerities and finally _see_ the mantras, and so on, proclaimed by the Vasishthas and other Rishis of former ages of the world, perfect in all their sounds and accents, without having learned them from the recitation of a teacher. There is thus no conflict between the eternity of the Veda and the fact that the Rishis are the _makers_ of its sections, hymns, and so on. A further objection is raised. Let it be admitted that after each pralaya of the kind called 'contingent' (naimittika), Prajapati may proceed to create new Indras, and so on, in the way of remembering on the basis of the Veda the Indras, and so on, of preceding periods. In the case, on the other hand, of a pralaya of the kind called elemental (prakritika), in which the creator, Prajapati himself, and words -- which are the effects of the elemental ahankara -- pass away, what possibility is there of Prajapati undertaking a new creation on the basis of Vedic words, and how can we speak of the permanency of a Veda which perishes? He who maintains the eternity of the Veda and the corporeality of gods, and so on, is thus really driven to the hypothesis of the course of mundane existence being without a beginning (i.e. not preceded by a pralaya). -- Of this difficulty the next Sutra disposes.

29. And on account of the equality of names and forms there is no contradiction, even in the renovation (of the world); as appears from -- Sruti and Smriti.

On account of the sameness of names and forms, as stated before, there is no difficulty in the way of the origination of the world, even in the case of total pralayas. For what actually takes place is as follows. When the period of a great pralaya draws towards its close, the divine supreme Person, remembering the constitution of the world previous to the pralaya, and forming the volition 'May I become manifold' separates into its constituent elements the whole mass of enjoying souls and objects of enjoyment which, during the pralaya state, had been merged in him so as to possess a separate existence (not actual but) potential only, and then emits the entire world just as it had been before, from the so-called Mahat down to the Brahman-egg, and Hiranyagarbha (Prajapati). Having thereupon manifested the Vedas in exactly the same order and arrangement they had had before, and having taught them to Hiranyagarbha, he entrusts to him the new creation of the different classes of beings, gods, and so on, just as it was before; and at the same time abides himself within the world so created as its inner Self and Ruler. This view of the process removes all difficulties. The superhuman origin and the eternity of the Veda really mean that intelligent agents having received in their minds an impression due to previous recitations of the Veda in a fixed order of words, chapters, and so on, remember and again recite it in that very same order of succession. This holds good both with regard to us men and to the highest Lord of all; there however is that difference between the two cases that the representations of the Veda which the supreme Person forms in his own mind are spontaneous, not dependent on an impression previously made.

To the question whence all this is known, the Sutra replies 'from Scripture and Smriti.' The scriptural passage is 'He who first creates Brahma and delivers the Vedas to him' (Svet. Up. VI, 18). And as to Smriti we have the following statement in Manu, 'This universe existed in the shape of darkness, &c. -- He desiring to produce beings of many kinds from his own body, first with a thought created the waters and placed his seed in them. That seed became a golden egg equal to the sun in brilliancy; in that he himself was born as Brahma, the progenitor of the whole world' (Manu I, 5; 8-9). To the same effect are the texts of the Pauranikas, 'From the navel of the sleeping divinity there sprung up a lotus, and in that lotus there was born Brahma fully knowing all Vedas and Vedangas. And then Brahma was told by him (the highest Divinity), 'Do thou create all beings, O Great-minded one'; and the following passage, 'From the highest Narayana there was born the Four-faced one.' -- And in the section which begins 'I will tell the original creation,' we read 'Because having created water (nara) I abide within it, therefore my name shall be Narayana. There I lie asleep in every Kalpa, and as I am sleeping there springs from my navel a lotus, and in that lotus there is born the Four-faced one, and I tell him "Do thou, Great-minded one, create all beings."' -- Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the deities.'

30. On account of the impossibility (of qualification for the madhuvidya, &c.) (Jaimini maintains the non-qualification (of gods, &c.).)

So far it has been proved that also the gods, and so on, are qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. But a further point here presents itself for consideration, viz. whether the gods are qualified or not to undertake those meditations of which they themselves are the objects. The Sutra states as a purvapaksha view held by Jaimini, that they are not so qualified, for the reason that there are no other Adityas, Vasus, and so on, who could be meditated on by the Adityas and Vasus themselves; and that moreover for the Adityas and Vasus the qualities and position of those classes of deities cannot be objects of desire, considering that they possess them already. The so-called Madhuvidya (Ch. Up. III) represents as objects of devout meditation certain parts of the sun which are being enjoyed by the different classes of divine beings, Vasus, Adityas, and so on -- the sun being there called 'madhu.' i.e. honey or nectar, on account of his being the abode of a certain nectar to be brought about by certain sacrificial works to be known from the Rig-veda, and so on; and as the reward of such meditation the text names the attainment of the position of the Vasus, Adityas, and so on.

31. And on account of (meditating on the part of the gods) being in the Light.

'Him the devas meditate upon as the light of lights, as immortal time' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 16). This text declares that the meditation of the gods has for its object the Light, i.e. the highest Brahman. Now this express declaration as to the gods being meditating devotees with regard to meditations on Brahman which are common to men and gods, implies a denial of the gods being qualified for meditations on other objects. The conclusion therefore is that the Vasus, and so on, are not qualified for meditations on the Vasus and other classes of deities.

32. But Badarayana (maintains) the existence (of qualification); for there is (possibility of such).

The Reverend Badarayana thinks that the Adityas, Vasus, and so on, are also qualified for meditations on divinities. For it is in their case also possible that their attainment of Brahman should be viewed as preceded by their attainment of Vasu-hood or Aditya-hood, in so far, namely, as they meditate on Brahman as abiding within themselves. They may be Vasus and Adityas in the present age of the world, but at the same time be desirous of holding the same position in future ages also. In the Madhuvidya we have to distinguish two sections, concerned respectively with Brahman in its causal and its effected state. The former section, extending from the beginning up to 'when from thence he has risen upwards,' enjoins meditation on Brahman in its condition as effect, i.e. as appearing in the form of creatures such as the Vasus, and so on; while the latter section enjoins meditation on the causal Brahman viewed as abiding within the sun as its inner Self. The purport of the whole vidya is that he who meditates on Brahman in this its twofold form will in a future age of the world enjoy Vasu-hood, and will finally attain Brahman in its causal aspect, i.e. the very highest Brahman. From the fact that the text, 'And indeed to him who thus knows the Brahma-upanishad, the sun does not rise and does not set; for him there is day once and for all,' calls the whole Madhuvidya a 'Brahma' -- upanishad, and that the reward declared is the attainment of Vasu-hood, and so on, leading up to the attainment of Brahman, we clearly are entitled to infer that the meditations which the text enjoins, viz. on the different parts of the sun viewed as objects of enjoyment for the Vasus, and so on, really are meant as meditations on Brahman as abiding in those different forms. Meditation on the Vasus and similar beings is thus seen to be possible for the Vasus themselves. And as Brahman really constitutes the only object of meditation, we also see the appropriateness of the text discussed above, 'On him the gods meditate as the light of lights.' The Vrittikara expresses the same opinion, 'For there is possibility with regard to the Madhu-vidya, and so on, Brahman only being the object of meditation everywhere.' -- Here terminates the adhikarana of 'honey.'

The Sutras now enter on a discussion of the question whether the Sudras also are qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.

The Purvapakshin maintains that they are so qualified; for qualification, he says, depends on want and capacity, and both these are possible in the case of Sudras also. The Sudra is not indeed qualified for any works depending on a knowledge of the sacred fires, for from such knowledge he is debarred; but he possesses qualification for meditation on Brahman, which after all is nothing but a certain mental energy. The only works prerequisite for meditation are those works which are incumbent on a man as a member of a caste or asrama, and these consist, in the Sudra's case, in obedience to the higher castes. And when we read 'therefore the Sudra is not qualified for sacrifices,' the purport of this passage is only to make a confirmatory reference to something already settled by reason, viz. that the Sudra is not qualified for the performance of sacrifices which cannot be accomplished by one not acquainted with the sacred fires (and not to deny the Sudra's competence for devout meditation). -- But how can meditation on Brahman be undertaken by a man who has not studied the Vedas, inclusive of the Vedanta, and hence knows nothing about the nature of Brahman and the proper modes of meditation? -- Those also, we reply, who do not study Veda and Vedanta may acquire the requisite knowledge by hearing Itihasas and Puranas; and there are texts which allow Sudras to become acquainted with texts of that kind; cp. e.g. 'one is to make the four castes to hear texts, the Brahmana coming first.' Moreover, those Puranas and Itihasas make mention of Sudras, such as Vidura, who had a knowledge of Brahman. And the Upanishads themselves, viz. in the so-called Samvarga-vidya, show that a Sudra is qualified for the knowledge of Brahman; for there the teacher Raikva addresses Janasruti, who wishes to learn from him, as Sudra, and thereupon instructs him in the knowledge of Brahman (Ch. Up. IV, 2, 3). All this proves that Sudras also have a claim to the knowledge of Brahman.

This conclusion we deny, on the ground of the absence of capability. It is impossible that the capability of performing meditations on Brahman should belong to a person not knowing the nature of Brahman and the due modes of meditation, and not qualified by the knowledge of the requisite preliminaries of such meditation, viz. recitation of the Veda, sacrifices, and so on. Mere want or desire does not impart qualification to a person destitute of the required capability. And this absence of capability is due, in the Sudra's case, to absence of legitimate study of the Veda. The injunctions of sacrificial works naturally connect themselves with the knowledge and the means of knowledge (i.e. religious ceremonies and the like) that belong to the three higher castes, for these castes actually possess the knowledge (required for the sacrifices), owing to their studying the Veda in agreement with the injunction which prescribes such study for the higher castes; the same injunctions do not, on the other hand, connect themselves with the knowledge and means of knowledge belonging to others (than members of the three higher castes). And the same naturally holds good with regard to the injunctions of meditation on Brahman. And as thus only such knowledge as is acquired by study prompted by the Vedic injunction of study supplies a means for meditation on Brahman, it follows that the Sudra for whom that injunction is not meant is incapable of such meditation. Itihasas and Puranas hold the position of being helpful means towards meditation in so far only as they confirm or support the Veda, not independently of the Veda. And that Sudras are allowed to hear Itihasas and Puranas is meant only for the end of destroying their sins, not to prepare them for meditation on Brahman. The case of Vidura and other Sudras having been 'founded on Brahman,' explains itself as follows: -- Owing to the effect of former actions, which had not yet worked themselves out, they were born in a low caste, while at the same time they possessed wisdom owing to the fact that the knowledge acquired by them in former births had not yet quite vanished.

(On these general grounds we object to Sudras being viewed as qualified for meditation on Brahman.) The Sutra now refutes that argument, which the Purvapakshin derives from the use of the word 'Sudra' in the Samvarga-vidya.

33. (That) grief of him (arose), this is intimated by his (Janasruti's) resorting to him (Raikva) on hearing a disrespectful speech about himself.

From what the text says about Janasruti Pautrayana having been taunted by a flamingo for his want of knowledge of Brahman, and having thereupon resorted to Raikva, who possessed the knowledge of Brahman, it appears that sorrow (suk) had taken possession of him; and it is with a view to this that Raikva addresses him as Sudra. For the word Sudra, etymologically considered, means one who grieves or sorrows (sokati). The appellation 'sudra' therefore refers to his sorrow, not to his being a member of the fourth caste. This clearly appears from a consideration of the whole story. Janasruti Pautrayana was a very liberal and pious king. Being much pleased with his virtuous life, and wishing to rouse in him the desire of knowing Brahman, two noble-minded beings, assuming the shape of flamingoes, flew past him at night time, when one of them addressed the other, 'O Bhallaksha. the light of Janasruti has spread like the sky; do not go near that it may not burn thee.' To this praise of Janasruti the other flamingo replied, 'How can you speak of him, being what he is, as if he were Raikva "sayuktvan"?' i.e. 'how can you speak of Janasruti, being what he is, as if he were Raikva, who knows Brahman and is endowed with the most eminent qualities? Raikva, who knows Brahman, alone in this world is truly eminent. Janasruti may be very pious, but as he does not know Brahman what quality of his could produce splendour capable of burning me like the splendour of Raikva?' The former flamingo thereupon asks who that Raikva is, and its companion replies, 'He in whose work and knowledge there are comprised all the works done by good men and all the knowledge belonging to intelligent creatures, that is Raikva.' Janasruti, having heard this speech of the flamingo -- which implied a reproach to himself as being destitute of the knowledge of Brahman, and a glorification of Raikva as possessing that knowledge -- at once sends his door-keeper to look for Raikva; and when the door-keeper finds him and brings word, the king himself repairs to him with six hundred cows, a golden necklace, and a carriage yoked with mules, and asks him to teach him the deity on which he meditates, i.e. the highest deity. Raikva, who through the might of his Yoga-knowledge is acquainted with everything that passes in the three worlds, at once perceives that Janasruti is inwardly grieved at the slighting speech of the flamingo, which had been provoked by the king's want of knowledge of Brahman, and is now making an effort due to the wish of knowing Brahman; and thus recognises that the king is fit for the reception of that knowledge. Reflecting thereupon that a knowledge of Brahman may be firmly established in this pupil even without long attendance on the teacher if only he will be liberal to the teacher to the utmost of his capability, he addresses him: 'Do thou take away (apahara) (these things), O Sudra; keep (the chariot) with the cows for thyself.' What he means to say is, 'By so much only in the way of gifts bestowed on me, the knowledge of Brahman cannot be established in thee, who, through the desire for such knowledge, art plunged in grief' -- the address 'O Sudra' intimating that Raikva knows Janasruti to be plunged in grief, and on that account fit to receive instruction about Brahman. Janasruti thereupon approaches Raikva for a second time, bringing as much wealth as he possibly can, and moreover his own daughter. Raikva again intimates his view of the pupil's fitness for receiving instruction by addressing him a second time as 'Sudra,' and says, 'You have brought these, O Sudra; by this mouth only you made me speak,' i.e. 'You now have brought presents to the utmost of your capability; by this means only you will induce me, without lengthy service on your part, to utter speech containing that instruction about Brahman which you desire.' -- Having said this he begins to instruct him. -- We thus see that the appellation 'sudra' is meant to intimate the grief of Janasruti -- which grief in its turn indicates the king's fitness for receiving instruction; and is not meant to declare that Janasruti belongs to the lowest caste.

34. And on account of (Janasruti ) kshattriya-hood being understood.

The first section of the vidya tells us that Janasruti bestowed much wealth and food; later on he is represented as sending his door-keeper on an errand; and in the end, as bestowing on Raikva many villages -- which shows him to be a territorial lord. All these circumstances suggest Janasruti's being a Kshattriya, and hence not a member of the lowest caste. -- The above Sutra having declared that the kshattriya-hood of Janasruti is indicated in the introductory legend, the next Sutra shows that the same circumstance is indicated in the concluding legend.

35. On account of the inferential sign further on, together with Kaitraratha.

The kshattriya-hood of Janasruti is further to be accepted on account of the Kshattriya Abhipratarin Kaitraratha, who is mentioned further on in this very same Samvargavidya which Raikva imparts to Janasruti. -- But why? -- As follows. The section beginning 'Once a Brahmakarin begged of Saunaka Kapeya and Abhipratarin Kakshaseni while being waited on at their meal,' and ending 'thus do we, O Brahmakarin, meditate on that being,' shows Kapeya, Abhipratarin, and the Brahmakarin to be connected with the Samvarga-vidya. Now Abhipratarin is a Kshattriya, the other two are Brahmanas. This shows that there are connected with the vidya, Brahmanas, and from among non-Brahmanas, a Kshattriya only, but not a Sudra. It therefore appears appropriate to infer that the person, other than the Brahmana Raikva, who is likewise connected with this vidya, viz. Janasruti, is likewise a Kshattriya, not a Sudra. -- But how do we know that Abhipratarin is a Kaitraratha and a Kshattriya? Neither of these circumstances is stated in the legend in the Samvarga-vidya! To this question the Sutra replies, 'on account of the inferential mark.' From the inferential mark that Saunaka Kapeya and Abhipratarin Kakshaseni are said to have been sitting together at a meal we understand that there is some connexion between Abhipratarin and the Kapeyas. Now another scriptural passage runs as follows: 'The Kapeyas made Kaitraratha perform that sacrifice' (Tand Bra. XX, 12, 5), and this shows that one connected with the Kapeyas was a Kaitraratha; and a further text shows that a Kaitraratha is a Kshattriya. 'from him there was descended a Kaitraratha who was a prince.' All this favours the inference that Abhipratarin was a Kaitraratha and a Kshattriya.

So far the Sutras have shown that there is no inferential mark to prove what is contradicted by reasoning, viz. the qualification of the Sudras. The next Sutra declares that the non-qualification of the Sudra proved by reasoning is confirmed by Scripture and Smriti.

36. On account of the reference to ceremonial purifications, and on account of the declaration of their absence.

In sections the purport of which is to give instruction about Brahman the ceremony of initiation is referred to, 'I will initiate you; he initiated him' (Ch. Up. IV, 4). And at the same time the absence of such ceremonies in the case of Sudras is stated: 'In the Sudra there is not any sin, and he is not fit for any ceremony' (Manu X, 126); and 'The fourth caste is once born, and not fit for any ceremony' (Manu X, 4).

37. And on account of the procedure, on the ascertainment of the non- being of that.

That a Sudra is not qualified for knowledge of Brahman appears from that fact also that as soon as Gautama has convinced himself that Jabala, who wishes to become his pupil, is not a Sudra, he proceeds to teach him the knowledge of Brahman.

38. And on account of the prohibition of hearing, studying, and performance of (Vedic) matter.

The Sudra is specially forbidden to hear and study the Veda and to perform the things enjoined in it. 'For a Sudra is like a cemetery, therefore the Veda must not be read in the vicinity of a Sudra;' 'Therefore the Sudra is like a beast, unfit for sacrifices.' And he who does not hear the Veda recited cannot learn it so as to understand and perform what the Veda enjoins. The prohibition of hearing thus implies the prohibition of understanding and whatever depends on it.

39. And on account of Smriti.

Smriti also declares this prohibition of hearing, and so on. 'The ears of him who hears the Veda are to be filled with molten lead and lac; if he pronounces it his tongue is to be slit; if he preserves it his body is to be cut through.' And 'He is not to teach him sacred duties or vows. ' -- It is thus a settled matter that the Sudras are not qualified for meditations on Brahman.

We must here point out that the non-qualification of Sudras for the cognition of Brahman can in no way be asserted by those who hold that a Brahman consisting of pure non-differenced intelligence constitutes the sole reality; that everything else is false; that all bondage is unreal; that such bondage may be put an end to by the mere cognition of the true nature of Reality -- such cognition resulting from the hearing of certain texts; and that the cessation of bondage thus effected constitutes final Release. For knowledge of the true nature of Reality, in the sense indicated, and the release resulting from it, may be secured by any one who learns from another person that Brahman alone is real and that everything else is falsely superimposed on Brahman. That the cognition of such truth can be arrived at only on the basis of certain Vedic texts, such as 'Thou art that,' is a restriction which does not admit of proof; for knowledge of the truth does not depend on man's choice, and at once springs up in the mind even of an unwilling man as soon as the conditions for such origination are present. Nor can it be proved in any way that bondage can be put an end to only through such knowledge of the truth as springs from Vedic texts; for error comes to an end through the knowledge of the true nature of things, whatever agency may give rise to such knowledge. True knowledge, of the kind described, will spring up in the mind of a man as soon as he hears the non-scriptural declaration, 'Brahman, consisting of non-differenced intelligence, is the sole

Reality; everything else is false,' and this will suffice to free him from error. When a competent and trustworthy person asserts that what was mistaken for silver is merely a sparkling shell, the error of a Sudra no less than of a Brahmana comes to an end; in the same way a Sudra also will free himself from the great cosmic error as soon as the knowledge of the true nature of things has arisen in his mind through a statement resting on the traditional lore of men knowing the Veda. Nor must you object to this on the ground that men knowing the Veda do not instruct Sudras, and so on, because the text, 'he is not to teach him sacred things,' forbids them to do so; for men who have once learned -- from texts such as 'Thou art that' -- that Brahman is their Self, and thus are standing on the very top of the Veda as it were, move no longer in the sphere of those to whom injunctions and prohibitions apply, and the prohibition quoted does not therefore touch them. Knowledge of Brahman may thus spring up in the mind of Sudras and the like, owing to instruction received from one of those men who have passed beyond all prohibition. Nor must it be said that the instance of the shell and the silver is not analogous, in so far, namely, as the error with regard to silver in the shell comes to an end as soon as the true state of things is declared; while the great cosmic error that clouds the Sudra's mind does not come to an end as soon as, from the teaching of another man, he learns the truth about Reality. For the case of the Sudra does not herein differ from that of the Brahmana; the latter also does not at once free himself from the cosmic error. Nor again will it avail to plead that the sacred texts originate the demanded final cognition in the mind of the Brahmana as soon as meditation has dispelled the obstructive imagination of plurality; for in the same way, i.e. helped by meditation, the non-Vedic instruction given by another person produces the required cognition in the mind of the Sudra. For meditation means nothing but a steady consideration of the sense which sentences declaratory of the unity of Brahman and the Self may convey, and the effect of such meditation is to destroy all impressions opposed to such unity; you yourself thus admit that the injunction of meditation aims at something visible (i.e. an effect that can be definitely assigned, whence it follows that the Sudra also is qualified for it, while he would not be qualified for an activity having an 'adrishta,' i.e. supersensuous, transcendental effect). The recital of the text of the Veda also and the like (are not indispensable means for bringing about cognition of Brahman, but) merely subserve the origination of the _desire_ of knowledge. The desire of knowledge may arise in a Sudra also (viz. in some other way), and thereupon real knowledge may result from non-Vedic instruction, obstructive imaginations having previously been destroyed by meditation. And thus in his case also non-real bondage will come to an end. -- The same conclusion may also be arrived at by a different road. The mere ordinary instruments of knowledge, viz. perception and inference assisted by reasoning, may suggest to the Sudra the theory that there is an inward Reality constituted by non-differenced self- luminous intelligence, that this inward principle witnesses Nescience, and that owing to Nescience the entire apparent world, with its manifold distinctions of knowing subjects and objects of knowledge, is superimposed upon the inner Reality. He may thereupon, by uninterrupted meditation on this inner Reality, free himself from all imaginations opposed to it, arrive at the intuitive knowledge of the inner principle, and thus obtain final release. And this way being open to release, there is really no use to be discerned in the Vedanta-texts, suggesting as they clearly do the entirely false view that the real being (is not absolutely homogeneous intelligence, but) possesses infinite transcendent attributes, being endowed with manifold powers, connected with manifold creations, and so on. In this way the qualification of Sudras for the knowledge of Brahman is perfectly clear. And as the knowledge of Brahman may be reached in this way not only by Sudras but also by Brahmanas and members of the other higher castes, the poor Upanishad is practically defunct. -- To this the following objection will possibly be raised. Man being implicated in and confused by the beginningless course of mundane existence, requires to receive from somewhere a suggestion as to this empirical world being a mere error and the Reality being something quite different, and thus only there arises in him a desire to enter on an enquiry, proceeding by means of perception, and so on. Now that which gives the required suggestion is the Veda, and hence we cannot do without it. -- But this objection is not valid. For in the minds of those who are awed by all the dangers and troubles of existence, the desire to enter on a philosophical investigation of Reality, proceeding by means of Perception and Inference, springs up quite apart from the Veda, owing to the observation that there are various sects of philosophers. Sankhyas, and so on, who make it their business to carry on such investigations. And when such desire is once roused, Perception and Inference alone (in the way allowed by the Sankaras themselves) lead on to the theory that the only Reality is intelligence eternal, pure, self-luminous, non-dual, non- changing, and that everything else is fictitiously superimposed thereon. That this self-luminous Reality possesses no other attribute to be learned from scripture is admitted; for according to your opinion also scripture sublates everything that is not Brahman and merely superimposed on it. Nor should it be said that we must have recourse to the Upanishads for the purpose of establishing that the Real found in the way of perception and inference is at the same time of the nature of bliss; for the merely and absolutely Intelligent is seen of itself to be of that nature, since it is different from everything that is not of that nature. -- There are, on the other hand, those who hold that the knowledge which the Vedanta-texts enjoin as the means of Release is of the nature of devout meditation; that such meditation has the effect of winning the love of the supreme Spirit and is to be learned from scripture only; that the injunctions of meditation refer to such knowledge only as springs from the legitimate study of the Veda on the part of a man duly purified by initiation and other ceremonies, and is assisted by the seven means (see above, p. 17); and that the supreme Person pleased by such meditation bestows on the devotee knowledge of his own true nature, dissolves thereby the Nescience springing from works, and thus releases him from bondage. And on this view the proof of the non-qualification of the Sudra, as given in the preceding Sutras, holds good. -- Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the exclusion of the Sudras.'

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