VEDANTA-SUTRAS WITH RAMANUJA'S SRÎBHASHYA 13 страница

Consider the following point also. Does the Lord produce his effects, with his body or apart from his body? Not the latter; for we do not observe causal agency on the part of any bodiless being: even the activities of the internal organ are found only in beings having a body, and although the internal organ be eternal we do not know of its producing any effects in the case of released disembodied souls. Nor again is the former alternative admissible; for in that case the Lord's body would either be permanent or non-permanent. The former alternative would imply that something made up of parts is eternal; and if we once admit this we may as well admit that the world itself is eternal, and then there is no reason to infer a Lord. And the latter alternative is inadmissible because in that case there would be no cause of the body, different from it (which would account for the origination of the body). Nor could the Lord himself be assumed as the cause of the body, since a bodiless being cannot be the cause of a body. Nor could it be maintained that the Lord can be assumed to be 'embodied' by means of some other body; for this leads us into a _regressus in infinitum._ -- Should we, moreover, represent to ourselves the Lord (when productive) as engaged in effort or not? -- The former is inadmissible, because he is without a body. And the latter alternative is excluded because a being not making an effort does not produce effects. And if it be said that the effect, i. e. the world, has for its causal agent one whose activity consists in mere desire, this would be to ascribe to the subject of the conclusion (i.e. the world) qualities not known from experience; and moreover the attribute to be proved would be absent in the case of the proving instances (such as jars, &c., which are not the work of agents engaged in mere wishing). Thus the inference of a creative Lord which claims to be in agreement with observation is refuted by reasoning which itself is in agreement with observation, and we hence conclude that Scripture is the only source of knowledge with regard to a supreme soul that is the Lord of all and constitutes the highest Brahman. What Scripture tells us of is a being which comprehends within itself infinite, altogether unsurpassable excellences such as omnipotence and so on, is antagonistic to all evil, and totally different in character from whatever is cognised by the other means of knowledge: that to such a being there should attach even the slightest imperfection due to its similarity in nature to the things known by the ordinary means of knowledge, is thus altogether excluded. -- The Purvapakshin had remarked that the oneness of the instrumental and the material cause is neither matter of observation nor capable of proof, and that the same holds good with regard to the theory that certain non-composite substances such as ether are created things; that these points also are in no way contrary to reason, we shall show later on under Su. I, 4, 23, and Su. II, 3, 1.

The conclusion meanwhile is that, since Brahman does not fall within the sphere of the other means of knowledge, and is the topic of Scripture only, the text 'from whence these creatures,' &c., _does_ give authoritative information as to a Brahman possessing the characteristic qualities so often enumerated. Here terminates the adhikarana of 'Scripture being the source.'

A new objection here presents itself. -- Brahman does not indeed fall within the province of the other means of knowledge; but all the same Scripture does not give authoritative information regarding it: for Brahman is not something that has for its purport activity or cessation from activity, but is something fully established and accomplished within itself. -- To this objection the following Sutra replies.

[FOOTNOTE 168:1. A certain potter may not possess the skill and knowledge required to make chairs and beds; but some other potter may possess both, and so on. We cannot therefore point to any definite want of skill and knowledge as invariably accompanying the capability of producing effects of some other kind.]

4. But that (i.e. the authoritativeness of Scripture with regard to Brahman) exists on account of the connexion (of Scripture with the highest aim of man).

The word 'but' is meant to rebut the objection raised. _That_, i.e. the authoritativeness of Scripture with regard to Brahman, is possible, on account of samanvaya, i.e. connexion with the highest aim of man -- that is to say because the scriptural texts are connected with, i.e. have for their subject, Brahman, which constitutes the highest aim of man. For such is the connected meaning of the whole aggregate of words which constitutes the Upanishads -- 'That from whence these beings are born'(Taitt. Up. III, 1, 1). 'Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second' (Ch. Up. VI, 2), &c. &c. And of aggregates of words which are capable of giving information about accomplished things known through the ordinary means of ascertaining the meaning of words, and which connectedly refer to a Brahman which is the cause of the origination, subsistence, and destruction of the entire world, is antagonistic to all imperfection and so on, we have no right to say that, owing to the absence of a purport in the form of activity or cessation of activity, they really refer to something other than Brahman.

For all instruments of knowledge have their end in determining the knowledge of their own special objects: their action does not adapt itself to a final purpose, but the latter rather adapts itself to the means of knowledge. Nor is it true that where there is no connexion with activity or cessation of activity all aim is absent; for in such cases we observe connexion with what constitutes the general aim, i.e. the benefit of man. Statements of accomplished matter of fact -- such as 'a son is born to thee.' 'This is no snake' -- evidently have an aim, viz. in so far as they either give rise to joy or remove pain and fear.

Against this view the Purvapakshin now argues as follows. The Vedanta- texts do not impart knowledge of Brahman; for unless related to activity or the cessation of activity, Scripture would be unmeaning, devoid of all purpose. Perception and the other means of knowledge indeed have their aim and end in supplying knowledge of the nature of accomplished things and facts; Scripture, on the other hand, must be supposed to aim at some practical purpose. For neither in ordinary speech nor in the Veda do we ever observe the employment of sentences devoid of a practical purpose: the employment of sentences not having such a purpose is in fact impossible. And what constitutes such purpose is the attainment of a desired, or the avoidance of a non-desired object, to be effected by some action or abstention from action. 'Let a man desirous of wealth attach himself to the court of a prince'; 'a man with a weak digestion must not drink much water'; 'let him who is desirous of the heavenly world offer sacrifices'; and so on. With regard to the assertion that such sentences also as refer to accomplished things -- 'a son is born to thee' and so on -- are connected with certain aims of man,

viz. joy or the cessation of fear, we ask whether in such cases the attainment of man's purpose results from the thing or fact itself, as e. g. the birth of a son, or from the knowledge of that thing or fact. -- You will reply that as a thing although actually existing is of no use to man as long as it is not known to him, man's purpose is accomplished by his knowledge of the thing. -- It then appears, we rejoin, that man's purpose is effected through mere knowledge, even if there is no actual thing; and from this it follows that Scripture, although connected with certain aims, is not a means of knowledge for the actual existence of things. In all cases, therefore, sentences have a practical purpose; they determine either some form of activity or cessation from activity, or else some form of knowledge. No sentence, therefore, can have for its purport an accomplished thing, and hence the Vedanta-texts do not convey the knowledge of Brahman as such an accomplished entity.

At this point somebody propounds the following view. The Vedanta-texts _are_ an authoritative means for the cognition of Brahman, because as a matter of fact they also aim at something to be done. What they really mean to teach is that Brahman, which in itself is pure homogeneous knowledge, without a second, not connected with a world, but is, owing to beginningless Nescience, viewed as connected with a world, should be freed from this connexion. And it is through this process of dissolution of the world that Brahman becomes the object of an injunction. -- But which texts embody this injunction, according to which Brahman in its pure form is to be realised through the dissolution of this apparent world with its distinction of knowing subjects and objects of knowledge? -- Texts such as the following: 'One should not see (i. e. represent to oneself) the seer of seeing, one should not think the thinker of thinking' (Bri. Up. III, 4, 2); for this means that we should realise Brahman in the form of pure Seeing (knowledge), free from the distinction of seeing agents and objects of sight. Brahman is indeed accomplished through itself, but all the same it may constitute an object to be accomplished, viz. in so far as it is being disengaged from the apparent world.

This view (the Mîmamsaka rejoins) is unfounded. He who maintains that injunction constitutes the meaning of sentences must be able to assign the injunction itself, the qualification of the person to whom the injunction is addressed, the object of the injunction, the means to carry it out, the special mode of the procedure, and the person carrying out the injunction. Among these things the qualification of the person to whom the injunction addresses itself is something not to be enjoined (but existing previously to the injunction), and is of the nature either of cause (nimitta) or a result aimed at (phala). We then have to decide what, in the case under discussion (i.e. the alleged injunction set forth by the antagonist), constitutes the qualification of the person to whom the injunction addresses itself, and whether it be of the nature of a cause or of a result. -- Let it then be said that what constitutes the qualification in our case is the intuition of the true nature of Brahman (on the part of the person to whom the injunction is addressed). -- This, we rejoin, cannot be a cause, as it is not something previously established; while in other cases the nimitta is something so established, as e.g. 'life' is in the case of a person to whom the following injunction is addressed, 'As long as his life lasts he is to make the Agnihotra-oblation.' And if, after all, it were admitted to be a cause, it would follow that, as the intuition of the true nature of Brahman is something permanent, the object of the injunction would have to be accomplished even subsequently to final release, in the same way as the Agnihotra has to be performed permanently as long as life lasts. -- Nor again can the intuition of Brahman's true nature be a result; for then, being the result of an action enjoined, it would be something non- permanent, like the heavenly world. -- What, in the next place, would be the 'object to be accomplished' of the injunction? You may not reply 'Brahman'; for as Brahman is something permanent it is not something that can be realised, and moreover it is not denoted by a verbal form (such as denote actions that can be accomplished, as e.g. yaga, sacrifice). -- Let it then be said that what is to be realised is Brahman, in so far as free from the world! -- But, we rejoin, even if this be accepted as a thing to be realised, it is not the object (vishaya) of the injunction -- that it cannot be for the second reason just stated -- but its final result (phala). What moreover is, on this last assumption, the thing to be realised -- Brahman, or the cessation of the apparent world? -- Not Brahman; for Brahman is something accomplished, and from your assumption it would follow that it is not eternal. -- Well then, the dissolution of the world! -- Not so, we reply; for then it would not be Brahman that is realised. -- Let it then be said that the dissolution of the world only is the object of the injunction! -- This, too, cannot be, we rejoin; that dissolution is the result (phala) and cannot therefore be the object of the injunction. For the dissolution of the world means final release; and that is the result aimed at. Moreover, if the dissolution of the world is taken as the object of the injunction, that dissolution would follow from the injunction, and the injunction would be carried out by the dissolution of the world; and this would be a case of vicious mutual dependence. -- We further ask -- is the world, which is to be put an end to, false or real? -- If it is false, it is put an end to by knowledge alone, and then the injunction is needless. Should you reply to this that the injunction puts an end to the world in so far as it gives rise to knowledge, we reply that knowledge springs of itself from the texts which declare the highest truth: hence there is no need of additional injunctions. As knowledge of the meaning of those texts sublates the entire false world distinct from Brahman, the injunction itself with all its adjuncts is seen to be something baseless. -- If, on the other hand, the world is true, we ask -- is the injunction, which puts an end to the world, Brahman itself or something different from Brahman? If the former, the world cannot exist at all: for what terminates it, viz. Brahman, is something eternal; and the injunction thus being eternal itself Cannot be accomplished by means of certa n actions. -- Let then the latter alternative be accepted! -- But in that case, the niyoga being something which is accomplished by a set of performances the function of which it is to put an end to the entire world, the performing person himself perishes (with the rest of the world), and the niyoga thus remains without a substrate. And if everything apart from Brahman is put an end to by a performance the function of which it is to put an end to the world, there remains no result to be effected by the niyoga, consequently there is no release.

Further, the dissolution of the world cannot constitute the instrument (karana) in the action enjoined, because no mode of procedure (itikartavyata) can be assigned for the instrument of the niyoga, and unless assisted by a mode of procedure an instrument cannot operate, -- But why is there no 'mode of procedure'? -- For the following reasons. A mode of procedure is either of a positive or a negative kind. If positive, it may be of two kinds, viz. either such as to bring about the instrument or to assist it. Now in our case there is no room for either of these alternatives. Not for the former; for there exists in our case nothing analogous to the stroke of the pestle (which has the manifest effect of separating the rice grains from the husks), whereby the visible effect of the dissolution of the whole world could be brought about. Nor, secondly, is there the possibility of anything assisting the instrument, already existing independently, to bring about its effect; for owing to the existence of such an assisting factor the instrument itself, i.e. the cessation of the apparent world, cannot be established. Nor must you say that it is the cognition of the non-duality of Brahman that brings about the means for the dissolution of the world; for, as we have already explained above, this cognition directly brings about final Release, which is the same as the dissolution of the world, and thus there is nothing left to be effected by special means. -- And if finally the mode of procedure is something purely negative, it can, owing to this its nature, neither bring about nor in any way assist the instrumental cause. From all this it follows that there is no possibility of injunctions having for their object the realisation of Brahman, in so far as free from the world.

Here another prima facie view of the question is set forth. -- It must be admitted that the Vedanta-texts are not means of authoritative knowledge, since they refer to Brahman, which is an accomplished thing (not a thing 'to be accomplished'); nevertheless Brahman itself is established, viz. by means of those passages which enjoin meditation (as something 'to be done'). This is the purport of texts such as the following: 'The Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated upon' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5); 'The Self which is free from sin must be searched out' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Let a man meditate upon him as the Self' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7); 'Let a man meditate upon the Self as his world' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 15). -- These injunctions have meditation for their object, and meditation again is defined by its own object only, so that the injunctive word immediately suggests an object of meditation; and as such an object there presents itself, the 'Self' mentioned in the same sentence. Now there arises the question, What are the characteristics of that Self? and in reply to it there come in texts such as 'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman'; 'Being only this was in the beginning, one without a second.' As these texts give the required special information, they stand in a supplementary relation to the injunctions, and hence are means of right knowledge; and in this way the purport of the Vedanta- texts includes Brahman -- as having a definite place in meditation which is the object of injunction. Texts such as 'One only without a second' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'That is the true, that is the Self (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7); 'There is here not any plurality' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19), teach that there is one Reality only, viz. Brahman, and that everything else is false. And as Perception and the other means of proof, as well as that part of Scripture which refers to action and is based on the view of plurality, convey the notion of plurality, and as there is contradiction between plurality and absolute Unity, we form the conclusion that the idea of plurality arises through beginningless avidya, while absolute Unity alone is real. And thus it is through the injunction of meditation on Brahman -- which has for its result the intuition of Brahman -- that man reaches final release, i.e. becomes one with Brahman, which consists of non-dual intelligence free of all the manifold distinctions that spring from Nescience. Nor is this becoming one with Brahman to be accomplished by the mere cognition of the sense of certain Vedanta-texts; for this is not observed -- the fact rather being that the view of plurality persists even after the cognition of the sense of those texts -- , and, moreover, if it were so, the injunction by Scripture of hearing, reflecting, &c., would be purposeless.

To this reasoning the following objection might be raised. -- We observe that when a man is told that what he is afraid of is not a snake, but only a rope, his fear comes to an end; and as bondage is as unreal as the snake imagined in the rope it also admits of being sublated by knowledge, and may therefore, apart from all injunction, be put an end to by the simple comprehension of the sense of certain texts. If final release were to be brought about by injunctions, it would follow that it is not eternal -- not any more than the heavenly world and the like; while yet its eternity is admitted by every one. Acts of religious merit, moreover (such as are prescribed by injunctions), can only be the causes of certain results in so far as they give rise to a body capable of experiencing those results, and thus necessarily produce the so-called samsara-state (which is opposed to final release, and) which consists in the connexion of the soul with some sort of body, high or low. Release, therefore, is not something to be brought about by acts of religious merit. In agreement herewith Scripture says, 'For the soul as long as it is in the body, there is no release from pleasure and pain; when it is free from the body, then neither pleasure nor pain touch it' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 1). This passage declares that in the state of release, when the soul is freed from the body, it is not touched by either pleasure or pain -- the effects of acts of religious merit or demerit; and from this it follows that the disembodied state is not to be accomplished by acts of religious merit. Nor may it be said that, as other special results are accomplished by special injunctions, so the disembodied state is to be accomplished by the injunction of meditation; for that state is essentially something _not_ to be effected. Thus scriptural texts say, 'The wise man who knows the Self as bodiless among the bodies, as persisting among non-persisting things, as great and all-pervading; he does not grieve' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 22); 'That person is without breath, without internal organ, pure, without contact' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2). -- Release which is a bodiless state is eternal, and cannot therefore be accomplished through meritorious acts.

In agreement herewith Scripture says, 'That which thou seest apart from merit (dharma) and non-merit, from what is done and not done, from what exists and what has to be accomplished -- tell me that' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 14). -- Consider what follows also. When we speak of something being accomplished (effected-sadhya) we mean one of four things, viz. its being originated (utpatti), or obtained (prapti), or modified (vikriti), or in some way or other (often purely ceremonial) made ready or fit (samskriti). Now in neither of these four senses can final Release be said to be accomplished. It cannot be originated, for being Brahman itself it is eternal. It cannot be attained: for Brahman, being the Self, is something eternally attained. It cannot be modified; for that would imply that like sour milk and similar things (which are capable of change) it is non-eternal. Nor finally can it be made 'ready' or 'fit.' A thing is made ready or fit either by the removal of some imperfection or by the addition of some perfection. Now Brahman cannot be freed from any imperfection, for it is eternally faultless; nor can a perfection be added to it, for it is absolutely perfect. Nor can it be improved in the sense in which we speak of improving a mirror, viz. by polishing it; for as it is absolutely changeless it cannot become the object of any action, either of its own or of an outside agent. And, again, actions affecting the body, such as bathing, do not 'purify' the Self (as might possibly be maintained) but only the organ of Egoity (ahamkartri) which is the product of avidya, and connected with the body; it is this same ahamkartri also that enjoys the fruits springing from any action upon the body. Nor must it be said that the Self _is_ the ahamkartri; for the Self rather is that which is conscious of the ahamkartri. This is the teaching of the mantras: 'One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1); 'When he is in union with the body, the senses, and the mind, then wise men call him the Enjoyer' (Ka. Up. I, 3,4); 'The one God, hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self within all beings, watching over all works, dwelling in all beings, the witness, the perceiver, the only one, free from qualities' (Svet. Up. VI, 11); 'He encircled all, bright, bodiless, scatheless, without muscles, pure, untouched by evil' (Îsa. Up. 8). -- All these texts distinguish from the ahamkartri due to Nescience, the true Self, absolutely perfect and pure, free from all change. Release therefore -- which _is_ the Self -- cannot be brought about in any way. -- But, if this is so, what then is the use of the comprehension of the texts? -- It is of use, we reply, in so far as it puts an end to the obstacles in the way of Release. Thus scriptural texts declare: 'You indeed are our father, you who carry us from our ignorance to the other shore' (Pra. Up. VI, 8); 'I have heard from men like you that he who knows the Self overcomes grief. I am in grief. Do, Sir, help me over this grief of mine' (Ch. Up. VII, 1, 3); 'To him whose faults had thus been rubbed out Sanatkumara showed the other bank of Darkness' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2). This shows that what is effected by the comprehension of the meaning of texts is merely the cessation of impediments in the way of Release. This cessation itself, although something effected, is of the nature of that kind of nonexistence which results from the destruction of something existent, and as such does not pass away. -- Texts such as 'He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9); 'Having known him he passes beyond death' (Svet. Up. III,8), declare that Release follows immediately on the cognition of Brahman, and thus negative the intervention of injunctions. -- Nor can it be maintained that Brahman is related to action in so far as constituting the object of the action either of knowledge or of meditation; for scriptural texts deny its being an object in either of these senses. Compare 'Different is this from what is known, and from what is unknown' (Ke. Up. II, 4); 'By whom he knows all this, whereby should he know him?' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'That do thou know as Brahman, not that on which they meditate as being this' (Ke. Up. II, 4). Nor does this view imply that the sacred texts have no object at all; for it is their object to put an end to the view of difference springing from avidya. Scripture does not objectivise Brahman in any definite form, but rather teaches that its true nature is to be non-object, and thereby puts an end to the distinction, fictitiously suggested by Nescience, of knowing subjects, acts of knowledge, and objects of knowledge. Compare the text 'You should not see a seer of seeing, you should not think a thinker of thought,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 4, 2). -- Nor, again, must it be said that, if knowledge alone puts an end to bondage, the injunctions of hearing and so on are purposeless; for their function is to cause the origination of the comprehension of the texts, in so far as they divert from all other alternatives the student who is naturally inclined to yield to distractions. -- Nor, again, can it be maintained that a cessation of bondage through mere knowledge is never observed to take place; for as bondage is something false (unreal) it cannot possibly persist after the rise of knowledge. For the same reason it is a mistake to maintain that the cessation of bondage takes place only after the death of the body. In order that the fear inspired by the imagined snake should come to an end, it is required only that the rope should be recognised as what it is, not that a snake should be destroyed. If the body were something real, its destruction would be necessary; but being apart from Brahman it is unreal. He whose bondage does not come to an end, in him true knowledge has not arisen; this we infer from the effect of such knowledge not being observed in him. Whether the body persist or not, he who has reached true knowledge is released from that very moment. -- The general conclusion of all this is that, as Release is not something to be accomplished by injunctions of meditation, Brahman is not proved to be something standing in a supplementary relation to such injunctions; but is rather proved by (non-injunctory) texts, such as 'Thou art that'; 'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman'; 'This Self is Brahman.'

This view (the holder of the dhyana-vidhi theory rejoins) is untenable; since the cessation of bondage cannot possibly spring from the mere comprehension of the meaning of texts. Even if bondage were something unreal, and therefore capable of sublation by knowledge, yet being something direct, immediate, it could not be sublated by the indirect comprehension of the sense of texts. When a man directly conscious of a snake before him is told by a competent by-stander that it is not a snake but merely a rope, his fear is not dispelled by a mere cognition contrary to that of a snake, and due to the information received; but the information brings about the cessation of his fear in that way that it rouses him to an activity aiming at the direct perception, by means of his senses, of what the thing before him really is. Having at first started back in fear of the imagined snake, he now proceeds to ascertain by means of ocular perception the true nature of the thing, and having accomplished this is freed from fear. It would not be correct to say that in this case words (viz. of the person informing) produce this perceptional knowledge; for words are not a sense-organ, and among the means of knowledge it is the sense-organs only that give rise to direct knowledge. Nor, again, can it be pleaded that in the special case of Vedic texts sentences may give rise to direct knowledge, owing to the fact that the person concerned has cleansed himself of all imperfection through the performance of actions not aiming at immediate results, and has been withdrawn from all outward objects by hearing, reflection, and meditation; for in other cases also, where special impediments in the way of knowledge are being removed, we never observe that the special means of knowledge, such as the sense-organs and so on, operate outside their proper limited sphere. -- Nor, again, can it be maintained that meditation acts as a means helpful towards the comprehension of texts; for this leads to vicious reciprocal dependence -- when the meaning of the texts has been comprehended it becomes the object of meditation; and when meditation has taken place there arises comprehension of the meaning of the texts! -- Nor can it be said that meditation and the comprehension of the meaning of texts have different objects; for if this were so the comprehension of the texts could not be a means helpful towards meditation: meditation on one thing does not give rise to eagerness with regard to another thing! -- For meditation which consists in uninterrupted remembrance of a thing cognised, the cognition of the sense of texts, moreover, forms an indispensable prerequisite; for knowledge of Brahman -- the object of meditation -- cannot originate from any other source. -- Nor can it be said that that knowledge on which meditation is based is produced by one set of texts, while that knowledge which puts an end to the world is produced by such texts as 'thou art that,' and the like. For, we ask, has the former knowledge the same object as the latter, or a different one? On the former alternative we are led to the same vicious reciprocal dependence which we noted above; and on the latter alternative it cannot be shown that meditation gives rise to eagerness with regard to the latter kind of knowledge. Moreover, as meditation presupposes plurality comprising an object of meditation, a meditating subject and so on, it really cannot in any perceptible way be helpful towards the origination of the comprehension of the sense of texts, the object of which is the oneness of a Brahman free from all plurality: he, therefore, who maintains that Nescience comes to an end through the mere comprehension of the meaning of texts really implies that the injunctions of hearing, reflection, and meditation are purposeless.

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