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I take the national Bureau of Asian research PLA Conference Volume2017 under the title:Securing the China Dream. The PLA’s Role in a Time of Reform and Change (РольНОАКвовремяреформиперемен) from which I’ve read thefirst 2chapters. The first chapter isTheI take the national Bureau of Asian research PLA Conference Volume2017 under the title: Securing the China Dream. The PLA’s Role in a Time of Reform and Change (РольНОАКвовремяреформиперемен) from which I’ve read thefirst 2chapters. The first chapter isThe PLA at an Inflection Point(Точкаперегиба). Thefirst chapter assesses the impact of key trends in China’s political and security environment under Xi Jinping on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). To answer the question of where prospective inflection points might lie, authorfocus on distinct developments under Xi that may alter longer-term assumptions and judgments about the PLA’s trajectory. Drawing on discussions at previous meetings of the PLA Conference about internal and external drivers of PLA modernization and evolutions in civil-military relations from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping, author address Xi’s increasing control of the military against the backdrop of China’s changing external security environment. Looking ahead, author consider whether U. S. assessments of China’s military power could reach a turning point. In considering several possible inflection points, this introduction offers a “big picture” framing for the 2017 conference discussions by examining key trends in China’s military power. The secondchapter is World Class: The Logic of China’s Strategy and Global Military Ambitions Xi Jinping’s report to the 19th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) proclaimed a “new era for socialism with Chinese characteristics. ”He framed the new era, however, not only as defined by new conditions but also as the period in which the party’s consistent aim of restoring China’s place in the world will finally be fulfilled. Furthermore, Xi made clear that these ambitions are global, not only regional. The party now promised that China would become “a global leader in terms of composite national strength and international influence” (综 合 国 力 和 国 际 影 响 力 领 先 的 国 家 ) by midcentury. Such aspirations also extended to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which Xi charged to be “fully transformed into world-class forces” (全 面 建 成 世 界 一 流 军 队 ). 3 This chapter argues that to understand what the party’s newly publicized—yet, to date, vaguely specified—long-term goals for its military mean for Washington, it is crucial to understand how the objective of a “world class” military flows from the enduring logic driving the party’s strategy for China throughout its rule. This consistent logic—gleaned from the party’s authoritative, public documents—can be expressed in three points. Each one counters a prevalent cliché about the party’s motivation among Western observers. For each, the 19th Party Congress also heralds a new phase of intensifying rivalry between China and the United States. First, the widespread characterization of the party’s leaders after Mao Zedong as primarily reactive and focused above all on retaining power underplays Beijing’s ambition and continuity of purpose. On the contrary, the party’s highest aim throughout its rule has been to make China a leading, modern country via long-term planning and target-setting. For the PLA in turn, status—not security alone—drives its modernization goals. Second, the common narrative that Beijing traded socialist ideals for economic growth and nationalism as the basis of its legitimacy in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse misses the party’s unswerving portrayal of socialism as the irreplaceable instrument of national salvation. The party’s leaders have consistently seen their governing system as domestically and internationally contested. Finally, a third point flows from the first two. Some observers read China’s ambitions as limited to regional predominance. Yet to achieve “the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, ” the party must obtain not only security for but also recognition of China as a leading country. For Beijing, this means replacing threatening components of the U. S. -led international order with features that instead embrace both China’s socialist system and the country’s status as a global leader. For the PLA, this requires backstopping the party’s efforts to reshape the international order by seizing the initiative in global military competition and taking on more international responsibilities to showcase China’s contributions to humanity.
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